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ARTICLES
REGULATING POLYGAMY:  INTIMACY, DEFAULT RULES,
AND BARGAINING FOR EQUALITY
Adrienne D. Davis*
Most legal scholarship has approached polygamy in one of two ways.
Some have framed it as a constitutional question of religious or privacy
rights; others have debated decriminalization based on the contested effects of
polygamy on matters ranging from women’s subordination to democracy.
This Article shifts attention from the constitutionality and decriminalization
debates to a new set of questions: whether and how polygamy might be effec-
tively recognized and regulated, consistent with contemporary social norms.
The Article begins by describing the diverse stakeholders and critics in the
polygamy debate, including not only religious fundamentalists but also black
nationalists and radical feminists.  Next, the Article refutes the analogy be-
tween gay marriage and polygamy, disputing it as a miscue from what is
legally distinctive about polygamy, its multiplicity.  Unlike gay marriage,
which is typically envisioned to adhere to a two-person marital model, mari-
tal multiplicity both increases the costs of intimate negotiation and compli-
cates it in several ways, including raising questions about how power is bar-
gained for and distributed in marriage.  The Article next contends that other
legal regimes have addressed polygamy’s central conundrum: ensuring fair-
ness and establishing baseline behavior in contexts characterized by multiple
partners, ongoing entrances and exits, and life-defining economic and per-
sonal stakes.  It turns to commercial partnership law to propose some tenta-
tive default rules that might accommodate marital multiplicity, while ad-
dressing some of the costs and power disparities that polygamy has
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engendered.  The Article concludes by showing how theorizing love and com-
mitment beyond heterodyadic marriage sheds light on the debates over recog-
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INTRODUCTION
“Will the polygamy debate ever be the same?”  This is the question
the Salt Lake Tribune posed shortly after the debut of Big Love, the hit
HBO series about a Utah polygamous family gone suburban.1 Big Love, a
star-studded sexual laugh fest, has brought polygamists “out of the com-
pound” as it were, casting them instead as the family next door.2  Some
1. Brooke Adams, ‘Big Love’ Debut:  Will the Polygamy Debate Ever Be the Same?,
Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 12, 2006, at A1.
2. The show premiered with quite a pedigree.  Two-time Oscar winner Tom Hanks is
the producer.  Film stars Bill Paxton, Jeanne Tripplehorn, and Ginnifer Goodwin along
with Oscar nominee and independent film star Chloe Sevigny play the four spouses.
Emerging actresses Amanda Seyfried (Mean Girls) and Tina Majorino (Napoleon Dynamite)
presumably appeal to adolescent viewers while “veteran freaks” Grace Zabriskie and Bruce
Dern round out the older generation.  Joy Press, All In The Family, Village Voice, Feb. 21,
2006, at http://www.villagevoice.com/2006-02-21/screens/all-in-the-family/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing show’s premise and listing stars).
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have even predicted Big Love might do for polygamists what Will & Grace
and Queer Eye for the Straight Guy did for gays:  familiarizing the foreign
and smoothing the way for recognition and real rights.3  In fact, the
highly acclaimed hit series self-consciously invites viewers to consider
analogies between same-sex and polygamous families.  In the show’s
much-anticipated second season, the invitation became more pointed
and persistent, with intermittent references to “coming out,” “closeted
families,” and “the state” as repressively surveilling nonconforming “big
love.”4  Curiously, this gay analogy is popular among both supporters and
detractors of expanded recognition for alternative family structures.  Po-
lygamy’s proponents liken it to same-sex marriage, urging both as equally
legitimate “alternative” lifestyles that should be tolerated and given legal
recognition—plural marriage is “the next civil rights battle” proclaims
Pro-Polygamy.com.5  Meanwhile, opponents of gay marriage liken it to
polygamy, invoking fears of a fast slide down a classically slippery slope.
This Article argues that, while the gay analogy may make for splashy
punditry and good television, it distracts us from what is truly distinctive,
and legally meaningful, about polygamy—namely, its challenges to the
regulatory assumptions inherent in the two-person marital model.
Most legal scholarship approaches polygamy in one of two ways.
Some have framed it as a question of how far constitutional protection for
religious freedom and privacy rights extends, including what we might
think of as “intimacy liberty,” particularly in light of Lawrence v. Texas.6
Others have debated decriminalization, based on the contested effects of
polygamy on matters ranging from women’s subordination, to fraudulent
3. See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text (discussing how television can R
familiarize the foreign, particularly with regard to race relations and acceptance of same-
sex marriage).
4. Big Love premiered on HBO in March 2006.  The second season aired in June 2007.
Episode List for Big Love, IMDb.com, at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0421030/episodes
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
5. Polygamy = Marriage, at http://www.Pro-Polygamy.com (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); see infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text R
(discussing use of analogy between gay and plural marriage by proponents of both).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  Compare Marci A. Hamilton, The First Amendment’s
Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court’s Contemporary Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 81, 99–111 (1994) (decrying Supreme Court’s
hostility to religious freedom as evidenced in nineteenth-century polygamy cases), with
Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:  Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-
Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1593–94 (1997) [hereinafter Strassberg, Distinctions]
(defending nineteenth-century constitutional decisions upholding polygamy bans under
contemporary theoretical frameworks). Sarah Gordon’s important legal history shows how
polygamy emerged as a central constitutional conflict shaping federalism in the nineteenth
century.  See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question:  Polygamy and
Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America 1 (2002) [hereinafter Gordon,
Mormon Question] (describing polygamy debate as “constitutional conflict over the
meaning and scope of liberty and democracy in the United States”).
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behavior, to democracy.7  This Article takes a different approach.  It shifts
attention from the constitutionality and decriminalization debates to a
new set of questions:  whether and how polygamy might be effectively
recognized and regulated, i.e., licensed, consistent with contemporary so-
cial norms.  The Article argues that the gay marriage analogy, invoked on
both the “left” and the “right,” is a red herring, a distraction from the real
challenge polygamy raises for law—how plural marriage transforms the
conventional marital dyad and whether law is up to regulating marital
multiplicity.8  Both of the gay analogies, the slippery slope invocation and
the alternative lifestyles defense, distract us from the fact that polygamy’s
distinctiveness lies not in the spouses’ gender (as is the case for same-sex
marriage) but rather in its departure from the two-person marital model.
Polygamy’s defining feature—marital multiplicity—generates specific
costs and vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities for exploitative and op-
portunistic behavior, some of which we have seen play out in distressing
fashion in recent high-profile conflicts (from Tom Green to Elizabeth
Smart to Warren Jeffs and the raids on his Yearning for Zion compound
in Texas in the spring of 2008).9  (Of course, for some, multiplicity also
generates upsides, which this Article also considers.)  Hence, this Article
7. Compare Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong,
16 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 (2006) (arguing criminalization imposes more harms than
benefits with particular emphasis on minimizing fraud and increasing cooperation among
spouses), with Strassberg, Distinctions, supra note 6, at 1585–93 (urging polygamy harms R
women and is injurious to liberal democratic state).
8. See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage:  Why Same-Sex Marriage Will
Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 Appalachian
J.L. 101, 133 (2006) (“The history of plural marriage . . . reveals a pattern of sexual abuse,
incest, child-brides, poverty, and discrimination against women.  These social policy
concerns do not arise in same-sex unions, but are prevalent in plural lifestyles, revealing
that prohibiting polygamous marriages would be justified notwithstanding the legalization
of same-sex marriages.”); Strassberg, Distinctions, supra note 6, at 1509 (“[M]onogamous R
marriage creates the foundation for a democratic state [which] make[s] it possible to
understand not only why the right to marry should be considered a fundamental right, but
also why polygamy could not be included within a fundamental right to marry and why
same-sex marriage could . . . .”); Elizabeth Larcano, Note, A “Pink” Herring:  The Prospect
of Polygamy Following the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 1065, 1067
(2006) (“Same-sex marriage and polygamy are inherently different.  Sexual orientation
represents an immutable characteristic and same-sex marriage still respects the binary
nature of marriage.  In contrast, polygamists are denied the right to marriage based not on
sex or other impermissible factors, but on the number of people they choose to marry.”);
cf. Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of
Disgust:  A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo,
99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543, 1562 (2005) (“[I]ncest, unlike polygamy or bestiality, is neither a
stable nor a fixed taboo in slippery slope rhetoric.”).
9. See, e.g., Cassiah M. Ward, Note, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives:
Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 Wm. & Mary J.
Women & L. 131, 140 (2004) (noting Elizabeth Smart’s kidnapping and Tom Green’s
polygamy prosecution brought national attention to polygamy); Ralph Blumenthal, Court
Says Texas Illegally Seized Sect’s Children, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2008, at A1 (reporting fate
of children from Warren Jeffs’s sect); Kirk Johnson, Leader of Polygamist Mormon Sect Is
Arrested in Nevada, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2006, at A12 (describing Jeffs’s arrest).
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approaches polygamy as a problem of bargaining, cooperation, strategic
behavior, and the issues they engender.  While analyses of marriage’s fu-
ture have incorporated some attention to polygamy, few legal scholars
have considered polygamy on its own and engaged in detail the regula-
tory challenges it might pose to our current family law system.  Even those
who have considered polygamy explicitly from a bargaining perspective,
such as Gary Becker and Richard Posner, seem to assume it is merely
dyadic marriage multiplied.10
But, is the law up to regulating marital multiplicity?  This Article con-
tends that, in contemplating the design of a plural marriage regime, we
are not starting from scratch.  While conventional family law, with its as-
sumptions of the marital dyad, may not be up to the task, other legal
regimes have addressed polygamy’s central conundrum:  ensuring fair-
ness and establishing baseline behavior in contexts characterized by mul-
tiple partners, ongoing entrances and exits, and life-defining economic
and personal stakes.  In particular, commercial partnership law has ad-
dressed precisely these concerns through a robust set of off-the-rack
rules.  This Article contrasts polygamy with aspects of partnership law to
derive a set of default rules that might accommodate polygamy’s marital
multiplicity, while addressing some of the costs and power disparities that
polygamy has engendered.  The point is not to use partnership law as a
“map,” but rather to make the point that there are already conceptual
models for what might be thought of as plural marital associations.
Of course others have urged the decriminalization of polygamy, but
they have not taken the additional step to contemplate what full regula-
tion might look like.  There are three main possibilities on the intimacy
spectrum.  The first is our current regime, which prohibits and criminal-
10. Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 80–107 (enl. ed. 1991) [hereinafter
Becker, Treatise] (analyzing polygamy and other marriage arrangements in “efficient
‘marriage markets’”); Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 253–60 (1992) (describing how
polygamy affects bargaining power in courtship markets).  Shayna Sigman and Emily
Duncan draw similar conclusions, but limit their analyses to demonstrating the costs of
criminally prohibiting polygamy and urging decriminalization. Sigman, supra note 7, at R
106–07 & n.27 (“This discussion is also a necessary precursor to exploring whether
polygamous relationships should be recognized by the state, which would be a significant
step beyond merely decriminalizing the practice.”); Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects
of Legalizing Polygamy:  “Love Is a Many Splendored Thing,” 15 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y
315, 316 (2008) (“Thus, if there is to be a rational policy in this area, it should consider the
legalization of polygamy, thereby allowing greater regulation of the practice, compelling
polygynous communities to emerge from the shadows, and openly assisting the women and
children who live in them.”).  These studies highlight the difference between
decriminalization and legalization, a distinction elaborated upon at infra notes 97–100 and R
accompanying text.  Miche`le Alexandre has urged limited inheritance rights for de facto
polygamy based on common law marriage, but has not called for recognition of polygamy
itself.  Miche`le Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy:  A Case for Expanding the
American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include De Facto Polygamous Spouses, 64
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1461, 1464 (2007) [hereinafter Alexandre, Lessons] (advocating “that
a redefinition of the concept of the surviving spouse in American estate distribution will
help to legally protect de facto spouses in the inheritance context”).
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izes plural marriage, denying plural unions recognition, although, ironi-
cally, courts often impose recognition in order to prosecute “polygamy.”11
A second possibility, decriminalization, entails lifting prohibitory bans.
Finally, legalization incorporates decriminalization, but also entails some
sort of official recognition, i.e., licensing and positive legal regulation.
Unsurprisingly, those practicing plural intimacy are as diverse in their
regulatory end goals as is the dyadic community.  Some want merely to be
left alone, for the state to stay out of their intimate lives.  Others, perhaps
the majority of adults, want state recognition and its accompanying regu-
lation.12  We see this split most visibly right now in the gay rights move-
ment.  Following these intimacy politics, within the “poly” community
some seek only decriminalization and nonintervention by the state.
Others call for full recognition and licensure, frequently invoking Law-
rence as a strategic step that sets the stage for recognition of plural mar-
riage alongside gay marriage.13  Hence, while a more radical polygamy
may exist outside of movements or desires for legal recognition, this Arti-
cle limits its focus to polygamists seeking formal recognition and licen-
sure, as it is here that the analogy to gay marriage falls apart.  In addition,
other legal scholars have recently analogized marriage and intimacy com-
mitments to business associational models.  Most notably, Cynthia Starnes
and, more recently, Jennifer Drobac and Antony Page, have contended
that conventional state-licensed dyadic marriage should be supplemented
with a private ordering system derived from commercial partnership
norms.14  Martha Ertman’s typology of intimacy and business associations
11. In op-eds urging the unconstitutionality of polygamy bans, legal scholar Jonathan
Turley has pointed out that since we no longer enforce anti-fornication laws, we tolerate
polyamory as long as it does not result in marriage.  In fact, some of the most high-profile
polygamy prosecutions have been against men who did not have more than one marriage
license, but were found to be constructively married or married at common law, and then
prosecuted for polygamy, thus violating their right to sexual freedom.  Jonathan Turley,
Polygamy Laws Expose Our Own Hypocrisy, USA Today, Oct. 3, 2004, at 13A; see also
Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 83 (discussing how proposed nineteenth- R
century bill would have criminalized plural cohabitation prosecution).
12. Throughout this Article I use the terms “recognition” and “regulation”
interchangeably even though I recognize a Foucauldian would radically disagree.
13. Ariela Dubler has pointed out that Lawrence is better analogized to McLaughlin v.
Florida than it is to Loving v. Virginia. McLaughlin decriminalized “fornication” between
intimates of different races, a crucial step on the road to interracial marriage.  Ariela R.
Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas:  Sexual Freedom and the Road to
Marriage, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1165, 1174–75, 1184–87 (2006).
14. See generally Jennifer A. Drobac & Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic
Partnership Act:  Marrying Business Partnership and Family Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 349 (2007)
(exploring “a domestic partnership model based on business partnership law as a vehicle
to better serve modern couples and their families in private relationship ordering”);
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker:  A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67 (1993)
[hereinafter Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker] (proposing marriage
modeled after “contemporary partnership law”); see also Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as
Suckers:  Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1513, 1534–38, 1540–44
(2004) [hereinafter Starnes, Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse] (“Like commercial
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includes polyamorous relationships.15  Larry Ribstein rejects the specific
analogy between marriage and business partnerships, yet still urges a stan-
dard form approach to marriage grounded in commercial law’s develop-
ment of different forms for different types of relationships.16  All of these
insights have moved forward the debate over regulation and recognition
of intimate relationships.  Yet, none of them has contemplated the partic-
ular analogy this Article draws—between the open-ended multiplicity of
polygamy and commercial partnerships and how law can ameliorate the
opportunism and vulnerability that can result.
My approach will appall some and amuse others.  Many will be imme-
diately skeptical of a claim that partnership law, rooted in regulating eco-
nomic interactions in arms-length commercial contexts, can have much
to say about marital interactions, not to mention the extreme gender sub-
ordination and other abuses feared from polygamy.17  Others, those
more familiar with the legal literature on the “economics of intimacy,”
will recognize this Article as joining the scholarly debate on the turn to-
ward private law to conceptualize intimate associations, and the extent to
which what we think of as market norms and the legal logic that regulates
them can have anything to say about sexual interactions, gender injuries,
or distributive justice within the household.18  Hence, the Article rejects
partners, spouses commonly pool their labor, time, and talent to meet responsibilities and
to generate income they expect to share.”).  Others have embraced private ordering more
generally.  See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:  A New
Model for State Policy, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 204, 211–23 (1982) (examining “matrix of options
available to the state in governing marriage,” and analyzing “contractual governance
option”); see also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 481–88 (1998) (examining
“contractual terms regulating behavior during the course of marriage”); Jeffrey Evans
Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 397, 425–26 (1992) [hereinafter
Stake, Mandatory Planning] (urging that state give intimates incentives to enter premarital
agreements).
15. Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:  Bridging the Private/Private Distinction,
36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 123–31 (2001) [hereinafter Ertman, Marriage as a Trade]
(“[T]he LLC’s legal structure might be particularly appropriate in providing a way to
understand polyamorous relationships.”).
16. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 Del. J. Corp. L. 407 (1999)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited] (proposing “Domestic Entity” as
mechanism to fill gaps in marriage standard form); Larry E. Ribstein, A Standard Form
Approach to Same-Sex Marriage, 38 Creighton L. Rev. 309, 317 (2005) [hereinafter
Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach] (discussing “arguments for distinct statutory
standard forms for different types of family relationships”); see also sources cited infra note
18 (describing scholars’ recognition of private law norms used to inform regulation of R
intimate relationships).
17. But see Drobac & Page, supra note 14, at 401–17 (describing how “[d]omestic R
partnership, based on traditional business partnership law, provides a near-perfect
structure”); Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 123–31 (analogizing R
polyamorous relationships to limited liability corporations).
18. I include in this camp the early work by Marjorie Schultz and more recent papers
by Jill Hasday, Martha Ertman, Mary Anne Case, and, to some extent, my own previous
work on slavery.  See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758,
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“romance” as a palliative for bargaining dilemmas in any long-term rela-
tionship.  Still, some, particularly my fellow feminists, might protest that
this Article essentially ignores the issues that lead many to find plural
marriage disturbing and perhaps intrinsically exploitative—its effects on
women and children.19  Yet, in contemplating a default rule structure,
this Article confronts head-on the extent to which the law can ameliorate
the power and bargaining disparities marital multiplicity engenders,
which may actually get right to the heart of our fears.
Finally, some will argue that this Article avoids the real question:
Why should the state continue to privilege certain intimate relationships
at the expense of others?20  While personally I am no particular fan of the
1777–82 (2005) [hereinafter Case, Marriage Licenses] (analogizing marriage licenses and
corporate charters); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex:  An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221, 274–79 (1999) (discussing interplay between contract law
principles and interracial marriage in postbellum southern courts); Adrienne D. Davis,
Roundtable Discussion:  Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 Tex. J. Women & L. 197, 219–20
(2003) (discussing contract law and marriage); Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note
15, at 90 (“Business models offer an attractive alternative to naturalized constructions of R
intimate relations . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic
Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 522–26 (2005) (comparing laws governing lawyer-client
and doctor-patient relationships to those governing intimate relationships); Schultz, supra
note 14, at 219–23 (illustrating usefulness of contract law in marriage context).  Related R
but distinct from the economics of intimacy is the feminist literature on bargaining over
care work.  See, e.g., Joan Williams, Unbending Gender:  Why Family and Work Conflict
and What to Do About It 57 (2000) (“In an ideal-worker/marginalized-caregiver
household, men have the bargaining advantage because they can always walk away with the
chief asset of the family—their ideal worker wage.”); Katharine K. Baker, Supporting
Children, Balancing Lives, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 359, 379–81 (2007) (discussing how courts view
traditional gender marriage roles as a “specializ[ed] contract”); Martha M. Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage:  A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work Through Premarital
Security Agreements, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 17, 21 (1998) [hereinafter Ertman, Commercializing
Marriage] (proposing couples enter into agreements that “would grant the creditor/
homemaker a security interest in marital property to secure compensation for services she
has performed and her foregone opportunities for market participation”); Laura T.
Kessler, The Politics of Care, 23 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 169, 169–70 (2008) (arguing care
work “when practiced by individuals whom the state has historically denied the privilege of
family privacy” can be valuable form of political expression).  See generally Mary Romero,
Unraveling Privilege:  Workers’ Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid Childcare, 76 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1651 (2001) (considering how resistance to bargaining affects market for paid
child care); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 Yale
J.L. & Feminism 81 (1997) (discussing judicial interplay of contract law, home labor, and
marital agreements); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy,
93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 65 (1998) [hereinafter Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts] (arguing for
“equal legal treatment” for home wage labor); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into
Love:  Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 81 (1996) (“By failing to enforce
contracts between spouses providing wages for housework, the law explicitly prohibits
attempts to obtain security for labor on the grounds that bargains in families are
inappropriate to the affections of family life.”).
19. See infra notes 32, 120–122, 127, 232–239 and accompanying text (discussing R
plural marriage and its effects on women and children).
20. In the legal literature, this argument appears in its strongest form in Martha
Fineman’s work.  See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the
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institution of marriage, and indeed in many ways I am an avid anti-gamist,
marriage, like the military, is a dominant and normative institution, with
life-altering formal and informal benefits.  Even during the height of
nineteenth-century women’s activism, only a minority completely con-
demned dyadic marriage or advocated its abolition on the grounds that it
was “bad for women.”21  Instead, they agitated, with a significant degree
of success, for marriage reform, and most contemporary feminists con-
tinue this approach.  Hence, while this Article does not advocate for po-
lygamy, explicitly declining to endorse it as the “next civil rights battle,” it
does attempt to move beyond the polygamy question framed as good ver-
sus bad, disputes between liberalism and pluralism, and decriminalization
versus prohibition, to a pragmatic assessment of whether and how polyg-
amy might be recognized and regulated, consistent with contemporary
norms of equality and fairness in family life.
This Article starts with a brief primer in Part I, summarizing some of
the anthropological, economic, and sociological insights on polygamy.  It
then describes contemporary criticisms of polygamy, as well as the domi-
nant discourses urging it as a lifestyle in the United States, distinguishing
religious fundamentalism from various strains of identitarian pragmatism
and idealism, including two odd bedfellows, feminism and black national-
ism.  Contrary to popular imagination, there are diverse stakeholders in
the polygamy debate.
Part II of this Article focuses on a curious alliance between propo-
nents of polygamy and opponents of same-sex marriage.  It shows how
polygamy’s advocates are increasingly “coming out of the closet” to piggy-
back on the lobbying, legal, and cultural work done to achieve civil rights
for “conventional” sexual minorities, i.e., gays and lesbians.  On the other
hand, those who oppose gay marriage frequently urge that it will open
the door to more intimacy horrors, chief among them, polygamy.  Thus
the gay analogy features prominently in what I will characterize as the
alternative lifestyles defense and the slippery slope invocation.  While the
gay analogy is a compelling one, this Part ends by disputing it as a miscue
from what is legally distinctive about polygamy:  its multiplicity.  Marital
multiplicity both increases the costs of intimate negotiation and compli-
Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995) (criticizing effects of
marriage on legal and political construction of intimate relationships); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 Stan. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 89, 93 (1998) [hereinafter Fineman, Inevitability of Dependency] (criticizing
encouragement of traditional marriage as solution to dependency); Martha L.A. Fineman,
Masking Dependency:  The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2181, 2181
(1995) [hereinafter Fineman, Masking Dependency] (arguing “continued adherence to an
unrealistic and unrepresentative set of assumptions about the family affects the way we
perceive and attempt to solve persistent problems of poverty and social welfare”).  For an
additional perspective, see Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal:  Sex, Politics, and
the Ethics of Queer Life 117 (2000) (describing marriage as a program for privilege).
21. See infra notes 265–268 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century R
calls for marriage reform).
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cates it in several ways, including raising questions about how power is
bargained for and distributed in marriage, and, as long as marriage is
limited to heterosexuals, inevitably then between men and women.
Part III turns to partnership law to propose some tentative default
rules that might accommodate marital multiplicity, while insuring against
some of its historic and ongoing abuses.  This Part starts with a brief re-
counting of how the scholarship on default rules has sought to address
bargaining dilemmas in arms-length contexts, giving particular weight to
the Ayres/Gertner penalty default norm and the notion of sticky versus
slippery default rules.  It then rehearses some proposed defaults for plu-
ral marital associations.  It argues that because both the stakes (intimacy)
and the context (intimacy) make arms-length, self-regarding bargaining
difficult, the rules might incorporate penalty defaults (as information-
forcing devices or to discourage opportunistic behavior) and also be par-
ticularly sticky, to avoid easy contrary negotiations.  Finally, this Part con-
fronts polygamy’s effects on third parties, or its “externalities”:  concerns
that it injures children and encourages fraud against the state.  This Part
contends that sunlight is the best disinfectant against fraud and that, with
regard to children, family law already accommodates intimate multiplic-
ity, or what might be thought of as “de facto” and “serial” polygamy.
As described in Part IV, this Article is inextricably tied to the broader
debate about whether the state should remain in the marriage “business.”
A dominant trend within debates over state recognition of intimate rela-
tions is to analogize marriage and intimacy commitments to business asso-
ciational models, or to turn to private ordering more generally.  The Arti-
cle concludes in this Part by contemplating the significance of
incorporating polygamy into the marriage pantheon for the broader de-
bate over state regulation of intimacy.  It parses the debate over recogni-
tion, abolition, and privatization into what it calls intimacy exceptional-
ism, urging instead a functional approach.  This Article ends by asking, in
effect, how big is our love?
In tackling this subject, several important caveats are in order.  Obvi-
ously, polygamy is a hot button issue, more so since authorities in Texas
argued abuses in plural families justified their summary removal of hun-
dreds of children from the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter Day Saints (FLDS), thus putting front and center the question of
whether the state owes any deference to polygamists’ family and parental
rights.22
Polygamy is also complex, and there is much that this Article will not
address.  Although it is a worldwide practice with a long legal history, this
22. For a discussion of the FLDS controversy, see, e.g., Joshua S. Press, The Uses and
Abuses of Religion in Child Custody Cases:  Parents Outside the Wall of Separation, 84 Ind.
L.J. Supp. 47, 47–48 (2009), at http://www.indianalawjournal.org/articles/84/
84_Press.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Angela Campbell, Bountiful
Voices, 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 183, 222–23 (2009) [hereinafter Campbell, Bountiful Voices]
(discussing FLDS community in Bountiful, British Columbia).
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is not a comparative law piece.  With the exception of considering some
implications of this debate for immigrant families, the Article limits itself
to the discourse and debate over plural marriage in the United States.23
In addition, because the Article focuses on the domestic debate over plu-
ral marriage, it largely restricts its focus to the dominant discourse of po-
lygamy in the United States, family structures of one husband with multi-
ple wives, formally known as polygyny.  Nor does this Article give much
attention to polyamory more generally, because the focus is limited to
bargaining dilemmas engendered by marital relationships in particular.
While Elizabeth Emens has done fascinating work on intimates who are
committed to nonmonogamy, polygamists are better described as em-
bracing “polyfidelity.”24  Relatedly, while it uses the terms polygamy and
plural marriage interchangeably, this Article rejects the term “monog-
amy” as suggesting a false dichotomy between conventional and plural
marriage.  As the widespread rejection of covenant marriage reinforces,
when put to the test, the vast majority of marital practitioners believe law
should permit more than one spouse, albeit serially instead of simultane-
ously.25  In addition, very few advocate criminal prosecutions for adultery.
23. There has been interesting comparative work on polygamy recently.  Comparative
feminists like Miche`le Alexandre and Adrien Wing have urged a more global and
comparative approach.  Miche`le Alexandre, Big Love:  Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron
or a True Possibility?, 18 Hastings Women’s L.J. 3, 6 (2007) [hereinafter Alexandre, Big
Love] (urging reform of Muslim marital law and polygamy as consistent with Islamic
jurisprudence); Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia
to Black America:  Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First
Century, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 811, 844–62 (2001) (describing discussions with
plural wives in southern Africa, Britain, and United States); see also Sigman, supra note 7, R
at 144–66 (offering fascinating digestion of comparative literature on polygamy).  For an
excellent comparative text, see David Pearl & Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law 237–78
(3d ed. 1998) (summarizing legal status of polygamy in traditional Muslim law, South Asia,
and Britain).
24. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law:  Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 283, 308 (2004) (“Polyamory is a lifestyle
embraced by a minority of individuals who exhibit a wide variety of relationship models
and who articulate an ethical vision that I understand to encompass five main principles:
self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and privileging love and sex over
other emotions and activities such as jealousy.”).  Emens describes polyfidelity as “a
sexually exclusive model analytically distinct from monogamous relationships primarily in
the number of the participants.”  Id. at 308–09; see also Julie Dunfey, “Living the Principle”
of Plural Marriage:  Mormon Women, Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 Feminist Stud. 523, 532 (1984) (linking polygamy historically to the “social
control of sex, specifically identifying sex with procreation, and by containing the
troubling potential of the erotic,” which is the conceptual opposite of polyamory);
Christian Klesse, Polyamory and Its ‘Others’:  Contesting the Terms of Non-Monogamy, 9
Sexualities 565, 566–67 (2006) (exploring boundaries of polyamory as contested within
polygamy movement and urging more pluralistic sexual definition); Maura Strassberg, The
Crime of Polygamy, 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353, 413 (2003) [hereinafter
Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy] (defining polyfidelity as sexually exclusive to group).
25. For description and discussion of covenant marriage, see infra notes 180, 188, and R
accompanying text.
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Hence, the Article uses the term dyadic marriage, or occasionally conven-
tional marriage, to characterize the current marital legal regime.
I. A POLYGAMY PRIMER
Despite its intermittent, and inevitably splashy, eruption into the
news cycle, most Americans know very little about polygamy.  This first
Part offers a brief introduction to marital multiplicity, proffering some
basic demographics and then focusing on the diversity of groups who en-
dorse and oppose it.
While currently a global “hot button” issue, many cultures have long
accommodated polygamy, overwhelmingly between a single husband
married to multiple wives, or what is termed “polygyny.”  Polygamy, or
group or plural marriage, is the gender-neutral term for marriages with
multiple spouses, regardless of the gender combination.  In seventy-eight
percent of cultures, plural marriage is practiced as polygyny.26  The con-
verse, polyandry, or one wife with multiple husbands, is far less com-
mon.27  Interestingly, contra the notion that polyandry is the feminist’s
answer to polygyny, “male dominance is a characteristic of polyandrous
societies as well.”28  Finally, only a few cultures seem to support the gen-
26. The vast majority of the roughly one hundred thousand practicing polygamists in
the United States are polygynists.  See infra note 33 and accompanying text; see also R
Miriam Koktvedgaard Zeitzen, Polygamy:  A Cross-Cultural Analysis 28–29, 33–36 (2008)
(classifying societies on a polygamy continuum and summarizing polygamy in the major
world religions); Melvin Ember et al., Comparing Explanations of Polygyny, 41 Cross-
Cultural Res. 428 (2007) (exploring variables that predict polygyny).
27. Polyandry is confined primarily to the Himalayan regions of South Asia and other
regions where living conditions are sufficiently harsh that men hope to obtain a fraction of
a wife in a time sharing mechanism, when the total number of wives a man could afford to
support is less than one.  Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 109–13 (discussing history and R
potential causes of polyandry in India).  Polyandry is counterintuitive because paternity is
difficult, if not impossible, to establish.  In much of the Himalayas, polyandry is largely
fraternal, practiced typically among brothers who share a father.  Id. at 113; see Melvyn C.
Goldstein & Cynthia M. Beall, Tibetan Fraternal Polyandry and Sociology:  A Rejoinder to
Abernathy and Fernandez, 84 Am. Anthropologist 898, 901 (1982) (arguing fraternal
polyandry is “result of social, political, and economic factors operating in the context of a
particular kind of encapsulated environment which motivated younger brothers to
relinquish a portion of their reproductive potential to obtain and maintain other, more
valued, sociocultural ends” (citation omitted)); see also Melvyn C. Goldstein, Pahari and
Tibetan Polyandry Revisited, 17 Ethnology 325, 325 (1978) (arguing similarities among
polyandrous groups have obscured “significant and . . . fundamental differences”).
Polyandry is sufficiently rare that Zeitzen speculates that “[p]olyandry’s only hope for the
future . . . is when it becomes a religious, political or nationalistic symbol, which may then
be practised for quite different reasons than it may originally have been.”  Zeitzen, supra
note 26, at 182. R
28. Sigman, supra note 7, at 162.  Sigman relates: R
While polygyny may be oppressive to women, this effect is not precisely because
men can marry many women, while women may only marry one man.  If this were
the case, then polyandrous communities would be subjugating of men.  But the
reality is that the few existing polyandrous societies are as oppressive to women as
any other polygamous community—if not more so.
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der neutral form, group marriage, i.e., multiple husbands and multiple
wives.29
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have attempted to identify the
factors that give rise to and support plural marriage, particularly in its
polygynous form.  Sociologists, anthropologists, and economists have
considered wealth disparities, religious beliefs, economic options, sex ra-
tios, pathogen stress, agricultural productivity, and rent seeking as influ-
encing marital multiplicity.30  They also have given considerable atten-
tion to polygamy’s effects on fertility, household wealth, individual
health, politics, and democracy.31  And of course, intensely debated is
Id. at 170 (footnotes omitted); see also Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 131–32, 138–44 R
(“Generally, a woman’s social status is not a function of the number of husbands she
has.”).
29. Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 12–14; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text R
(defining polyfidelity as being sexually exclusive to a group).
30. See, e.g., Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Celestial Marriage and Earthly
Rents:  Interests and the Prohibition of Polygamy, 37 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 169, 171–76,
180 (1998) (considering political restriction on polygamy as form of rent seeking); Cynthia
T. Cook, Polygyny:  Did the Africans Get It Right?, 38 J. Black Stud. 232, 234 (2007)
(considering polygamy as adaptive practice in some countries, which has positive effect on
population growth and fertility but is harmful to health and well-being of women and
children); Ember et al., supra note 26, at 437 (finding two main cross-cultural predictors of R
nonsororal polygyny to be high male war mortality for nonstate societies and high
pathogen stress in more densely populated state societies); Eric D. Gould et al., The
Mystery of Monogamy, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 333, 334 (2008) (contending more developed
societies tend to be monogamous, but take account of inequality among women more than
traditional societies that are polygamous); Hanan G. Jacoby, The Economics of Polygyny in
Sub-Saharan Africa:  Female Productivity and the Demand for Wives in Coˆte D’Ivoire, 103
J. Pol. Econ. 938, 939 (1995) (linking polygyny in Africa to agricultural productivity, or
“cost,” of women); Marina E. Adshade & Brooks A. Kaiser, The Origins of the Institutions
of Marriage 1 (Queen’s Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 1180, 2008), available at
http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1180.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (suggesting agricultural externalities may cause monogamy to prevail
even when resource inequality predicts polygyny); Theodore C. Bergstrom, On the
Economics of Polygyny 1 (Aug. 25, 1994) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.bec.ucla.edu/polygyny3.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (exploring
economics of polygyny in “well-functioning markets for marriage partners”).
31. See, e.g., Bala Audu et al., Polygamy and the Use of Contraceptives, 101 Int’l J.
Gynecology & Obstetrics 88, 91 (2008) (comparing contraceptive use among women in
monogamous and polygamous marriages in Nigeria); Miche`le Tertilt, Polygyny, Fertility,
and Savings, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 1341, 1342–43 (2005) (finding polygyny in sub-Saharan
Africa generates high bride prices to “ration” women, thus crowding out other
investments; banning polygamy decreases fertility, increases savings, and increases output
per capita); Juan R. de Laiglesia & Christian Morrisson, Household Structures and Savings:
Evidence from Household Surveys 38, 45 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 267, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/61/
39922188.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (comparing polygamous households
in Africa and Asia and finding lower rates of capital accumulation as well as education in
polygamous ones); see also Paul H. Rubin, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Polygamy,
Regulation, Summer 2008, at 4, 5 (discussing difficulty for polygamous societies to become
open and democratic).  Economists Gary Becker and Richard Posner have both speculated
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women’s status in polygyny, and whether it empowers women, subordi-
nates them, or both.32
In the United States, estimates are that somewhere between thirty
thousand and a hundred thousand families currently practice plural mar-
riage.33  Those who do risk criminal prosecution, with authorities relying
on substantial religious, regional, and “ethnic” profiling to do so.34  Al-
though marriage had historically been left to state regulation, polygamy
became a matter of federal policy in the mid-nineteenth century.  Follow-
ing decades of anti-Mormon activism and the struggle over the Utah
Territory, between 1862 and 1887, Congress enacted a series of laws de-
signed to criminalize plural marriage.  In the process, Congress altered
the shape of constitutional federalism, as well as the Mormon faith.35
that polygamy advantages women.  For this discussion, see infra notes 128–131 and R
accompanying text.
32. Zeitzen discusses the debate over female choice versus male dominance and
whether co-wives compete or cooperate.  Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 127–34; see also id. at R
176 (“Many of the wives and sexual partners of polygynous men . . . fear becoming HIV-
infected, as they have little control over the sexual behaviour of other members of their
household.”); Sigman, supra note 7, at 146 (refuting “gender bloc” approach to R
determining whether men or women motivate polygamy).
33. See Ward, supra note 9, at 132 n.14 (citing sources estimating thirty thousand to R
one hundred thousand polygamists among fundamentalist Mormons alone).  These
statistics, which are compiled by the U.S. Attorneys’ offices for Utah and Arizona, may
reflect an ongoing anti-fundamentalist bias by mainstream Mormons and Mormon
institutions in those states.  See, e.g., Mary Farrell Bednarowski, Gender in New and
Alternative Religions, in Introduction to New and Alternate Religions in America 206, 233
(Eugene V. Gallagher & W. Michael Ashcroft eds., 2006) (discussing public officials’
religious persecution of fundamentalist Mormons by “stereotyping polygamists” and
Governor Pyle’s characterizing fundamentalists as a cult and charging them with “‘rape,
statutory rape, carnal knowledge, polygamist living, cohabitation, bigamy, adultery, and
misappropriation of school funds . . . .’”).
34. Several communities practice underground polygamy undisturbed.  See infra note
236 (noting prevalence of enforced silence and privacy in underground polygamist R
communities).  Law enforcement appears to target primarily Mormon fundamentalists.
See infra note 90 (discussing criminal prosecutions targeting polygamists).  Jurisdictions R
impose disparate criminal sanctions for polygamy.  For instance, in Utah, it is punishable
by up to five years in prison and a $5,000 fine; in Arizona, it entails a four-year prison term
and a $150,000 fine; and in Montana, polygamy is only a misdemeanor punishable by six
months in jail and a $500 fine.
35. See Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 80–83, 149–55 (discussing anti- R
polygamy federal legislation in late nineteenth century); see also Sarah Barringer Gordon,
“The Liberty of Self-Degradation”:  Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in
Nineteenth-Century America, 83 J. Am. Hist. 815, 817–20 (1996) [hereinafter Gordon,
Liberty] (exploring how debates over polygamy implicated notions of political liberty);
Sarah Barringer Gordon, A War of Words:  Revelation and Storytelling in the Campaign
Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 739, 747–64 (2003) [hereinafter Gordon,
War of Words] (assessing discursive strategies in conflicts over Mormonism); Sigman,
supra note 7, at 118–34 (summarizing legal history of anti-polygamy legislation and R
prosecutions in nineteenth century).  Six years earlier, in 1854, Congress contemplated a
homestead bill that would have made it illegal for polygamists residing in the Utah
Territory to acquire title to land from the federal government.  However, this bill was not
passed and subsequent versions did not incorporate that provision.  Michael G. Myers,
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A. Polygamy’s Stakeholders
While polygamy continues to be associated with Mormonism, partic-
ularly in light of such high-profile incidents as Elizabeth Smart’s 2002
kidnapping and the FLDS controversies of 2008, those who practice, en-
dorse, and lobby for polygamy comprise a diverse cross-section of
America.
The dominant domestic voices urging not only decriminalization but
full legal recognition of polygamy remain religious ones.  As noted, plural
marriage became the battleground on which the federal government and
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints fought for control of Utah
Territory during the second half of the nineteenth century.36  The
Mormon Church (LDS) finally conceded, formally banning plural mar-
riage in 1890 and eventually backing the ban with the threat of excommu-
nication for those who continued its practice or advocacy.  Some
Mormon leaders, however, rejected the ban as breaking with Church
founder Joseph Smith and his 1848 Declarations and Covenants; they cre-
ated fundamentalist offshoots of Mormonism that continued to embrace
polygamy and to practice it underground.  These non-LDS sects of Mor-
monism organized their faith around plural “celestial marriage,” or “the
Principle,” arguing it was at the core of their religious faith, structure of
government, and constitutional freedom.37  Their nineteenth-century
counterparts had contended, “[P]olygamy is included in the ordinance of
marriage, and in the everlasting covenant and laws of God . . . under
proper regulations, it is an institution holy, just, virtuous, pure, and, in
the estimation of God, abundantly calculated to bless, preserve, and mul-
Comment, Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy:  Homosexual Sodomy . . . Gay
Marriage . . . Is Polygamy Next?, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 1451, 1461 (2006).  Kerry Abrams has
shown how, during this same period, immigration law was federalized to resist polygamy
and prostitution and designed to exclude Chinese women and prevent growth of Chinese-
American communities.  See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization
of Immigration Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 641, 643 (2005) (“While California could not
exclude Chinese women for being ‘Chinese,’ it could exclude them by classifying them as
outside the acceptable category of ‘wives.’”).
36. See Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 111–12 (discussing federal R
officials’ and Mormon leaders’ attempts to wrest control of Utah).
37. See, e.g., Richard K. Scott, Celebrating Celestial Marriage 109 (2005) [hereinafter
Scott, Celebrating] (mentioning “celestial marriage”).  This remains the case today.  Joe
Jessop, a member of FLDS with five wives and forty-six children said, “My family came to
Short Creek [Arizona] for the same reason as everyone else, to obey the law of plural
marriage, to build up the Kingdom of God.”  Scott Anderson, The Polygamists:  An
Exclusive Look Inside the FLDS, Nat’l Geographic, Feb. 2010, at 34, 46–47.
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tiply a nation.”38  Successor fundamentalists in the twentieth century con-
curred they were “the true keepers of the faith.”39
While less vocal and visible than Mormon polygamists, other relig-
ious groups also endorse polygamy as mandated, or permitted, by their
faith.  These include evangelical Christians, African Hebrew Israelites of
Jerusalem, and Muslims, affiliated both with the Nation of Islam and also
Sunni sects.40  The religious fundamentalist embrace of polygamy, rooted
in strict interpretation of and uncompromising adherence to sacred texts
and traditions, does dominate the political and cultural discourse favor-
ing polygamy.  But it is also important to look beyond religious defenses,
which can obscure the diversity of current interests and stakeholders in
plural marriage.
Less familiar than the Mormon and other religious endorsements
are secular defenses of polygamy, including two from unlikely bedfellows:
radical feminists and black nationalists.  Some groups in the United
States have urged polygamy as a way of preserving the black family,
viewed by many as the bedrock of the black community.  Made in its
weaker form, the argument is a pragmatic one:  Distorted gender ratios,
lack of economic options, and sexual norms have reduced black marriage
to a statistical oddity.41  The result:  67.1% of black children are born
38. Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 91.  Gordon elaborates: R
The Saints defended polygamy as a positive religious command, which they had
designated “the Principle,” and attacked monogamy as evil and unnatural.  They
offered their own theories of male and female sexual nature and eugenically
focused claims that the children of polygamous marriages were physically
superior.  They also derided the hypocrisy of profligate opponents, calling
themselves honest and forthright polygamists, and made arguments based on
biblical mandates for polygamy as well as the power of the New Dispensation.
Defending the Principle, Mormons constructed what one scholar has called a
“denigration of the monogamous ethic.”
Id. at 85; see also Duncan, supra note 10, at 323 (describing four dominant fundamentalist R
Mormon sects operative today); Sigman, supra note 7, at 134–37 (describing rise of R
Mormon fundamentalism in first half of twentieth century).
39. Eve D’Onofrio, Child Brides, Inegalitarianism, and the Fundamentalist
Polygamous Family in the United States, 19 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 373, 375 (2005) (quoting
Kathleen Tracy, The Secret Story of Polygamy 80 (2002)).
40. Kay S. Hymowitz, I Wed Thee . . . and Thee . . . and Thee, Wall St. J., Oct. 18,
2004, at A18 (“Christian polygamists are conservative evangelicals who base their beliefs on
the Old and New Testaments; by contrast, Mormons cite extra-biblical revelations of their
founding prophet Joseph Smith.”).
41. See, e.g., Sigman, supra note 7, at 166 (“For the vast majority of Americans, R
polygamy is still a second best response . . . . An important exception is the African-
American community, which seems to possess characteristics indicative of polygamous
society and currently struggles under existing government definitions of family and
households.”).  One NPR story about black Muslims in Philadelphia offers at least
anecdotal confirmation:  “The single women at the mosque say polygamy is a fact of life.
But it’s not their first choice.”  Philly’s Black Muslims Increasingly Turn to Polygamy
(NPR radio broadcast May 28, 2008), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=90886407 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Compare Alexandre,
Lessons, supra note 10, at 1469–70 (describing informal practice of polygamy in some R
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outside of marriage and 34.5% grow up in poverty.42  In this view, what
might be thought of as “crisis” polygamy, or “pragmatic” or “charitable”
polygamy,43 represents a practical way of providing black women with
(black) husbands, and black children with more present and committed
fathers.44  In its stronger form, the black nationalist argument embraces
polygamy as a way to rescue black masculinity and restore patriarchy to
the black community, a sort of identitarian idealism.45  In this view, polyg-
amy offers not only pragmatic multiplicity, but also reinforces conven-
black communities), with Wing, supra note 23, at 858–61 (raising research questions about R
informal polygamy in black communities and how to distinguish it from infidelity).
42. U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 American Community Survey tbl. B13002B (2007),
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&-state=dt&-ds_name=
ACS_2007_1YR_G00_&-mt_name=ACS_2007_1YR_G2000_B13002B&-redoLog=true&-_
caller=geoselect&-geo_id=01000US&-geo_id=NBSP&-format=&-_lang=en (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); id. tbl. C17001B, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
DTTable?_bm=&-state=dt&-ds_name=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_&-mt_name=ACS_2007_1YR_
G2000_C17001B&-redoLog=true&-_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=01000US&-geo_id=NBSP&-
format=&-_lang=en (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
43. In this sense, the “crisis” is a shortage of men, akin to the shortage of men in
cultures in which wars or immigration patterns led to polygamy.  By “charitable” polygamy,
I mean instances in which a dyadic family turns to plural marriage in order to help a single
woman.  Charitable polygamy is instantiated in some religions and may or may not entail
conjugal relations.
44. One polygynist husband “believes ultimately, polygamy is good for society—
especially in the inner city, where intact families are rare and many kids grow up without
their fathers.”  In the same story, a single mother in south Philadelphia said, “We’re
dealing with brothers who are incarcerated—that is, unavailable. . . . And then,
unfortunately, you have the AIDS and HIV crisis, where HIV has struck the African-
American community disproportionately than to others.  So when you look at it that way,
there is a shortage.”  Hagerty, supra note 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
Interestingly, providing black children with black fathers is the opposite of the “lost boys”
concern of polygamy’s critics.  See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing R
harmful effects of polygamy on children).  In some ways, these polygamists have identified
a paradox I will discuss later in this Article:  Black children will either grow up in formal or
de facto polygyny.  See infra notes 241–246 and accompanying text (describing how many R
groups already practice plural intimacy resulting in multiple families).
45. As one website argues:
In these times, when the Black Family finds itself in absolute chaos, under this
western system/culture/order, polygamy needs to be discussed and reviewed, as a
Nation, for we are today more fragmented then [sic] ever.  There are many more
women to men, why should one sistah be honored, provided for and protected,
while the other be dishonored by being neglected and relegated to being “my
baby’s mama.”  Why shouldn’t we pull our resources together, strengthen the
Kingman, and give the youths extra security?  Why shouldn’t we consider
returning to our ancient traditions, especially when we have seen the results of
Western culture?  It is simply amazing to me that sistahz grudgingly accept that
men “cheat” and dishonor them, but absolutely reject our ancient tradition,
where economics are shared, work is shared, motherhood is shared, and things
are done in the light, with honesty and balance.  Why fight something which may
prove to be beneficial to us all as a collective?
Empress Tsahai, Polygamy as a Choice for the Black Family (2002), available at
http://www.rastafarispeaks.com/newspapers/articles/polygamy2002.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Scot Brown, Fighting for US:  Maulana Karenga, the US
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tional gender roles as well.  This pro-polygamy stance differs in a crucial
respect from the mainstream conservative urging of black “monogamous
marriage” (I use that term intentionally here).  Black nationalists and
conventional conservatives may both view marriage as the best antidote to
poverty and sexual immorality, far preferable to government entitlements
or restructuring the family.46  Yet, while mainstream conservatives addi-
tionally support black marriage as an assimilationist strategy, black na-
tionalists advocate plural marriage as a way to further separate the black
community culturally, morally, and, ultimately, politically and economi-
cally from mainstream American culture.
Meanwhile, some radical feminists urge polygamy as a potential
weapon in dyadic marriage’s ongoing battle of the sexes.  Decades after
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, even after substantial shifts in gen-
der roles, many women continue to complain that conventional marriage
leaves them craving deeper emotional intimacy and more equitable divi-
sions of household labor.47  Thus far, frustrated wives have had three op-
tions:  surrender and consign themselves to gender inequity and personal
exhaustion; remain locked in battle with their husbands; or divorce.48
Polygamy presents another option.  For some women, increasing the ratio
of women to men in a household might be more effective than pressur-
ing husbands to “change” and conform to women’s expectations.  Done
properly—that is, among women committed to feminist principles—po-
lygamy can provide a “sisterhood” within marriage, generate more adults
committed to balancing work/family obligations, and allow more leisure
time for each wife.49  As Luci Malin, vice chairman of Utah’s National
Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism 62–65 (2003) (situating experiments and
tensions with polygamy within conflicts over male dominance in black nationalism).
46. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families:  Fostering Capacity, Equality,
and Responsibility 4 (2006) [hereinafter McClain, The Place of Families] (arguing families
are “significant sites” for “producing persons capable of responsible personal and
democratic self-government”); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47
Hastings L.J. 339, 403–07 (1996) (describing alliances between black communities and
mainstream conservatives to change childbearing patterns in black families).
47. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 18, at 47–48, 66–72, 272 (describing studies and R
statistics on “the leisure gap”); Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American Family
and Family Economics, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 7–8 (2007) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak,
American Family] (describing 2005 survey showing sixteen hours per week of housework
for women versus less than eleven hours for men—a thirty percent gap).
48. Of course, these three manifest in complex and nuanced ways.  Confronting the
classic “leisure gap,” some wives may delegate to paid careworkers or other family members
as “kincare” or deny there is any “conflict.”  Others may not label marital tension over care
work as a “battle of the sexes” but instead as the personal deficiencies of their husbands.
49. One co-wife explains:
The thing that I love most about our relationship is the support that we all have
for each other.  Karen has frequently helped me and Martin out of a few
disagreements as have I with the two of them.  I like that I can support Karen in
the things she loves to do.  She likes to work outside in the yard for several hours
at a time, and Martin likes to have someone nearby and not feel left by himself.
So I can fulfill this need for the both of them, by being with Martin when Karen
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Organization for Women, once remarked, “[Polygamy] seems like a
pretty good idea for professional women, who can proceed with their ca-
reers and have someone at home they can trust to watch their chil-
dren.”50  In fact, lawyer and polygamist Elizabeth Joseph has called plural
marriage “the ultimate feminist lifestyle.”51  Contra polygyny as iden-
titarian bonding among women, others laud polygamy as destabilizing
the conventional gender roles assigned by dyadic marriage’s “yin and
yang.”52  In this view, polygamy arguably has the potential to “queer”
marriage.
Feminist endorsements of polygyny might seem to have little in com-
mon with black nationalist ones:  The latter sees polygamy as patriarchy’s
savior, the former as its death knell.  Still, what they share is attention to
the material realities that shape intimacy and the ways marriage can fos-
ter such things as “gender” or “racial” community.  In the end, what the
feminist and black nationalist endorsements of polygamy share is a fasci-
nating combination of pragmatism and identitarian idealism.
likes to work outside.  Also Karen likes to take trips to see her daughter out of
state frequently.  I can stay at home with Martin so he doesn’t feel left behind.  So
Karen gets what she needs without feeling guilty, Martin gets what he needs
without feeling left behind.  And I get my needs met by feeing [sic] that I have an
important part of holding things together.  I also have a strong need to not be
alone too much, so this also fulfills my need in this way by being with Martin.
It is so symbiotic, that we frequently don’t have to even discuss these matters.  We
just know intuitively what each other needs.  We also can be honest with each
other and all sit down and say what’s on our mind if we aren’t feeling great about
something or feel that we have a need that isn’t being met.  We probably know
more about each other than anyone has ever known about us personally.  The
realness and honesty are beautiful and really bond us together.
Noah Smith, Lisa, Martin, and Karen:  Our Family Profile (Jan. 28, 2007), at
http://pilegesh.blogspot.com/2007/01/lisa-martin-and-karen.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
50. Joyce Price, New NOW Answer:  Polygamy for Moms, Wash. Times, Aug. 12, 1997,
at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing polygamy as “a solution for the
problems of working mothers”).
51. Joseph contends that polygamy “provides me the environment and opportunity to
maximize my female potential without all the tradeoffs and compromises that attend
monogamy.”  Elizabeth Joseph, Polygamy Now!, Address at Utah Chapter of the National
Organization of Women, Harper’s Mag., Feb. 1998, at 26, 26–27; see also Elizabeth Joseph,
Op-Ed., Feminism Finds Empowerment in Polygamous Lifestyle, Chi. Trib., Mar. 1, 1998,
at 10 (noting as polygamous co-wife she does not have to choose between work and
family); Elizabeth Joseph, My Husband’s Nine Wives, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1991, at A31 (“I
am sure that in the challenge of working through [monogamy’s] compromises, satisfaction
and success can be realized.  But why must women only embrace a marital arrangement
that requires so many trade-offs?”).
52. See, e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage?  Lessons for
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1023,
1037–42 (2005) (discussing relationship between polygamy and gender equality in
marriage).  Some advocates of polyamory also endorse polygamy, but many polyamorists
reject parsing intimacy multiplicity into the marital form.  See, e.g., Emens, supra note 24, R
at 283–84 (contending women might find satisfaction in nonmonogamous relationships).
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A final defense of polygamy that does not fall neatly into either of
the above categories rests on a sort of gendered pragmatic moralism
rooted in an essential distinction between male and female nature.  The
logic runs as follows.  Men are, by nature, sexually unfaithful.  Women,
who are less interested in sex, are not.  To the contrary, women prefer
monogamy.53  Part of the virtue, then, of polygamy is its transparency:  It
permits men’s basic (base?) instincts while using the marital structure to
domesticate and discipline them.  Following this logic, men may serve
their biological impulses for multiplicity, but may not be deceitful or dis-
respectful.  They may have multiple sexual partners, but they may not
turn women into “prostitutes.”54  In sum, in this essentialist, biologically
determinative, and, of course, heteronormative, view, plural marriage is
defended as preferable to the alternative of men’s inevitable adultery and
infidelity.
As in any discursive analysis, there is overlap between the religious
fundamentalist and various pragmatist and identitarian idealist endorse-
ments of polygamy.  For example, some black communities urge polyg-
amy as a matter of both religious principle and racial pragmatism.  (For
instance, Philadelphia has the highest density of polygamy, due to a com-
bination of conversions to Islam, currents of racial nationalism, and the
demographic effects of male incarceration and underemployment.55)
Similarly, “feminist” arguments often appear in some form in religious
fundamentalist defenses of polygamy.  For instance, fundamentalist
Mormon wives believe they will comprise one family with their sister wives
53. In sociobiology this is known as the Bateman Effect.  See, e.g., Sigman, supra note
7, at 147 (describing how Bateman Effect or Bateman Principle operates).  Of course, such R
characterizations are also made by evolutionary biologists.  See, e.g., Donald Symons, The
Evolution of Human Sexuality 27 (1979) (arguing one “primary male-female difference[ ]
in sexuality among humans” is that men are inclined to polygyny while women may be
equally satisfied in polygynous, monogamous, or polyandrous arrangements).
54. Polygamists claimed that “polygamy was the only reliable antidote for
prostitution,” and one suffragist, “testifying at a congressional hearing on woman suffrage,
endorsed the theory that polygamy was a protection against prostitution.”  Gordon,
Liberty, supra note 35, at 844 & n.66.  For further discussion of the proposition that R
“monogamy and prostitution went hand in hand,” see id.; Dunfey, supra note 24, at R
527–28, 531 (nineteenth-century Mormon women made frequent references to “fallen
women, mistresses, prostitutes, and the necessity of alternative sexual outlets for men”);
Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 92 (listing “whoredoms” among “vile R
abominations” considered incident to monogamy); see also Janet Bennion, Evaluating the
Effects of Polygamy on Women and Children in Four North American Mormon
Fundamentalist Groups:  An Anthropological Study 35 (2008) (interviewing contemporary
Mormon polygamists “[m]any [of whom] suggest that if polygamy were adopted
throughout the United States, prostitution would be eliminated”).  This is curiously
reminiscent of some pro-slavery discourse, in which defenders argued that slavery was
preferable to white prostitution.  See, e.g., W. Gilmore Simms, The Morals of Slavery,
reprinted in The Pro-Slavery Argument 175, 229–30 (Walker, Richards & Co. 1853).
55. See, e.g., Hagerty, supra note 41 (discussing experience of wives in Philadelphia’s R
black Muslim polygamist families).
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in the afterlife.56  The inevitability of male infidelity predictably pops up
across pro-polygamy discourse.57
My point is not to caricature or misrepresent any of these groups or
their ideological commitments to plural marriage.  Rather, it is to show
that the conflict over recognizing polygamy is not just an academic de-
bate, nor does it affect the material and intimacy interests of only one
religious group.  While curtailing Mormonism may have driven early fed-
eral policy defining marriage as dyadic, currently there are diverse stake-
holders in the plural marriage debate.
B. Polygamy’s Critics
Polygamy offends a diverse array of interests:  traditionalists who be-
lieve in “family values” (they suspect it to be promiscuity in disguise),
mainstream Christians who resent religious fundamentalism, children’s
rights advocates, liberals who suspect that polygamy is a combination of
parental exploitation of children and religious brainwashing, hindering
realization of individual desires and will (one might view earlier conflicts
over the Amish as a more diluted version of this tension), romantics in-
vested in the companionate bond that conventional marriage is imagined
to engender, and even those who argue polygamy provides a cover for a
range of fraudulent behavior from welfare abuse to tax fraud.  And, of
course, there are those who believe polygamy is an inherently patriarchal
institution that subordinates women.
Two legal scholars capture many of these concerns.  Maura
Strassberg, one of the most vocal scholars urging the ongoing criminaliza-
tion of polygamy, contends it injures the liberal democratic state, individ-
ual well-being, and the flourishing of the specific populations who prac-
tice it:  “[P]olygyny not only fails to produce critical building blocks of
liberal democracy, such as autonomous individuality, robust public and
private spheres, and affirmative reconciliation of individuality and social
existence, but promotes a despotic state populated by subjects rather
56. See, e.g., Scott, Celebrating, supra note 37, at 109 (“The gate to eternal life is R
celestial marriage, which holy order of matrimony enables the family unit to continue in
eternity, so that the participating parties may have posterity as numerous as the sands upon
the seashore or the stars in heaven.” (citation omitted)); Dunfey, supra note 24, at 534 R
(quoting nineteenth-century Mormon woman on polygamy:  “Only for the sake of its
expected joys in eternity, could I endure its trials through time.”).
57. As one advocate for polygamy put it:  “So, I ask the question:  Why are we all so coy
about the thought of men having other women in their lives?  That’s the way they’re
designed.”  Admin, Men Are Designed to Chase Skirts . . ., Polygamy (Dec. 6, 2009),
at http://www.polygamy.com/index.php/commentary/men-are-designed-to-chase-skirts/#
comments (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Dunfey, supra note 24, at R
528–29, 530 (“Just as the ideology of the larger [nineteenth-century] society stressed the
pure and passionless qualities of the ideal woman in contrast to the lust of man, so too did
Mormon women see themselves as curbing the passion of depraved men.”).
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than citizens.”58  Shayna Sigman, on the other hand, urges polygamy’s
decriminalization.  But she concurs with Strassberg that, in the United
States, Mormon enclaves have retreated from civil society, cloaking their
members in insular, theocratic-fundamentalist polygamous enclaves that
segregate themselves from society and perpetuate both abuse against
their members and fraud against the state.59  For Sigman and Strassberg
then, polygamy is a symptom of an illiberal and antidemocratic political
community.
Both scholars also stress the injuries of systemic polygamy to individ-
ual well-being, which are often manifested in gendered ways.  Unlike oc-
casional polygamy, systemic polygamy is practiced by substantial portions
of the population and it either rests on unequal demographics of sex and
intimacy, as exemplified by the aforementioned “crisis polygamy,” or it
generates them:
Unless war, migration, or some other significant event occurs to
change the sex ratio in a society from its natural state, polygyny
is a zero sum game among the men—some have multiple wives
at the expense of others.  One way of curing this imbalance is to
recruit female converts.  Another way is to tap into a population
of even younger girls.  Yet another solution is to get rid of some
of the males.60
58. Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 356 (footnotes omitted); see R
also D’Onofrio, supra note 39, at 374 (“[T]he patriarchal nature of plural R
Fundamentalist[ ] families and communities undercuts the public’s legitimate interest in
promoting an appreciation for justice, equality, and liberty among society’s youngest
members.”); Duncan, supra note 10, at 326 (arguing religious teachings compel women to R
“obey not only the prophet, but the entire male hierarchy as well”).
59. Sigman, supra note 7, at 177–84 (listing ways polygyny disproportionately burdens R
state and harms adolescent members).  Unlike Strassberg, Sigman contends that polygamy
is merely a symptom of other harms and of chronic under-enforcement.  She does,
however, offer a fascinating summary of the main arguments against polygamy, particularly
her parsing of the two theories of the polygamy-despotism connection.  The first version
(which she calls the Lieber-Reynolds theory due to its influence on the Supreme Court’s
Reynolds decision) contends that “people who accepted familial despotism would legitimate
the existence of political despotism, though [Lieber] never explained just how this
connection would be bridged.”  Id. at 174.  In the second version, Strassberg-Hegel says:
[M]onogamous marriage is a fundamental aspect of the liberal state, because
monogamy fosters the development of autonomous individuals who fall in love,
based on unique characteristics.  These fully-developed autonomous individuals
are then able to interact within private spheres to fulfill their emotional and
intimate needs, as well as in public spheres that recognize rights and liberty. . . .
Polygamous marriage, on the other hand, stifles individual development in favor
of religious and communal goals, diminishing an opportunity for individualized
romantic love.  Accordingly, polygamy blurs the development of distinct spheres
of public versus private life.  It also prevents the transcendence of individuals,
because it reinforces inequalities that exist between different groups of men and
between men and women.
Id. at 175 (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. at 182.  Maura Strassberg elaborates:
Given the crucial importance of teenage plural brides to the Mormon
fundamentalist practice of polygyny and the extreme difficulty of regulating
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While polygamy within the United States overall is occasional, some
insular communities do practice it systemically, engendering exactly these
described dynamics.  Whether the result is “lost boys,” teen brides, wide-
spread statutory rape and incest, or an uneducated and excessively con-
trolled population, the outcome is the same:  demographics that are not
consonant with high rates of individual well-being.61  Similarly, polyan-
dry, which generates more husbands per wife, is associated with high
rates of female infanticide.62
While today’s sustained discourse against plural marriage by and
large avoids the racism and xenophobia of the earlier campaigns, the
concerns remain largely the same.63  Whether manifest as nineteenth-
polygyny in any way in the isolated, theocratically governed communities that
practice such polygyny, it would be impossible to protect teenage girls and very
young women from the identified evils of polygynous marriage for them while
allowing polygynous marriage in general.  This in itself provides some justification
for banning all polygynous marriages, even those involving mature adult women,
on the grounds that the practice viewed more widely will inevitably and
significantly target and victimize teenagers as plural wives.
Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 357–58; see also Zeitzen, supra note R
26, at 173–74 (describing expulsion of young males from polygamous communities). R
61. See, e.g., Karel Kurst-Swanger & Jacqueline L. Petcosky, Violence in the Home:
Multidisciplinary Perspectives 21 (2003) (“Aside from public debate regarding the utility of
polygamy, professionals are concerned about child sexual abuse, wife battering,
intermarriage, child marriage, reliance on welfare and Medicaid, high levels of child
poverty, tax, welfare fraud, and educational deprivation.”); Simon LeVay & Sharon
McBride Valente, Human Sexuality 300 (2d ed. 2006) (“However, law enforcement and
child welfare officials cite many social ills that are associated with Mormon polygamy,
incest, physical and sexual abuse of children, poverty, welfare and tax fraud, criminal
nonsupport of children, and diminished educational opportunities and health care.”).
62. See, e.g., Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 141 (discussing relationship between R
polyandry and female infanticide, but rejecting claims of “simple causality” between the
two); see also James Peoples & Garrick Bailey, Humanity:  An Introduction to Cultural
Anthropology 171 (8th ed. 2009) (noting although female infanticide is not the only
explanation for polyandry, “female infanticide does indeed have the effect of decreasing
the number of marriageable women”).
63. Sarah Gordon and Martha Ertman have both highlighted the association of
polygamy with barbarism, slavery, and race treason.  Gordon returns to the 1856
Republican Party platform describing polygamy and slavery as “the twin relics of
barbarism,” political economies characterized by tyrannical and lascivious despots who
subjugated and abused their wives or slaves, respectively.  Gordon, Mormon Question,
supra note 6, at 55–83; see also Gordon, War of Words, supra note 35, at 747–57 (assessing R
discursive strategies employed by opponents of Mormonism).  Martha Ertman has taken a
different track, showing how popular discourse associated Mormon polygamy with “race
treason,” characterizing Mormons as miscegenistic degenerates threatening the newly
reunified nation.  Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason:  The Untold Story of America’s Ban
on Polygamy, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 287, 365 (2010) [hereinafter Ertman, Race
Treason] (noting widespread view that “the progeny of Mormons constituted a new species
that resembled those supposedly backward races, degenerating the White race and
undermining white supremacy” and arguing “[c]onsequently, we should read American
antipolygamy law in light of [the legal doctrine shapers’] intent to remedy political and
race treason”).  What both of these racialized analogies share with the contemporary
“despotism” charge is the view of polygamy as barbaric, tyrannical, and incompatible with
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century theocracies struggling with the federal government for control of
the Utah Territory, or twentieth-century “compounds” that have with-
drawn from civil society, the claim is that the injury of polygamist commu-
nities is twofold:  Polygamists do not contribute to secular government
and instead “game the societal demographics and economics to create
artificial characteristics that are favorable to polygamy in order to sustain
[it],” in the process wreaking significant harm on the populations who
practice the institution.64  While differing in the remedy—continued
criminalization versus decriminalization—Strassberg and Sigman both
capture this concern that polygamy’s harm to the liberal state is its pro-
duction of “unregulated communities” that are incompatible with liberal
democracy and its commitments to individual well-being.65
democracy.  See also Abrams, supra note 35, at 642–43 (“Congress not only feared the R
Chinese practices of polygamy and prostitution, but also believed that these customs
rendered the Chinese unfit for self-governance.  Congress viewed these institutions as
reflective of an underlying ‘slave-like’ mentality, fundamentally at odds with citizenship in
a participatory democracy.”); Alexandre, Lessons, supra note 10, at 1467–68 (discussing R
social outcry against polygamy in nineteenth-century America); John Tierney, Op-Ed.,
Who’s Afraid of Polygamy?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2006, at A15 (noting implicit racism of
Supreme Court’s dismissal of polygamy as “a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African
people” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. Sigman, supra note 7, at 166–67.  In fact, Sigman contends this is what R
distinguishes polygamy in the United States from its other global incidences:
Because American polygamy lacks the stronger demographic- and economic-
based rationales that produce polygamy in other countries, and instead relies on
religious ideology and other belief systems, it is not inherently self-supporting. . . .
Rather than presenting a threat to the nation and the underpinnings of a liberal
democratic state, what makes American polygamy dangerous is the extent to
which it requires polygamous communities to game the societal demographics
and economics to create artificial characteristics that are favorable to polygamy in
order to sustain itself. . . . Polygamy is harmful precisely because it cannot survive
within the United States without deliberate efforts to make it viable in a system
that is geared from a demographic, economic, and sociological standpoint toward
monogamy.
Id.  In fact, Strassberg does not oppose polyamory because it is not community-creating in
the same way polygamy is.  Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 413 R
(“[P]olyfidelity does not facilitate the creation of a homogenous community engaged in
group marriage.”); see also Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy:
Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. U. L. Rev. 439, 561 (2003) (asserting “polyandry is too
diffuse as a social phenomenon to currently have any significant impact”).
65. The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in Eldorado,
Texas typified this threat to the liberal state and self-determination.  Church leaders would
scare young women away from exploring the world outside of the church’s compound by
portraying the outside world as one in which the women would be exploited for sex and
ostracized for their background.  Court Documents Show Polygamist Sect Married Girls at
Puberty, Associated Press, Apr. 9, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,348148,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Within this insular
community, girls just entering puberty were married to older “strong” men, forced to have
sex, and regularly abused.  Id.; see also Bennion, supra note 54, at 39 (“A side effect of the R
belief in communalism and polygamy is a psychological pre-disposition toward anti-
government sentiment, mistrust of ‘Babylon,’ the outside modern world, and isolation.”).
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In sum, both polygamy’s stakeholders and its critics are far more di-
verse than we might imagine.  Indeed, Philadelphia’s black Muslim com-
munity, not Utah’s Mormon one, has the highest concentration of
polygamists.66  Meanwhile polygamy’s critics fear an array of harms, rang-
ing from abuse of women and children to its intrinsic incompatibility with
democracy and propensity for despotism.  The next Part explores the
forces that have recently ramped up the debate over polygamy.  It also
considers why, despite all the heat, they still have failed to shed light on
the regulatory challenges polygamy poses for law and equality.
II. THE GAY ANALOGY AND MARITAL MULTIPLICITY
In the 1960s, Ed Firmage, an intern working on Vice President
Hubert Humphrey’s civil rights initiatives, leaned on television advertisers
to feature black Americans in commercials:  “Once you do that, the game
is over.”67  When HBO premiered Big Love four years ago, Firmage, now a
retired law professor at the University of Utah, speculated that the series
could have a similar effect for polygamists.68  If African Americans could
sell soap powder, perhaps polygamists could be the family next door.69
Firmage’s analogy is both tempting and telling.  What he anticipated
in the 1960s was the visual power of television to collapse social taboos.
By humanizing the unfamiliar and normalizing the foreign, the then-new
media could smooth the way for social acceptance and, eventually, rights
recognition.  As noted in the Introduction, the hit show, now in its fourth
season, has introduced mainstream America, or at least its vast cable-
By contrast, another insular religious community, the Amish, urges its adolescents to
make an informed choice about their commitment to the religion and the community.
During rumspringa, Amish adolescents are encouraged to experiment with mainstream
culture, dress, customs, and practices so that they may decide for themselves if they want to
return for baptism and immersion in the traditional Amish lifestyle.  See Tom Shachtman,
Rumspringa:  To Be or Not to Be Amish (2006), excerpt available at http://www.beliefnet.
com/Faiths/Christianity/2006/05/Partying-With-The-Amish.aspx (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Amish tradition of rumspringa).
66. See Hagerty, supra note 41 (discussing increases in polygamy in Philadelphia’s R
black Muslim community).
67. Adams, supra note 1.  Firmage, the author of a book on Mormon history, also R
endorses decriminalizing polygamy.  Ed Firmage, Polygamy, Monogamy and Monotheism:
The One and the Many, One Utah (June 3, 2006), at http://oneutah.org/2006/06/03/
polygamy-monogamy-and-monotheism-the-one-and-the-many/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
68. The New Yorker concurred:  “The hook has also snagged a boatload of cultural
critics and reporters, commenting both on its controversial subject and on what it means
that that subject has bubbled up to the level of acceptability for television.”  Nancy
Franklin, Triple Threat:  Polygamy Goes Mainstream in HBO’s “Big Love,” New Yorker,
Mar. 27, 2006, at 78, 78.
69. Indeed, during a meeting with the Utah Attorney General, a group of polygamist
women compared themselves to Rosa Parks.  Nancy Perkins, Plural Wives Plead Case,
Deseret News (Utah), Sept. 28, 2003, at B.1.
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viewing population, to plural marriage, even taking out ads on the wed-
ding pages of the New York Times.70
“Big Love” sets up Bill’s clan as an exemplar of family values,
with some of the same problems that conventional marriages
can have:  petty jealousies; misunderstandings; conflicting time-
tables when it comes to sexual desire; in-law problems; a toddler
eating mayonnaise out of the jar while you’re trying to change
the diaper of a screaming baby; and requests of the “can you
pick up the dry cleaning, I’m running late” variety.71
If this strategy of familiarizing the foreign through quirky families
sounds familiar, it’s for a reason.  HBO has framed the series as “yet an-
other look at the human condition through an unconventional lens:  the
Mafia, funeral homes, single thirty-something women, and now
polygamists.”72
Just a few years ago, some contended that polygamists were too far
outside the cultural mainstream to be virtually integrated:
When the high court struck down anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence
v. Texas, we ended decades of the use of criminal laws to perse-
cute gays.  However, this recent change was brought about in
part by the greater acceptance of gay men and lesbians into soci-
ety, including openly gay politicians and popular TV characters.
Such a day of social acceptance will never come for
polygamists.  It is unlikely that any network is going to air The
Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy or add a polygamist
twist to Everyone Loves Raymond.73
And yet, that is exactly what Big Love has done, issuing frequent, typi-
cally tongue-in-cheek invitations to its sophisticated viewers to consider
polygamy as valid an “alternative lifestyle” as gay marriage.  In fact, Big
Love itself is a product of the gay marriage analogy.  The show’s creators,
Mark Olsen and Will Scheffer, who are romantic as well as creative part-
ners, have explained they were intrigued by polygamists’ enthusiastic re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s 2003 decriminalization of homosexual
sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas:  “[W]e thought that just made such interest-
ing, strange, and perverse bedfellows that it was just too delicious to not
use.”74  Hollywood is onto something.  In the last several years, in law and
policy—in addition to popular culture—the gay analogy has ridden high.
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2006, § 9, at 1.
71. Franklin, supra note 68, at 79; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Business and Big Love, R
Ideoblog (May 10, 2006, 9:26 AM), at http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/05/
business_and_bi.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he show forces us to
think about real people and their problems, rather than a theoretical abstraction, and
makes sure these are real people we like.  This brings us closer to accepting legal rights
that would enable these people to be comfortable with their chosen lifestyle.”).
72. Adams, supra note 1.  This refers to other HBO shows that were both critically R
acclaimed and highly popular: The Sopranos, Six Feet Under, and Sex and the City.
73. Turley, supra note 11. R
74. Adams, supra note 1.  Mark Olsen and Will Scheffer elaborated, “[t]he show’s R
hook is ‘the overall social, largely revulsion, against the lifestyle and the marriage they
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Indeed, debates about decriminalizing same-sex sodomy and legaliz-
ing same-sex intimacy have generated a veritable cottage industry on the
law’s stance toward polygamy.  And, since the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Lawrence v. Texas, the import of the gay analogy has achieved more than
hypothetical force.  Indeed, the Lawrence ruling has generated intriguing
and unexpected alliances, and, as I’ll explain, some fascinating rifts.
A. Intimacy Liberty
In its much-anticipated ruling in Lawrence v. Texas,75 the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional state statutes banning sodomy, explicitly
overturning its previous ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.  Legal scholars are
still trying to make sense of the import and scope of the ruling.  While
clearly a victory for the very existence of same-sex relationships, less clear
is whether Lawrence will provide the foundation for recognizing sexual
minorities as warranting constitutional status, which ultimately could lead
to gay marriage as a federal right.76  As the legal and policy communities
continue to debate and predict what Lawrence will mean for gay rights,
others have seized on the decision’s implications for plural marriage.  If
Lawrence opens the door for same-sex marriage, can polygamists follow
through?77  Curiously, the gay analogy is popular among both supporters
and detractors of expanded recognition for alternative family structures,
or “big love.”
Perhaps not surprisingly, opponents of same-sex marriage draw anal-
ogies between it and polygamy.  One National Review Online review of Big
Love started:  “It’s getting tougher to laugh off the ‘slippery slope’ argu-
ment—the claim that gay marriage will lead to polygamy, polyamory, and
ultimately to the replacement of marriage itself by an infinitely flexible
partnership system.”78  But this argument can claim an older and more
practice’ . . . .”  Id.  Olsen and Scheffer spent three years researching how to most fairly
present plural marriage in an entertainment format.
75. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
76. Currently, a state by state approach exists alongside the federal Defense of
Marriage Act, which permits both the federal government’s refusal to recognize same-sex
marriages authorized by the states and individual states’ refusals to extend conventional
marital comity principles to same-sex marriages.
77. For polygamists seeking full recognition and rights, reliance on Lawrence is a
strategic step in analogizing their intimacy liberty to that of the most visible sexual
minorities, gays and lesbians, and setting the stage for recognition of plural marriage
alongside gay marriage.  See Dubler, supra note 13, at 1187 (“Or, perhaps, Lawrence will be R
seen as the beginning of the extension of constitutional protection to a range of sexual
practices that do not fall within monogamous marriage.”).
78. Stanley Kurtz, Big Love, from the Set, Nat’l Rev. Online (Mar. 13, 2006), at http://
www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Big
Love’s lovable polygamists also serve as subtle standard bearers for gay marriage, as the
show explicitly notes from time to time.”); see also Adams, supra note 1 (“The slippery R
slope corollary between the two goes something like this:  Approve of one and the other is
sure to follow.”); Megan Basham, Pushing for Polygamy, Nat’l Rev. Online (Apr. 18, 2005),
at http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/basham200504180745.asp (on file with the
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premium vintage.  In 1996, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans
cautioned:
But there is a much closer analogy [to regulation of homosexu-
ality than prohibitions on alcohol], one that involves precisely
the effort by the majority of citizens to preserve its view of sexual
morality statewide, against the efforts of a geographically con-
centrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it.
The Constitutions of [several states] to this day contain provi-
sions stating that polygamy is “forever prohibited.” . . . The
Court’s disposition today suggests that these provisions are un-
constitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted in these
States on a state-legislated, or perhaps even local option, basis—
unless, of course, polygamists for some reason have fewer consti-
tutional rights than homosexuals.79
Likewise, during debates over the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which authorized states to refuse recognition of same-sex mar-
riages entered in other states, Representative Bob Inglis of South
Carolina asked, “If a person had an ‘insatiable desire’ to marry more than
one wife . . . what argument did gay activists have to deny him a legal,
polygamous marriage?”80  (Utah implicitly recognizes the analogy, as its
adoption statute prohibits adoption by people who live with someone in
Columbia Law Review) (“The primary tactical difference between polygamist communities
and gay-marriage activists is that the former have traditionally neither sought nor desired
government recognition or even government involvement . . . . [But] they too are
beginning to push for unqualified endorsement in the eyes of the law.”).
79. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
Thomas, J., dissenting).  Seven years later, Justice Scalia reiterated the position in his
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas:  “State laws against bigamy . . . [are] called into question by
today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude
them from its holding.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In its decision
declaring the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage unconstitutional, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court forestalled the slippery slope issue by stating the plaintiffs
“do not attack the binary nature of marriage.”  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 965 (Mass. 2003).
80. Ruth K. Khalsa, Polygamy as a Red Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54
Duke L.J. 1665, 1665 & n.3 (2005) (referencing article citing Inglis’s statement).  Senator
Rick Santorum expressed a similar opinion in the debates over Lawrence:  “If the Supreme
Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have
the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have
the right to adultery.  You have the right to anything.”  Sean Loughlin, Santorum Under
Fire for Comments on Homosexuality, CNN (Apr. 22, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/22/santorum.gays (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Elizabeth Marquardt of the Institute for American Values warns:  “Though most advocates
of same-sex marriage say they do not support group marriage, the partial success of the
gay-marriage movement has emboldened others to borrow the language of civil rights to
break open further our understanding of marriage.”  Elizabeth Marquardt, Two Mommies
and a Daddy:  The Future of Polygamy, The Christian Century, July 25, 2006, at 8.
Marquardt directs the Center for Marriage and Families at the Institute for American
Values; see also David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 Hofstra L. Rev.
53, 56–60 (1997) [hereinafter Chambers, Polygamy] (summarizing use of polygamy
analogy in Defense of Marriage Act hearings and debates).
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an intimate relationship not recognized by law, which applies to both gay
couples and polygamists.81)  Academics, too, have weighed in.  One law
professor argued:
Gay activists champion autonomy in intimate relationships and
charge that traditionalists simply fear what is different and
mindlessly mouth religious prejudice.  On these grounds polyg-
amy is even easier to support because, unlike gay marriage, it
has been and still is condoned by many religions and societies.
The Equal Protection argument for same-sex marriage also ap-
plies to polygamy.82
Each of these arguments shares the fear that recognizing gay mar-
riage will lead all sexual minorities to make similar claims.  An Amherst
professor of jurisprudence sums it up:  “Every argument for gay marriage
is an argument that would support polygamy.”83  Every first year law stu-
dent will recognize this for what it is:  a classic invocation of the slippery
slope.84
Perhaps more surprisingly, polygamists too have endorsed the anal-
ogy between gay and plural marriage.  As noted in Part I, the most vocal
and visible advocates of polygamy historically have rooted their argu-
ments in religious fundamentalism, which would seem to reject the LGBT
community as coalition-mates.  Unlike feminist endorsements of polyg-
amy, many strains of both religious fundamentalism and black national-
ism are explicitly patriarchal, mandating specific roles for men and wo-
men.  At worst they are homophobic; at best they reject same-sex
marriage as inconsistent with their religious principles.  Yet fundamental-
ist polygamists seem to have overcome their condemnation of homosexu-
ality, “coming out of the closet” to join the fight for rights recognition for
“sexual minorities.”  Pro-polygamy activists vociferously proclaim slogans
linking polygamy and the same-sex marriage campaign, such as “polyg-
81. Utah State Law asserts:  “A child may not be adopted by a person who is
cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws
of this state,” where “cohabiting” is defined as “residing with another person and being
involved in a sexual relationship with that person.”  Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-103(9),
-117(3) (LexisNexis 2008); see also Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological
Connection:  Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22
BYU J. Pub. L. 289, 316 & n.184 (2008) (discussing Utah’s adoption statute in context of
gay and lesbian couples).
82. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & Pol. 581, 628
(1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Myers, supra note 35, at 1471–76 (arguing Lawrence R
may provide precedent for recognition of polygamous marriages).
83. Dent, supra note 82, at 628 (quoting Hadley Arkes’s statement in One Man, One R
Woman, Wash. Watch, Jan. 26, 1998, at 1).  In the same vein, Arkes argues:  “If marriage is
detached from that ‘natural teleology of the body,’ on what ground of principle could the
law rule out the people who profess that their own love is not confined to a coupling of
two, but woven together in a larger ensemble of three or four?”  Hadley Arkes, A Culture
Corrupted, First Things, Nov. 1996, at 30, 31.
84. See Cahill, supra note 8, at 1544 (discussing polygamy and slippery slope in R
context of incest taboos).
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amy is the next civil rights battle”85 and “two mommies and a daddy.”86
Even more explicitly, Pro-Polygamy.com proclaims “[f]reely-consenting,
adult, non-abusive, marriage-committed [polygamy] is the next civil
rights battle. Lawrence v. Texas has just guaranteed it.”87  The slogans are
more than mere rhetoric.
One threesome denied a marriage license has filed suit against the
Salt Lake City county clerk’s office, arguing that if Texas cannot criminal-
ize sodomy then Utah should not be able to criminalize polygamy.88
Tom Green’s attorney sought to have his polygamy conviction thrown out
in light of Lawrence.89  Meanwhile, polygamy has found some heavyweight
allies.  The ACLU has embraced the comparison, urging that Lawrence’s
defense of intimacy liberty extends to the polygamist lifestyle.  In chal-
lenging the denial of a marriage license to a plural union, one ACLU
leader contended that “[t]alking to Utah’s polygamists is like talking to
gays and lesbians who really want the right to live their lives, and not live
in fear because of whom they love.  So certainly that kind of privacy ex-
pectation is something the ACLU is committed to protecting.”90  Hence,
85. Pro-Polygamy.com, supra note 5.
86. One polygamist activist argued in Newsweek, “If Heather can have two mommies,
she should also be able to have two mommies and a daddy.”  Elise Soukup, Polygamists,
Unite!, Newsweek, Mar. 20, 2006, at 52, 52.  Similarly, Carol Smith of the Women’s
Religious Liberties Union, a pro-polygamy group, concurs:  “[Y]ou can’t discriminate
against us because of our life choices.”  ACLU of Utah to Join Polygamists in Bigamy Fight,
Am. Civ. Liberties Union (July 16, 1999), at http://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/aclu-utah-
join-polygamists-bigamy-fight (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Felicia R. Lee,
Real Polygamists Look at HBO Polygamists, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2006, at E1 (quoting
polygamist widow’s thoughts on Big Love premiere as, “[polygamy] can be seen as a viable
alternative lifestyle between consenting adults”).
87. Pro-Polygamy.com, supra note 5 (emphasis omitted).  The home page also
includes an excerpt from Lawrence v. Texas.  Id. (noting “individuals have ‘the full right to
engage in private conduct without government intervention’” and that “[o]bviously, this
brings enormous ramifications for the civil rights of adult, freely-consenting, non-abusive,
marriage-committed polygamists” (quoting syllabus of Lawrence)).
88. Complaint at 8, Bronson v. Swensen, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (D. Utah 2004) (No.
02:04-CV-21-TS).  The district court stated that Utah’s criminal prohibition of polygamy
did not violate any substantive due process right. Bronson, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
However, on appeal the Tenth Circuit held that there was no justiciable controversy, and
therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  Bronson v. Swensen, 500
F.3d 1099, 1113 (10th Cir. 2007).
89. Green was charged with four counts of bigamy and also criminal nonsupport.  He
appealed his bigamy convictions, but the Utah Supreme Court affirmed them.  State v.
Green, 99 P.3d 820, 822 (Utah 2004); Catherine Blake, Note, I Pronounce You Husband
and Wife and Wife and Wife:  The Utah Supreme Court’s Re-Affirmation of Anti-Polygamy
Laws in Utah v. Green, 7 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 405, 405 (2005).
90. Basham, supra note 78 (quoting Steven Clarke, the ACLU’s Salt Lake City legal R
director).  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once questioned the constitutionality of laws
mandating monogamy while serving as general counsel of the American Civil Liberties
Union.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Brenda Feigen Fasteau, Report of Columbia Law School
Equal Rights Advocacy Project:  The Legal Status of Women under Federal Law 190–91
(1974).  Constitutional scholar Jonathan Turley also invokes the gay analogy, opposing
criminal prosecutions of plural marriage and arguing that the abuse laws have been used
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from multiple quarters, the alternative lifestyles defense is rapidly on its
way to becoming a legal trope, with all of the accompanying analogical
power.
Finally, perhaps most intriguingly of all, polygamists have gained
some gay allies, exposing somewhat of a rift in the gay rights community.
Many in the campaign for same-sex marriage reject any common cause
with polygamists.91  Yet, others have broken with the party line.  Scholars
such as David Chambers, Chesire Calhoun, and Martha Ertman have
compared the persecution of Mormon polygamists and the contemporary
LGBT community, drawing links between nineteenth-century bans on po-
lygamy and the 1996 DOMA as the only two instances in which Congress
intervened in state regulation of marriage.  They also point out that,
while DOMA targets same-sex couples, it also limits marriage to “monoga-
mous,” or dyadic, unions.  DOMA thus entrenches heterodyadic marriage
as a federal norm.  Each cautions the gay rights movement against exclud-
ing polygamists from the campaign for intimacy liberty.  Professor
Calhoun explains:  “[D]espite their apparent radicalism, both the pro-
polygamy and pro-same-sex marriage campaigns have been marked by an
antipluralist and exclusionary conception of marriage.  Neither debate
seized the opportunity to question the desirability of defining a single form
of state marriage.”92  She and Martha Ertman have both urged that the
gay rights movement should embrace more fully the disestablishment of
the traditional marriage ideal.93  Michigan law professor David Chambers
concludes:
to target polygamists, much as sodomy laws have been used to persecute gays.  See Turley,
supra note 11 (discussing this issue in relation to Green). R
91. On the academic front, several legal scholars have rejected the analogy.  See, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 8.  Conservative columnist and political commentator Charles
Krauthammer has said:
In an essay 10 years ago, I pointed out that it is utterly logical for polygamy rights
to follow gay rights.  After all, if traditional marriage is defined as the union of (1)
two people of (2) opposite gender, and if, as advocates of gay marriage insist, the
gender requirement is nothing but prejudice, exclusion and an arbitrary denial
of one’s autonomous choices in love, then the first requirement—the number
restriction (two and only two)—is a similarly arbitrary, discriminatory and
indefensible denial of individual choice.
This line of argument makes gay activists furious.  I can understand why they
do not want to be in the same room as polygamists.  But I’m not the one who put
them there.  Their argument does.
Charles Krauthammer, Editorial, Pandora and Polygamy, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 2006, at
A19.  But see Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 559, 603 (2008)
(acknowledging linkages but urging gay marriage activists to continue distancing
themselves from polygamy to preserve social and political capital); see also Emens, supra
note 24, at 280–81 (“In short, both sides in the debate over same-sex marriage seem to R
agree on one thing:  whatever happens with gay marriage, multiparty marriage should
remain impossible.”).
92. Calhoun, supra note 52, at 1036–37. R
93. Calhoun notes:
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One of the lessons to be derived from exploring the history of
reactions to Mormon polygamy is that all of us, including those
of us who favor same-sex marriage, find difference threatening,
and that all of us, including those who favor same-sex marriage,
need to work harder to understand those who are different from
us.94
Analogies are powerful weapons in the liberal legal arsenal.95  Thus,
if the gay marriage analogy holds, a strong case can be made to treat likes
alike.  For opponents of expanding recognition for alternative lifestyles,
permitting gay marriage means opening the flood gates to other sexual
minorities, including polygamists.  For polygamy’s proponents the ana-
logical force tilts in the other direction, meaning that the growing accept-
ability of gay intimacy should yield acceptance for plural relationships as
well.  In many ways then, the gay analogy is the battleground on which
the cultural war over expanded recognition for alternative family struc-
tures is being fought.
B. A Miscue
Despite Hollywood’s efforts to market Big Love as a “quirky family,”
the next Sopranos, Sex and the City, or Six Feet Under, the controversy over
polygamy is more than just another unconventional lifestyle debate.  Al-
though compelling and provocative, the gay analogy is a miscue, a distrac-
tion from polygamy’s meaningful distinctiveness and the actual chal-
lenges it poses for law and its regulation of intimate relationships.  Both
the slippery slope invocation and the alternative lifestyles defense fall
prey to this.  Each relies on the notion that polygamy’s distinctiveness lies
in the fact of its deviation from conventional intimacy norms—no differ-
ent than same-sex marriage.  This analogy may hold when gay and plural
Same-sex marriage advocacy loses much of its radical (and plain old liberal)
potential by refusing to take up the banner of disestablishing a single state form
of marriage.  Disestablishing a single state form of marriage would in turn, of
course, open the doors to state recognition of polygamous marriages.
Id. at 1037; see also Ertman, Race Treason, supra note 63, at 357–65 (“DOMA’s supporters R
raised status-based arguments to ban same-sex marriage that eerily echo nineteenth
century concerns about polygamy fostering chaotic households and feral relationships that
threaten civilization.”).
94. Chambers, Polygamy, supra note 80, at 54; see also David L. Chambers, What If? R
The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male
Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 491 (1996) (“By ceasing to conceive of marriage as a
partnership composed of one person of each sex, the state may become more receptive to
units of three or more.”).
95. As Serena Mayeri points out, law works by analogy, and hence commensurability
claims may be an unavoidable consequence.  See Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of
Discrimination”:  Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 Yale L.J.
1045, 1046 (2001) (exploring constitutional trajectory of analogical arguments in civil
rights jurisprudence); see also Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1789, 1792 (2008) (challenging standard account of sex equality
jurisprudence as resting on imperfect and incomplete analogy to race and instead positing
more reciprocal relationship in 1970s sex equality advocacy).
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marriage are viewed as matters of intimacy liberty, privacy, autonomy, and
agency, or even an incipient constitutional respect for “sexual minori-
ties.”96  However, from a regulatory perspective, and the question of what
stake the law has in how intimates treat each other, the challenges posed
by dyadic marriage, gay or straight, and plural marriage differ
substantially.
Recall that this Article relies on the crucial distinction between
decriminalization and legalization, i.e., between repealing the prohibi-
tions on plural marriage and enacting positive regulations to license and
govern it.97  There are important differences in the legal histories of
same-sex and plural intimacy, including the fact that sodomy was
criminalized but same-sex marriage was not.  Such unions were denied
recognition and licensure, but there were no prosecutions for attempting
same-sex marriage.98  The regulation of plural intimacy has been the con-
verse.  Plural intimacy has only been criminalized in conjunction with
monogamous marriage, that is, as adultery.99  On the other hand, plural
marriages are a crime, with prosecutions often based on courts finding
“constructive marriages,” an ironic and bizarre form of recognition.100
96. In her work on polygamy in South Africa, Penny Andrews questions whether this
aspect of the analogy holds up:
But arguably, the recognition of the rights of gay people to marry is somewhat
different than the recognition of polygamy.  The institution of polygamy is
embedded in patriarchal traditions that raise profound questions about the
volition of women who choose to enter into a polygamous arrangement.
Whether the exercise to marry a polygamous husband is a free choice or not, it is
arguably circumscribed by economic pressures.  The reality is that women’s
continuing subordinate status in South Africa curtails the free exercise of her
choice in a range of situations, including whom she chooses to marry.
Penelope E. Andrews, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy?  Exploring the Boundaries of Family,
Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 351, 368 [hereinafter Andrews,
Who’s Afraid of Polygamy?] (footnotes omitted).
97. Several legal theorists recently re-clarified the crucial distinction between
decriminalization and legalization.  Discussing sex work, they say, “Legalization involves
complete decriminalization coupled with positive legal provisions regulating one or more
aspect of sex work businesses.”  Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:  Four
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 335, 339 (2006).
Decriminalization may be partial, i.e., decriminalizing the activities of sex workers alone, or
complete, eliminating all criminal legislation.
98. C.f. Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 18, at 1759–60 (distinguishing between R
states where same-sex couples can legally acquire marriage licenses and those where such
licenses may be conferred upon such couples in contravention of law and left to state
courts to evaluate for legality and enforcement).
99. Of course adultery was criminalized along with fornication outside of marriage,
and remains so in some states.  But there have never been heightened penalties for plural
fornication.
100. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Texas Polygamy and Child Welfare, 46 Hous. L.
Rev. 759, 768–71, 778 (2009) (describing states’ insistence that they have power to
recognize marriages when they wish to regulate polygamy and to refuse to recognize
marriages when they wish to deny benefits to same-sex couples).
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While the decriminalization projects of same-sex and plural intimacy are
by and large the same, i.e., repealing prohibitory legislation, their legal
recognition—their licensing and regulation—are not.
Much has been written about game theory and bargaining in dyadic
marriage, most of it focusing on disparities in bargaining power between
men and women, i.e., husbands and wives.  Early scholars of the house-
hold, such as Gary Becker, downplayed conflicts within households, con-
tending that husbands had incentives to be “altruistic” in managing re-
sources to the benefit of the household.101  Subsequent empirical studies,
though, have challenged Becker’s hypothesis.  The now vast literature on
household bargaining has identified two primary points of conflict be-
tween husbands and wives:  the struggle to control resources during the
marriage and the distribution of resources at the end of the marriage.
For instance, Robert Pollak and Shelly Lundberg have shown that hus-
bands and wives allocate resources differently in marriages.102  In addi-
tion, economists have documented a variety of factors that make women
vulnerable as marriages proceed, thereby diminishing their bargaining
power.103  Women as a group do the majority of child-rearing, thereby
losing market capital, while at the same time aging and also losing
“beauty capital.”  Men, on the other hand, enjoy enhanced market capi-
tal, due in part to the “flow of domestic labor” they enjoy from their
wives, and while men may lose their looks as they age, they gain social and
economic capital, which may be more attractive to other women.104  The
upshot is the much-studied divorce threat, in which husbands’ ability to
leave their marriages and start afresh diminishes wives’ bargaining power.
For all of its insight and richness, this vast literature has largely limited
101. Becker noted:
Altruism is common in families not only because families are small and have
many interactions, but also because marriage markets tend to “assign” altruists to
their beneficiaries. . . . [For example,] [a]ltruistic parents might not have more
children than selfish parents, but they invest more in the human capital or quality
of children because the utility of altruistic parents is raised by the investment
returns that accrue to their children.
Gary S. Becker, Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place, 48 Economica
1, 12 (1981); see also Becker, Treatise, supra note 10, at 277–306 (elaborating on altruism R
theory).
102. Shelly Lundberg, Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, Do Husbands and Wives
Pool Their Resources?  Evidence from the U.K. Child Benefit, 32 J. Hum. Resources 463,
464 (1997).
103. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 18 (describing how market and domestic norms R
economically marginalize women, leaving them financially vulnerable within their
marriages).
104. See generally Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (1985) (describing
unintended and negative consequences of no-fault divorce in California on women and
children); Williams, supra note 18 (showing how allocation of domestic labor allows men R
to become ideal workers with increased earning capacity while women become increasingly
economically marginalized); Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and
Distribution in Marriage, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 139, 141–52 (1996) [hereinafter Lundberg &
Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution] (discussing familial bargaining models).
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itself to assumptions and studies of dyadic marriages involving only two
spouses.105  Marital multiplicity however engenders distinct interactions
and dynamics.
First, in the two-person marital model, scholars have distinguished
“formation,” “midgame,” and “end game” (i.e., divorce), as the relevant
bargaining time frames.106  Plural marriages proceed in a way that neces-
sarily complicates these dynamics and assumptions.  Polygamous unions
as practiced typically envision the serial addition of new spouses, thereby
contemplating ongoing formation, and, as some communities’ higher
rates of divorce demonstrate, ongoing exits.107  In other words, they form
105. Economists Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak point out that “[m]ost
bargaining models of family behavior allow two decision makers—the husband and the
wife.”  Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 104, at 142; see also R
Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining Around the Hearth, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 414, 416 (2007)
[hereinafter Pollak, Bargaining Around the Hearth], at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/property-law/bargaining-around-the-hearth/ (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“Economists achieve specificity and simplicity by focusing on
two-person households or, more precisely, on households in which only two persons play
roles in household governance.”).
106. Compare Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household:  Informal Property
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 226, 238, 297 (2007), at http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal/content-pages/unpacking-the-household:-
informal-property-rights-around-the-hearth/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(analyzing relationships in household “formation,” “midgame,” and “endgame”), with
Pollak, Bargaining Around the Hearth, supra note 105, at 417 (using four models to refute R
Ellickson’s midgame analysis).
107. One historical study found that “many Mormon marriages during [the Brigham
Young period] were rather unstable, and official attitudes toward divorce were quite
lenient,” resulting in higher rates of divorce.  Eugene E. Campbell & Bruce L. Campbell,
Divorce Among Mormon Polygamists:  Extent and Explanations, 46 Utah Hist. Q. 4, 5
(1978).  The authors found that “although statements about the family and the eternal
nature of the marriage covenant might lead one to conclude that the barrier against
divorce in Mormon polygamy was strong, there were other factors tending to reduce that
barrier.”  Id. at 12.  In fact, “[i]n addition to the normal problems that arise in marriage
relationships, the Mormon concepts of millennialism, the feelings of romantic love, and
the lack of proven standards of conduct and behavior all contributed to the relatively high
ratio of divorce among Mormon polygamists.”  Id. at 8.  Speculating on reasons for higher
divorce rates in this context, the authors noted:  “The pressure to marry polygamously
appears to have been intense, and little attention was paid to the future stability of such
marriages because of the belief that the coming millennium would solve such earthly
problems.”  Id. at 10.  In his famous quote, Brigham Young himself acknowledged the
stresses polygamy could bring to families:
And my wives have got to do one of two things; either round up their shoulders to
endure the afflictions of this world, and live their religion, or they may leave, for I
will not have them about me.  I will go into heaven alone, rather than have
scratching and fighting around me.
Id. at 11.  In keeping with this, Young was generous in granting divorces.  See Edwin Brown
Firmage & Richard Collin Mangrum, Zion in the Courts:  A Legal History of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1830–1900, at 325 (1988) (“The emphasis placed on
reconciliation, however, did not preclude divorce, and polygamy increased its likelihood.
Though for Mormons divorce had grave consequences, if the couple insisted, the brethren
did not stand in the way . . . .”).
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL801.txt unknown Seq: 36 15-NOV-10 9:07
1990 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 110:1955
incrementally.  This open-ended multiplicity complicates the basic logis-
tics of marital registration and licensing, a relatively minor, but still note-
worthy point from the perspective both of plural families themselves as
well as the administrative systems that license intimacy.  But, more to the
point, unlike dyadic marriage, in polygamy, there is no “midgame.”  The
marriage is constantly forming and constantly dissolving.
From a bargaining perspective, this has significant and material ef-
fects.  In the two-person model, marriage formation fixes certain spousal
rights and entitlements that typically are not altered until dissolution.108
While the division of spousal property at divorce will be uncertain in all
but the eleven community property states, other rights, such as inheri-
tance, retirement, and employment benefits, are fixed by law.  Mary Anne
Case refers to this as “reciprocal default designations.”109  Jane gets fifty
percent of John’s government or employment benefits; reciprocally, John
gets fifty percent of Jane’s.  However, plural marriage substantially com-
plicates this easy reciprocity.  First, it blurs the application of automatic
reciprocity; when the unit is John, Jane, and Jo, it is less clear whether
Jane or Jo, or both, are John’s reciprocals in benefits and entitlements.
At least as significantly, the addition of each subsequent spouse increases
the claims on the marital “pie,” thereby reducing the proportion of the
existing spouses’ “draw.”110  It also may alter a spouse’s influence within
the unit, reducing it from the presumptive fifty percent of “voting
power.”
Similarly, daily “inputs” and “outputs”—income flows and consump-
tion patterns—are less predictable and controllable in plural unions.  A
“mono-wife” can more easily control her own reproduction and the con-
sumption patterns of and investments in her children than can a co-wife
for a “poly” household.111  Economist Robert Pollak and others have con-
108. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage:  Divorce or Death,
2005 Utah L. Rev. 1227, 1233–74 [hereinafter Rosenbury, Two Ways] (analyzing
differences between state laws regulating distribution of property following divorce and
death).  All of this, of course, is against the background of what Martha Fineman calls the
privatization of dependency.  See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth:
A Theory of Dependency 38 (2004) (“Instead of a societal response, inevitable dependency
has been assigned to the quintessentially private institution—the traditional, marital
family.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1403,
1405–06 (2001) (“[T]he public nature of dependency is hidden, privatized within the
family . . . .”).
109. Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 18, at 1783 (“Among the chief functions civil R
marriage today serves is as a series of reciprocal default designations . . . .”); see also Laura
A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 226–33 (2007) [hereinafter
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?] (urging social insurance functions of intimate
associations, including non-sexual ones).
110. Of course, the pie could be enlarged, in theory.
111. This is consistent with studies showing “a strong positive association between
child well-being and the mother’s relative control over family resources” or what I call the
“kids-do-better hypothesis.”  Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note
104, at 140. R
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tested game theory approaches to intrahousehold distribution as reliant
on misguided unitary or common preference models of households that
“treat[ ] the family as though it were a single decision-making agent, with
a single pooled budget constraint and a single utility function that in-
cluded the consumption and leisure time of every family member.”112
Polygamy in particular has long confounded standard models of “in-
trafamily distribution” predicated on “single-agent models.”113  While
common preference models do not accurately describe “mono” house-
holds, they are even less likely to capture the complexity of negotiation or
consumption and distribution in “poly” ones.
Hence, as typically practiced, the serial and open-ended nature of
polygamy’s multiplicity means that one doesn’t know whether one will
end up as a mono-wife or as one of ten co-wives.114  Without veto power,
poly wives cannot accurately predict change and diminution.  In sum, po-
lygamy’s serial entrances and exits means that these unions are constantly
forming and constantly dissolving, which engenders substantial uncer-
tainty and vulnerability for plural spouses.
In addition to the transaction costs of managing instability and vul-
nerabilities, marital multiplicity and seriality also enable intimate oppor-
tunism and strategic behavior.  As Bob Ellickson observes, “[a] household
setting is rife with possibilities for an opportunist.”115  Polygamy enhances
these possibilities.  Anthropologists studying polygynous cultures report
that husbands threaten to marry an additional wife to exert power over
existing wives.116  And perhaps suggesting that a gendered dynamic is at
112. Id. at 142.  The “common preference” model of the family “may be the outcome
of consensus among family members or the dominance of a single family member, but all
such models imply that family expenditures are independent of which individuals in the
family receive income or control resources.”  Id. at 139; see also Shelly Lundberg & Robert
A. Pollak, Efficiency in Marriage, 1 Rev. Econ. Household 153, 153–54 (2003) [hereinafter
Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency] (countering the proposition that marriage provides
“stationary environment” in which repeated interactions lead to efficient outcomes and
allocations).
113. Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 104, at 140–41. R
Such models also “rule out analysis of intrafamily distribution or of the connection
between marriage markets and marital behavior.”  Id. at 154; see also Lundberg & Pollak,
American Family, supra note 47, at 12 (explaining “[u]nitary models imply that spouses R
pool their resources” so that “behavior . . . depends on prices, wage rates, and total
nonlabor income”).  In contrast, other family economics models that try to take account of
the “multiplicity of decision makers in the family” are more helpful in considering
polygamy.  Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 104, at 141–42. R
114. See infra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (discussing uncertainty of R
monogamy contracts).
115. Robert C. Ellickson, Norms of the Household, in Norms and the Law 59, 64
(John N. Drobak ed., 2006) [hereinafter Ellickson, Norms of the Household].
116. See Ellen E. Foley, Your Pocket Is What Cures You:  The Politics of Health in
Senegal 120 (2010) (“The permanent threat of a co-wife serves as an effective mechanism
to ensure that women live up to dominant expectations about their roles as wives and
mothers.”); see also Pearl & Menski, supra note 23, at 210–14 (describing cases involving R
this dynamic).
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work, studies of polyandry do not seem to have uncovered a similar dy-
namic.117  This intimate blackmail midgame is not the innovation of poly-
gynous husbands, of course.  The ubiquitous, much studied, and in-
tensely gendered “divorce threat” demonstrates that men’s greater
options outside of marriage give them more bargaining power within
it.118  However, husbands in polygynous unions can threaten the eco-
nomic or emotional diminution of an existing wife’s status without risk-
ing the other losses, and potential litigation, of complete exit or di-
vorce.119  Hence polygyny’s “marriage threat” gives husbands even more
bargaining power to accompany the divorce threat.
Nor is strategic or opportunistic behavior limited to intergender in-
teractions and negotiations.  Plural wives can find themselves in intensely
competitive relationships.120  Polygamy can heighten and intensify house-
hold conflicts as co-wives jockey for either formal or informal status that
accompanies rank and favor with the husband, as well as for daily and
long-term economic and emotional resources for themselves and their
children.  The possibility of a “runt wife” is real.121  Some findings suggest
these conflicts weigh particularly heavily on first wives, who may have an-
ticipated, hoped for, or been promised a dyadic marriage as a mono-wife.
But, under polygamy, all wives must make ongoing assessments of
whether to submit, renegotiate, or exit as their household constantly
shifts.122
117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting women in polyandrous R
societies are also oppressed and do not measure social status by number of husbands).
118. See generally Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household
Decision-Making:  A Bargaining Analysis, 21 Int’l Econ. Rev. 31 (1980) (discussing
marriage as decision based on relative bargaining power and preferences); Marjorie B.
McElroy & Mary Jean Horney, Nash-Bargained Household Decisions:  Toward a
Generalization of the Theory of Demand, 22 Int’l Econ. Rev. 333, 346 (1981) (finding
decision to marry “depends upon the maximum value of (indirect) utility each person can
obtain outside of the household”).  But see Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate
Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 988, 988 (1993) (displacing
conventional divorce threat model with threat of noncooperative marriage).
119. See, e.g., Alexandre, Big Love, supra note 23, at 14–16 (describing how husbands R
foment rivalry among co-wives as way of maintaining power).
120. There is substantial literature as to whether women in polygynous households
are competitive or cooperative.  See, e.g., Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 32–33, 126 (“Broadly R
speaking, cooperation and competition among co-wives vary markedly even within local
regions, making generalizations about them . . . difficult.”); see also Bennion, supra note
54, at viii, 160, 173–74 (noting attraction of some to polygamy’s “economic communalism” R
and “fierce interdependence” but also finding conflicts between wives over resources for
their children and manipulation of husbands for resources); Remi Clignet & Joyce A.
Sween, For a Revisionist Theory of Human Polygyny, 6 Signs 445, 452–58 (1981)
(discussing differences in polygynous wives’ background experiences and concluding,
“[w]hether these variations enhance competition or cooperation among co-wives or
facilitate a more egalitarian pattern of division of labor among them should depend on the
degree to which they confirm the prerogatives attached to matrimonial rank”).
121. I owe this term to Kathy Baker.
122. As two scholars have put it:
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL801.txt unknown Seq: 39 15-NOV-10 9:07
2010] REGULATING POLYGAMY 1993
All of these dynamics—uncertainty, vulnerability, and opportu-
nism—run counter to the sharp trend in family law, which has been to
promote egalitarianism and fairness in marriage.123  Nor is family law, as
currently structured, equipped to deal with these bargaining dilemmas.
Family law is a licensing scheme, necessary for formation (marriage) and
dissolution (divorce), but with little to say, or do, in between.  Rights are
fixed at formation and do not change until endgame, or divorce.  Family
law has taken the not uncontroversial decision not to intervene in “intact”
families midgame.  In fact, prenuptial or postnuptial agreements specify-
ing marital behavior or allocating household responsibilities are unlikely
to be enforced during the life of the marriage.124  What Saul Levmore has
While a man decides successively whether to marry, to divorce, or to add a new
wife to his household, a woman must first decide whether to enter a monogamous
household or to enter a polygynous one as a junior co-wife.  Should she take the
first route, she must later decide whether to divorce her husband or to accept the
role of a senior co-wife.  If she divorces, she must decide whether she will retain
such a status, whether she will remarry a monogamous male, or whether she will
reenter a polygynous household as a junior co-wife.
Clignet & Sween, supra note 120, at 450.  According to one “first wife” in Philadelphia, R
“polygamy isn’t easy for either wife,” though she thinks it is “harder on the first.”  She
explained, “The second wife is receiving something, where a first wife will feel that
something is being taken away from her.  I mean, I’m devoted to you for my whole life, but
then you’re only devoted to half of my life.”  All Things Considered:  Philly’s Black Muslims
Increasingly Turn to Polygamy (NPR radio broadcast May 28, 2008), available at
http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=90886407
&m=90907215 (transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Zeitzen’s findings
confirm this:  “Overall, junior wives were less dissatisfied . . . .”  Zeitzen, supra note 26, at R
128.
123. Several scholars argue the trajectory in family law in the last half century has
been to incorporate fairness and anti-exploitation in state-sanctioned intimate relations.
See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action?  Searching for Gender Talk in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 97, 110–11 (2005) (“American family
law has changed dramatically with the elimination of official gender roles emerging as
perhaps the most significant and pervasive transformation.”); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminism and Family Law, 33 Fam. L.Q. 475 (1999) (reviewing feminism’s influence on
family law norms); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443,
1508–22 (describing emergence of individual autonomy and privacy and formal gender
equality as norms in family law); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law,
50 Stan. L. Rev. 225, 229 (1997) (reviewing Nancy E. Dowd, In Defense of Single-Parent
Families (1997) and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (1997) and stating that
family law’s “new ideology is based on fairness and equality both within and among families
rather than on concepts of fairness and equality for the head of the family hiding within
the language of family solidarity and interdependence”).  But see Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, supra note 109, at 194–96 (contending family law has achieved gender neutrality
but not necessarily gender equality).
124. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 456 (“Anglo-Saxon courts have R
traditionally abstained from intervening in conduct during marriage and this has not
changed with the no-fault revolution.”); see also Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan,
Properties of Marriage, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 76 (2004) (“Because [the legal rules
surrounding marital property] practically apply most often at the moment of divorce,
commentators tend to focus more on their impact on divorced and divorcing couples than
on ongoing marital relationships.”); Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra note 18, at 70–71 R
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characterized as exclusivity of remedies, or “love-it-or-leave-it” rules, re-
quire parties in some relationships to “simply end the relationship or not
litigate at all.”125  Marriage, again controversially, is one of those relation-
ships with little recourse for dispute resolution midgame.126  The only
option is dissolution, and with the advent of no-fault divorce, many mid-
game wrongs may never be litigated.
Yet polygamous marriages defy family law’s binary between intact
and dissolving families.  Polygamy’s serial additions and exits mean that
rights and status are in an ongoing process of alteration and in a context
in which vulnerabilities are heightened and chances for opportunism
grow with the addition of each spouse.  As Levmore says of commercial
partnerships, “[i]t is easy to imagine that this exclusivity (of remedies)
(“Premarital agreements . . . are enforceable when the terms of the agreement fix property
rights at the end of marriage. . . . But they are generally unenforceable insofar as the
attempt to govern [nonmonetary agreements].”).  For an argument in favor of prohibiting
the enforcement of all prenuptial agreements on equality grounds, see Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Prenuptial Agreements:  A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 359
(2005) (contending prenuptial agreements are overenforced, creating inequality between
married and unmarried couples).
125. Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It:  Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity
of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1995, at 221,
224 [hereinafter Levmore, Love It or Leave It].  Levmore characterizes such regimes as
adopting property rules at the expense of liability rules:
In contrast, a shareholder of a corporation can pursue a claim against an agent,
or fiduciary, while continuing to own stock in the corporation.  Somewhat
similarly, an employee can sue her employer (and, conversely, the employee can
be sued) without severing the employment relationship. . . . Other fiduciaries can
also be sued while their services continue.
Id. at 226 (footnote omitted).  The “implicit question is whether a love-it-or-leave-it rule
generates more or less private bargaining or compromise than a scheme that permits
ongoing appeals or judicial intervention.”  Id. at 228.  See generally Margaret F. Brinig &
June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 855, 856–57
(1988) (reexamining spousal support regimes in light of no-fault divorce and increased
economic opportunities for women).
126. Saul Levmore states:
The love-it-or-leave-it rule governing marriage might be regarded as economizing
on valuation work, among other things, because, even when parties proceed to
divorce, courts can often avoid performing the valuation tasks that would be
necessary if married persons had liability rights.  It is, after all, often the case that
decisions about divorce, child custody, support payments, and so forth can be
made without assessing the harm imposed earlier by implicit or explicit breaches
of the marriage arrangement.  For this reason alone, it is not surprising that the
law of partnership remedies has moved further and more quickly toward a
liability rule than has the law of marriage and divorce.
Levmore, Love It or Leave It, supra note 125, at 243 (footnotes omitted).  Martha Ertman R
concurs:
One of the reasons that business relationships and intimate relationships are
described as private is the purported lack of state intervention in those
relationships.  The end of a partnership (romantic or business) is one of the few
instances in which the state can play an active role.  During the course of the
relationship, the state generally allows the parties to regulate their own affairs.
Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 104 (footnote omitted). R
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rule can leave wrongs uncorrected and in this way permit an unhealthy
degree of exploitation of a minority partnership interest,” or, in this con-
text, of a plural marital partner.127
In the end, then, the analogy between same-sex marriage and polyg-
amy is both inaccurate and incomplete.  The battle for same-sex marriage
is fought on dyadic terrain; that is, gays and lesbians want the ability to
enter the current couples-only regime.  The sex of the spouses makes no
regulatory difference, only a moral one.  In contrast, as argued above, the
number of spouses creates a distinct set of dynamics.  Multiplicity can
generate additional chances for opportunistic and exploitative behavior
that runs counter to contemporary family law’s investment in formal
equality and fair treatment.  Hence, the gay marriage analogy, as provoca-
tive as it is, is a red herring, a distraction from the distinct regulatory
issues polygamy poses that gay marriage, as long as it is dyadic, does not.
C. A New Game:  The Polygamy Paradox
This is a very different account of polygamy than that given by other
scholars of economics and bargaining.  Both Gary Becker in his landmark
work on the economics of the household and Richard Posner in his work
on sex and bargaining have contended that, from a bargaining perspec-
tive, polygamy is “good” for women because of the sexual competition it
induces between men that advantages women in the marital “market-
place” (my term, not theirs).128  According to Becker, “[m]y analysis of
efficient, competitive marriage markets indicates . . . that the income of
women and the competition by men for wives would be greater when
polygyny is greater . . . .”129  Posner concurs:  “[P]olygamy with the con-
sent of all of the husband’s wives would be the unambiguously best re-
gime for women because it would expand their choice set.”130  In other
words, in cultures that do not limit men to one wife, the “demand” for
marriageable women exceeds the “supply,” giving women heightened
bargaining power, ex ante, in the courtship market.131
127. Levmore, Love It or Leave It, supra note 125, at 222. R
128. Becker, Treatise, supra note 10, at 80–104 (“[P]olygynous men have more R
incentive to invest in superior skills when the marginal contribution of women to output is
greater . . . .”); Posner, supra note 10, at 253 (“Polygamy increases the effective demand for R
women . . . .”).
129. Becker, Treatise, supra note 10, at 98. R
130. Posner, supra note 10, at 257. R
131. Posner continues:
The prohibition of polygamous marriage may appear to make no sense from the
standpoint of protecting women.  Polygamy increases the effective demand for
women, resulting in a lower average age of marriage for women and a higher
percentage of women who are married . . . . [R]arely is a person made better off
by having an option removed.  Forbidding polygamy withdraws one option from a
woman, namely that of being a nonexclusive wife.  By doing so it reduces
competition among men for women and thus reduces the explicit or implicit
price that a woman can demand in exchange for becoming a wife—even a sole
wife.
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What this model misses, however, is how marital multiplicity shifts
gender power after marriage, ex post.  In polygamy, women go from be-
ing a “scarce resource” when being courted to an “abundant” one as
wives, thereby losing bargaining power.  Following Becker and Posner’s
own logic, polygyny induces competition between wives over the now scarce
resource, the husband.  The wives must compete for his affection, his eco-
nomic resources, any employment or government benefits, and any other
entitlements or social insurance that might flow through him.132  Indeed,
empirical and other studies support this game speculation, documenting
competition and frustration among co-wives.133  Absent prenuptial agree-
ments, which would formalize and preserve the power Becker and Posner
hypothesize ex ante, polygamy’s complication of the two-person marital
model does indeed seem to disadvantage women.134
Moreover, these post-marital dynamics also challenge Becker and
Posner’s hypotheses about the ex ante marital “market.”  As courted wo-
men predict that their ex post bargaining power will diminish, this will
inevitably shape courtship dynamics.  Men who promise, or at least signal,
a willingness as husbands to diffuse co-wife competition may well find
themselves in higher demand, assuming that fair, or preferential, treat-
ment is at a premium for wives.  In addition, women may sacrifice other
valued negotiations in order to secure this fairness or preferential pre-
mium.135  Taking account of the full run of intimate relationships,
through courtship and the marriage itself, not only demonstrates that po-
lygamy disadvantages women after marriage, but also invalidates, or at
least weakens, the claim that they are advantaged before marriage.
Becker and Posner both underestimate the extent to which multiplicity
complicates marriage markets.  In sum, the set of bargaining dynamics
Id. at 253.
132. Posner does take note of other “factors” shaping polygamy’s gender dynamics,
such as the propensity to establish household hierarchies of co-wives to manage costs, and
surveillance of wives to prevent them from seeking adulterous unions elsewhere.  He
acknowledges that both of these reduce the freedom polygamy might otherwise give
women.  Id. at 255–57.
133. Miche`le Alexandre and Cynthia Cook have each documented various ways in
which polygamy is frustrating or painful for women.  See, e.g., Alexandre, Big Love, supra
note 23, at 13–17 (describing struggles polygamous families face when moving from R
Muslim to non-Muslim countries); Cook, supra note 30, at 239–49 (relating findings from R
interviews with women in polygamous marriages in Africa); see also Clignet & Sween, supra
note 120, at 457–58 (describing examples from Cameroon).  Theodore Bergstrom R
disagrees with Becker’s hypothesis using a formal economic model.  Bergstrom, supra note
30, at 11–12. R
134. See generally Barbara R. Bergmann, Becker’s Theory of the Family:
Preposterous Conclusions, 39 Challenge 9 (1996) (refuting Becker’s contention that
women fare better under polygamy than monogamy by showing abysmal status of women
in polygamous societies).
135. See, e.g., Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 24–25 (1989).
Tirole also points out that people will invest less in relationships they fear will become
asymmetrical.  Whether this is characteristic of polygamous marriages is an empirical
question.
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this Article has identified challenges existing efforts to apply game theory
to marital multiplicity.  Following Becker and Posner’s hypothesis, polyg-
amy should enhance women’s power in marriage markets.  And yet, the
opposite seems to be true.  This Part has suggested some reasons why.136
Becker and Posner focus solely on ex ante competition for wives.  How-
ever, if men must compete for wives in the polygynous courtship market,
then, once married, women spend the rest of their lives competing for
resources as wives.  This diminished bargaining power ex post also inevi-
tably shapes the gender allocation of bargaining power ex ante.  We
might think of this bargaining conundrum as the “polygamy paradox.”
D. Summary
The current structure of family law assumes a two-person marital
model and is designed to regulate and address the concerns that arise in
that context.  The only meaningful difference between same-sex and het-
erosexual marriage, is, of course, the gender of the spouses.  I do not
mean to minimize the cultural or political significance of this distinc-
tion—some find it immoral and intolerable; others a real but tolerable
difference, even helpful in exploding gender stereotypes; and still others
find it irrelevant and meaningless.  But, from the perspective of legal lo-
gistics, the gender of the spouses matters little.  Incorporating same-sex
couples into conventional dyadic marriage would portend some changes
for our current marital regime, but these are largely a matter of changing
linguistic gender assumptions.  “Gay marriage” does not challenge the lo-
gistical administration or change the underlying legal assumptions of the
prevailing marital model (and, definitionally, same-sex marriages,
whether dyadic or plural, would not entail the same gender dynamics).
Indeed, same-sex marriage advocates primarily seek to be admitted into
the current heterodyadic regime, not to undermine it.
In contrast to the gay marriage analogy, plural marriage is funda-
mentally different from dyadic marriage, whatever the gender of the
spouses.  In asserting gay marriage’s analogical force, we miss that polyg-
amy’s differences, and hence its regulatory challenges, stem not from
gender difference but from marital multiplicity.  For people who care
about distributive justice within the household, polygamy may fairly be
cause for concern.  Same-sex marriage, as long as it adheres to the cur-
rent dyadic regime, will not engender the heightened transaction costs,
vulnerabilities, and opportunism that polygamy does.
None of the domestic discourses of polygamy—fundamentalist,
black nationalist, or radical feminist—have addressed the regulatory
questions, which I argue are a central challenge for polygamy.  Similarly,
neither the slippery slope proponents nor advocates of expanded recog-
nition for alternative families have grappled with the regulatory implica-
136. Of course, there are many other reasons for women’s subordinate status in
polygamous communities.  Cultural, religious, and legal norms also affect women’s status.
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tions of multiplicity, largely limiting their arguments to assuming polyg-
amy’s ongoing criminalization as a fringe practice or to urging its
decriminalization in the name of “big love.”  Nor have other legal schol-
ars involved in the polygamy debate confronted regulation.  Liberal plu-
ralists who defend polygamy based on constitutional principles of relig-
ious freedom and intimacy liberty and those who urge toleration of
polygamy as a matter of protecting vulnerable populations have largely
limited their arguments to urging decriminalization of polygamy, avoid-
ing the prickly questions of regulating marital multiplicity.137  And finally,
those economists who have endorsed polygamy as “good for women” also
have limited their analysis to demand and supply ex ante, avoiding the
polygamy paradox and the distinct question of ex post negotiations.  In
sum, neither polygamy’s stakeholders nor the legal literature have con-
fronted polygamy’s distinctive features, instead assuming it is merely dy-
adic marriage multiplied.138
Can we effectively regulate marital multiplicity?  The dilemmas po-
lygamy engenders pose challenges that the two-person marital model is
not equipped to handle.  If polygamy is to be permitted, it will almost
certainly require distinct regulation to catch up to dyadic norms.  We are
not starting from scratch though.  The next Part considers these regula-
tory issues from the perspective of default rules, and whether we could
design a set that might measure up to the standards to which we currently
hold dyadic marriage.
III. BARGAINING FOR EQUALITY
Whether conducted in constitutional or public policy terms, schol-
arly debates over polygamy overwhelmingly have focused on decriminal-
ization.  Of course, ending the prohibition on plural marriage is a prelim-
inary and crucial question.  Yet, as described above, decriminalization is a
precursor to legalization, but the latter is distinct, entailing formal recog-
nition and positive regulation.  As Part II just illustrated, plural marriage
can yield heightened opportunities for opportunism and exploitation.
Decriminalization would not necessarily change that.  Full legalization
137. But see Miche`le Alexandre, who urges some limited reforms:
A women-centric form of polygamy is a system where all the decisions are made
by, and for the benefit of, the women involved.  All marriage contracts should
include the terms by which a male spouse might be allowed to marry one or more
additional wives.  In addition, all potential co-wives should negotiate among
themselves the terms of the partnership without any influence or coercion from
the male spouse.  A women-centric form of polygamy should also grant each co-
wife the unilateral right to divorce.  Finally, any equitable form of polygamy
should allow for the possibility of polyandry and must set up safeguards for the
physical and emotional protection of all the parties involved.
Alexandre, Big Love, supra note 23, at 26. R
138. Even other scholars who have refuted the gay marriage analogy have not
confronted polygamy’s distinctive bargaining dynamics and vulnerabilities.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL801.txt unknown Seq: 45 15-NOV-10 9:07
2010] REGULATING POLYGAMY 1999
might.  The rest of this Section explores the possibility of recognition and
regulatory amelioration.
A. Default Rules
Default rules are those that govern a transaction in the absence of
parties’ specifying their own rules.  Unlike immutable rules, which are
mandatory, default rules can be avoided by negotiating, bargaining, or
drafting around them.  Classic examples of default rules include the price
and delivery terms in the Uniform Commercial Code (avoided by specify-
ing these terms), expectation damages in common law contracts (avoided
by stipulating damages in advance), the mailbox rule (avoided by an of-
feror specifying the requirements for an offer to be accepted), and intes-
tacy (avoided by executing a will).139  Hence, the essence of a default rule
is that it determines outcomes when parties have been silent, that is,
when they have left a transaction incomplete.
As a matter of legal ideals, the design of any given set of default rules
should turn on underlying legal and policy goals.  Following Ayres and
Gertner’s classic distinction, majoritarian defaults are based on outcomes
that law determines most people would prefer.140  If the underlying the-
ory is that parties can and will bargain around default rules when it is in
their interest to do so, then the majoritarian approach reduces transac-
tion costs and hence facilitates arrangements.  Classic majoritarian rules
include the reasonable price term in sales of goods and intestacy defaults
to family members.  In contrast, penalty defaults are designed to shape
and direct behavior, typically to punish and deter strategic or opportunis-
tic behavior.141  For instance, information-forcing defaults shift costs to
139. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2005) (stating rules for contracts viewed as completed
despite absence of specific price); id. § 2-308(a) (noting in absence of specific place for
delivery, default delivery location is seller’s residence); see also Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence:  Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 822–24
(1992) (explaining conceptual role of “gap-filling” function default rules play under
“implied-in-law” theory in contract law); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice:  An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 264–89 (1985) (detailing function and risk of default rules).
140. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91 (1989); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1591 (1999) [hereinafter
Ayres & Gertner, Defaults] (exploring causes of contractual incompleteness to discern
appropriate default rules).
141. See Ayres & Gertner, Defaults, supra note 140, at 1591 (“Penalty default rules R
demonstrate how efficient rules cannot be derived by simply asking what most parties
would have contracted for had they written a complete contract.”).  Compare Ian Ayres, Ya-
Huh:  There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 589 (2006)
(defending penalty defaults against contentions that they do not exist or are inefficient),
with Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 557
(2006) (criticizing Ayres & Gertner’s model).  For a discussion of penalty defaults in the
public sphere, see Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 663 (2004) (discussing penalty defaults in context of statutory
incompleteness); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum.
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those who purposely leave contracts incomplete in order to avoid disclos-
ing information.142  Defaults such as construing contract ambiguities
against the drafter reduce opportunistic behavior by eliciting information
disclosure.  Relatedly, while the essence of default rules is that they can
be bargained around, some default rules are stickier than others.  Bar-
gaining around sticky rules generates higher transaction costs; the stick-
ier the default, the closer to a norm it becomes.143
Default rules are crucial in family law.  In the absence of prenuptial
agreements, or, even rarer, postnuptial ones, marital default rules govern
intimate relationships.  In fact, the marital context heightens the need
for thoughtful defaults precisely because people are unlikely to bargain
in intimate contexts.144  Romantic denial is one reason people do not
bargain in such contexts.  Signaling is another.  Even if a party is prag-
matic about an intimate partnership, he or she may still fear that re-
vealing a desire to bargain will be perceived as announcing disinvestment
or anticipation of failure in the relationship.  In addition, marriages are
long-term relational deals and suffer from their perils, including imper-
fect information ex ante and increased vulnerability ex post.  Finally, at
bottom, there is a widespread distaste for bargaining in the intimate
sphere, reinforced by law’s hesitancy about enforcing prenuptial agree-
ments.  These “allergies” may stem from a (false) equation of the “eco-
nomic” with the “commercial,” which is the antithesis of “romance” and
“family,” a classic manifestation of the public/private split.  For all of
these reasons—denial, signaling, information deficits, bargaining power,
and social norms—few couples avail themselves of their right to bargain
L. Rev. 2162 (2002) (arguing default rules are meant to elicit legislative and party
preferences); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L.
Rev. 2027 (2002) (asserting judges should choose probabilistic default rules that “minimize
the expected dissatisfaction of enactable preferences”); see also Rachel Leiser Levy,
Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks:  The Creation of a Common
Law Information-Eliciting Penalty Default Rule, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 695, 697 (2005)
(characterizing common law penalty default rule as information-forcing).
142. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan.
L. Rev. 1547, 1554 (1999) (“A default rule properly designed to elicit information . . .
would penalize the better-informed party for failing to contract around the rule.”); Lucien
Ayre Bebchuk & Steven M. Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of
Contract:  The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 284, 285–86 (1991)
(employing formal model to conclude that information-forcing default rule minimizes
transaction costs).
143. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law:  A Problem in
Search of its Context, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1031, 1042–52 (2004) (explaining sticky default
rules in intestacy context).
144. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Defaults and Choices in the Marriage
Contract:  How to Increase Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, and Circumvent
Constitutional Constraints, 24 Touro L. Rev. 31, 34 (2008) (“States have used their powers
to set default terms of the marriage contract in only a very limited way, however, typically
dealing solely with disposition of assets upon divorce.” (footnote omitted)).
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around marital defaults in the form of prenuptial or postnuptial
agreements.145
In addition, marital default rules are notoriously sticky.  Even when
parties are predisposed to bargain around them, their best efforts to do
so may come under heightened legal scrutiny and not be enforced.
Echoing Levmore’s love-it-or-leave-it principle, Stake and Rasmusen ob-
serve that while courts might uphold the financial agreements that
couples create, they remain reluctant to enforce behavioral conduct in an
existing marriage.146  Attempting to avoid marital defaults also generates
more hurdles and higher costs, including disclosure and counsel man-
dates.  Much has been written about courts’ reticence to enforce con-
tracts made between intimates, whether prenuptial agreements, postnup-
tial agreements, or other related agreements.147  This, along with various
145. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 175,
201–06 (2010) (using psychoanalytic psychology to consider propensity to enter prenuptial
agreements); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1989, 2021 (2000)
(arguing raising subject of prenuptial agreements signals distrust because there is no norm
of entering into such agreements); Stake, Mandatory Planning,  supra note 14, at 425–26 R
(explaining why few couples make premarital agreements); see also Williams, supra note
18, at 117–18 (describing anxiety over commodifying intimate relationships in distribution R
of marital property at divorce); Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the
Limits of Private Ordering, 73 Ind. L.J. 503, 505–09 (1998) (stating prenuptial agreements
may be avoided because they fail to account for lack of relevant information by parties, the
change in a mate’s character, or other inherent defects that can exist in marriage contract,
and noting modern restrictive marriage contracts exemplify intrusion of private ordering
into an institution traditionally considered public); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 254–58 (1995) (citing
prenuptial agreements as example of bounded rationality); Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market:  A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1497–99
(1983) (arguing traditional market/family dichotomy limited reforms aimed at improving
lives of women and transcending dichotomy can improve lives of all individuals); Elizabeth
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 1231
(1998) (arguing contractual paradigm of marriage encourages stability and mutual
investment in marital relationship).  On relational contract theory, see generally Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978).
Jeffrey Stake contends that making prenuptial agreements mandatory or incentivized
might eliminate bases for negative inferences, reduce bargaining costs, and force parties to
try to overcome their own irrationality.  Stake, Mandatory Planning, supra note 14, at R
425–27.  He also speculates that mandatory bargaining rules, as opposed to rules
generated by the state,  might make intimates more likely to honor their own
commitments.  Id. at 418.
146. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 464–65; see also Silbaugh, Marriage R
Contracts, supra note 18, at 76–79 (discussing courts’ reluctance to enforce nonmonetary R
provisions, such as those dictating division of labor, or restricting right to divorce, in
premarital agreements).
147. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (“[W]hen the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot
change.”); see also Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love:  The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 145,
150–58 (1998) (discussing some courts’ willingness to invalidate premarital agreements
that are substantively or procedurally unfair); Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 Hofstra
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allergies to marital bargaining, reinforces the importance of marital de-
faults as the “social norm,” and hence as crucial in the operation of family
law.
B. Partnership & Polygamy
One might assume that the task of generating default rules for polyg-
amy would be daunting.  Yet, there is an extant analogy, even if it is not to
same-sex marriage.  Commercial partnership law addresses some of the
same conundrums that plural marriage generates, i.e., an association
characterized by open-ended and serial multiplicity.  In other words, it
addresses ongoing entrances and exits that continually alter and trans-
form the association, as well as the individual property and other rights of
its members.  Whether a plural marriage or a business partnership, this
form of association generates unique transaction costs, bargaining uncer-
tainties, and possibilities for economic vulnerability and opportunism.
To address these concerns and minimize the costs of doing so from
scratch, partnership law has generated a robust set of default rules that
govern formation, entrance, exit (whether voluntary exit or expulsion),
dissolution, and property rights.  These rules minimize the costs of man-
aging both the intrinsic instability and also the economic and status vul-
nerability of partners.
The Uniform Partnership Act, as revised by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1997 (RUPA), defines a part-
nership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit.”148  Unlike the corporate form, partnership
unifies ownership, control, and liability.  The general partnership is a de-
fault, one that is created explicitly or implicitly in the absence of parties
choosing a different organizational form, such as a corporation or a lim-
ited liability association.
L. Rev. 1753, 1755–70 (2007) (discussing courts’ responses to co-parenting agreements
between gay couples, premarital agreements, separation agreements, and agreements with
egg/sperm donors or surrogates); Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 501 (stating courts R
have not kept up with changing societal sensibilities concerning marriage and thus may
not enforce marital contracts); Sherman, supra note 124, at 375–83 (discussing evolution R
and enforceability of prenuptial agreements); Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts, supra note 18, R
at 74–75 (discussing how courts treat premarital agreements differently than regular
contracts by scrutinizing them according to fairness criteria before enforcement); Barbara
Stark, Marriage Proposals:  From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 Calif.
L. Rev. 1479, 1495–97 (2001) (discussing courts’ willingness to enforce marital agreements
concerning services incidental to marriage, leaving such agreements in legal limbo).  A
leading case on other contracts between intimates is Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d
16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce contract stipulating compensation for spouse
who stayed in marriage and cared for other spouse during illness).
148. Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), § 101(6) (1997).  States almost
uniformly adopted the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914, and thirty-two states have
adopted some version of the revised Act, although with less uniformity than the 1914
version.
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One of the challenges that has plagued the field is whether the addi-
tion or departure of a partner necessitates a reformation or dissolution of
the partnership.  Partnership law has generated a comprehensive set of
entrance and exit rules that attempt to reduce the costs of managing this
constant instability.  New parties may join an existing partnership without
necessitating the formation of a brand new association.  By the same to-
ken, the 1997 revised rules expand and formalize the circumstances
under which a partner may exit, or dissociate, without necessitating disso-
lution of the entire association.  An individual partner can leave the part-
nership for any reason.  Or, under some circumstances, the existing part-
ners may vote for expulsion or seek judicial expulsion.149  Per the
revisions, partner exits, whether voluntary or not, yield one of two conse-
quences:  The partnership may be dissolved and business wound up, or
the remaining partners can buy out the exiting partner, seeking judicial
appraisal of the stake if need be.150  These defaults provide mechanisms
for the ongoing entrances and exits that so often characterize partner-
ship associations, while minimizing the costs of continual dissolution and
formation.
Permitting partnerships to remain intact through member transfor-
mation, though, generates another concern:  the adverse effects of ongo-
ing entrances and exits on the rights and statuses of existing partners.  By
default, partners are jointly and severally liable and distribute debts
equally, not according to contribution.151  Yet, the uncertainty of future
entrants into the membership means that one’s ownership percentage
and economic stake are also unknown.  Without control over partnership
admission, one can start off in a fifty-fifty partnership and eventually find
oneself with a minority economic stake through a series of entrances,
each of which diminishes the ability to vote down a subsequent admis-
sion.  In short, the partnership form generates real uncertainty and po-
tential for strategic and opportunistic behavior.  Partnership defaults at-
tempt to ameliorate these various vulnerabilities.
First, partnership law imposes fiduciary obligations on partners.
Partners owe each other, as well as the partnership, well-defined duties of
loyalty, care, and good faith.152  This rule is perhaps better described as a
quasi-default and quasi-immutable rule, as it can be “modif[ied] but not
waive[d].”153  Relatedly, equality is a governing default principle for part-
nership.  Partnerships default to a one-person-one-vote model, giving
149. Id. §§ 103(b)(6) & cmt. 8, 601(5), 602(a), 703 cmt., 801 cmt. 1.  But see Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act:  Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. Law.
45, 62–65 (1993) (contending RUPA dissociation changes are mainly illusory).
150. The 1997 RUPA provides a complex set of rules for when dissolution is triggered.
RUPA § 801.
151. Id. § 306(a) & cmt. 1.
152. Id. § 404(a)–(d); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 209, 215–16 [hereinafter Ribstein, Partners] (discussing function and nature of
fiduciary duties).
153. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Agency, Partnership & LLC’s 148 (2004).
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partners equal governance rights, and, in most situations, partnerships
are governed by majority rule.  In addition, default rules entitle partners
to an equal share of the association’s profits.154  Describing the curiosity
of this principle, especially when compared to corporate rules, Stephen
Bainbridge notes, “[e]qual division . . . is both a prominent solution and
also one that enjoys the benefit of strong social support.”155
However, there are some crucial deviations from egalitarianism, em-
blematic of other vulnerabilities that partnership’s inherent instability
can introduce.  For instance, unanimity is required to amend the partner-
ship agreement.  Similarly, entrance and exit rules are governed by una-
nimity principles.  Once the partnership association is formed, other par-
ties can join only with the unanimous consent of the existing partners.
By the same token, under certain conditions, the 1997 Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (RUPA) permits expulsion of a partner by unanimous
vote of the partnership, or by judicial expulsion.156  In the end, all of
these rules minimize the costs of managing instability, keeping partner-
ships intact regardless of entrance and exit, while ameliorating vulnera-
bility by reinforcing the importance of partner consent, egalitarianism,
and good faith norms.
The defaults I propose for plural marriage are based loosely on these
partnership rules.  The point is not to use partnership law as a literal
blueprint, but rather to make the point that there are already conceptual
models for what might be thought of as “plural marital associations.”
C. Defaults for Plural Marital Associations
While “off the rack” and frequently bargained around, these forma-
tion, exit, and dissolution defaults ameliorate at least some of the particu-
lar costs and vulnerabilities that the commercial partnership form gener-
ates.  Of course, marriage and commercial partnerships are different.
Partnerships are characterized by the profit-seeking motive that defines
all commercial associations.  They also are construed in the legal litera-
ture as “arms-length” relations, the conceptual opposite of intimate
ones.157  Still, commercial partnerships share some crucial characteristics
with long-term intimate associations.  Like partnerships, marriages typi-
cally generate wealth and assets through their members’ combined ef-
154. RUPA § 401(b).
155. Bainbridge, supra note 153, at 127.  Bainbridge further explains why R
corporations follow a different allocation:  “Social norms of fairness are most important
among players who are part of a close-knit group in which they repeatedly interact.
Partnership law is designed for small businesses in which the owners closely cooperate.”
Id.
156. RUPA §§ 401(i)–(j), 601(4).
157. Martha Ertman’s work resists this legal segregation.  See, e.g., Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage, supra note 18, at 19–20 (proposing use of commercial law R
norms within marriage to “solve some of the financial problems of divorced
homemakers”); Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 103–09 (suggesting strong R
similarities between intimate relationships and corporate partnerships).
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forts, which can confuse ownership and frustrate titling at dissolution
(that is, at divorce or death).158  In the eleven community property states,
the law has already recognized these similarities, explicitly incorporating
commercial partnership norms into its default principles.159  More re-
cently, reform of dissolution principles in family and inheritance law in
non-community-property states has been driven by the recognition that
intimate associations are also characterized by partnership principles.160
Like dyadic marriages, plural ones share key attributes with commer-
cial partnership, in addition to other characteristics that are distinct to
the plural form.  Most saliently, the open-ended multiplicity of both types
of plural association, i.e., the ongoing entrances and exits, whether of
partners or spouses, will continually alter and often diminish members’
rights and influence from a presumptive fifty percent while increasing
their liability and vulnerability.  In particular, people fear that polygamy’s
structure yields the potential for the strategic behavior and opportunism,
often gendered, described in Part II.B.161  While the vulnerability in-
duced by commercial associations, typically solely economic, and intimate
associations, sexual and emotional in addition to economic, differs in ob-
vious ways, the sources of both, the open-ended serial multiplicity, are
analogous.  The remainder of this Part uses commercial partnership de-
158. See generally Rosenbury, Two Ways, supra note 108 (summarizing how states R
distribute property at death or divorce).
159. See, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Community Property in California:  Cases,
Statutes, Problems 1 (1980) (“The crux of the community property system . . . is shared
ownership by husband (H) and wife (W) of acquisitions earned by either or both during
marriage. . . . Community property thus extends the notion of marriage as a partnership to
property rights of spouses.”); see also Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Calif. L.
Rev. 1517, 1538–41 (2003) (“The basic principle of the community property form . . . is
that spouses are equal owners of all property acquired during marriage resulting out of
either one’s effort . . . .”); Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and
Career Assets:  The Ascendency of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 59,
70–72 (2001) (stating “[p]artnership ideology draws on community property principles”
and explaining how system ensures spouses, like partnership members, enjoy more
equitable share of marital estate).
160. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse’s
Forced Share, 22 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 303, 308–10 (1987) (noting movement to
common property regime is likely based on contribution theory which recognizes marriage
as partnership); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in Divorce
Reform at the Crossroads 130, 136–41 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,
1990) (“Perhaps a better legal analogy to no-fault divorce can be found in partnership
law.”); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under
the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 236–42 (1991) (discussing 1990
UPC reforms of elective share in accord with marriage as partnership).  See generally Alan
Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law:  The
Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-
Property Alternative, 49 Emory L.J. 487 (2000) (comparing UPC reforms and community
property in implementing partnership approach to marriage).  But cf. Rosenbury, Two
Ways, supra note 108, at 1282–89 (arguing against partnership theory of marriage as R
entrenching gender roles in which women are caretakers and men are income earners).
161. Again, this is intragender behavior as well as intergender.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL801.txt unknown Seq: 52 15-NOV-10 9:07
2006 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 110:1955
faults to contemplate some analogs for polygamous marriages, or what we
might think of as “plural marital associations.”  It starts by comparing po-
lygamy and commercial partnerships, then derives a series of norms from
partnership rules, including unanimity, dissolution, and buyout norms,
considers how plural marital associations would interact with the existing
dyadic regime, and ends by contemplating whether the proposed rules
are best characterized as majoritarian or penalty defaults.
One first-order point is crucial.  An approach to plural marriage
based on the default rules of partnership would, as a matter of logic, in-
corporate the basic precepts of contracts.  In their twenty-first century it-
eration, contracts are only available to consenting adults.  Hence, one
first principle of plural marriage must be capacity to consent, which re-
quires a certain age and some degree of relevant information.162  In addi-
tion, it should go without saying that we have longstanding prohibitions
on both incest and statutory rape, and nothing in a regime recognizing
polygamy would change these basic norms.163  Finally, while dyadic mar-
riage historically mandates a notoriously low standard of capacity and
consent, given its risks, plural marriage could logically require more, e.g.,
raising the age of consent, requiring counseling, waiting periods, etc.164
In short, where polygamy might run afoul of other first principles of law,
such as sexual autonomy, informed consent, and protection of children,
it must give way to those prior principles.
162. From a constitutional perspective, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lawrence v.
Texas bolsters these baseline contractual principles in the intimate sphere.  Of the intimacy
liberty in question, the Court said, “The present case does not involve minors.  It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Cf. Annie Bunting, Stages of Development:  Marriage of Girls and Teens as an
International Human Rights Issue, 14 Soc. & Legal Stud. 17 (2005) (using sociological
insights to question wisdom of universal ban on early marriage); Guggenheim, supra note
100, at 814–16 (discussing complexity of imposing age norm on polygamous R
communities).
163. With regard to consensual incest among adults, some scholars have argued that it
too should be legalized, as the conventional rationales for its prohibition fade away.  See,
e.g., Christine McNiece Metteer, Some “Incest” Is Harmless Incest:  Determining the
Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest
Statutes, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 262, 279–81 (2000) (reviewing genetic, abuse of power,
and other rationales and concluding some incest bans should be lifted).  See generally
Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the Workplace,
33 Vt. L. Rev. 551 (2009) (grounding incest taboos in power imbalances between ancestors
and descendants to theorize regulation of workplace sexual relationships).
164. Marital age minimums might be raised to ensure comprehension of polygamy’s
distinct risks and also to guard against parents coercing their minor children into plural
marriage, a real concern given the abuses in some communities that currently practice
underground polygamy.  Similarly, states might explore heightened requirements such as
counseling, waiting periods, or refined informed consent norms.  See, e.g., Drobac & Page,
supra note 14, at 384 (noting some states already require or incentivize premarital R
counseling).
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1. Open-Ended Multiplicity. — The defining feature of polygamy is be-
ing married to more than one spouse at a time.  (In contrast, many peo-
ple have multiple spouses, but serially instead of contemporaneously.
This Article contrasts this “serial polygamy” at the end of Part III.)  Typi-
cally, polygamists do not present themselves as a complete(d) “group”
when they marry, but rather contemplate adding spouses serially, not un-
like the way that a partnership admits new members.  The defaults for
commercial partnership would enable plural marital associations to func-
tion in an analogous fashion.  Neither the addition of a new spouse nor
the departure of an existing one would necessitate the dissolution of a
marriage or the creation of a new one.  Instead, the marital association
itself would remain intact, accommodating the ongoing entrances and
exits that define both association forms.  A polygamous marriage would
be established when an intimate association conformed to the same prin-
ciples as a commercial association; i.e., when at least two parties commit-
ted to the form—here, the plural marital form.  Like commercial partner-
ships, under these defaults, plural marital associations could grow and
contract without incurring the costs and instability of continual dissolu-
tion and formation.
Key points of contention will be who enters a plural marriage and
how they do so; rules and effects of exit and expulsion—that is, divorce,
property rules, and, of course, how plural marriage would fit into the
current marital landscape.  Currently, dyadic marriage requires the con-
sent of both spouses, and unilateral, i.e., non-consensual, no-fault divorce
has emerged as the norm.  Under what circumstances can a single spouse
exit the plural marital association and under what circumstances can a
group of spouses expel another?  In short, how would plural marital as-
sociations operate?
As noted, the advantage of the partnership form, its intrinsic mem-
bership flexibility, also generates specific vulnerabilities.  These vulnera-
bilities and, relatedly, opportunities for exploitation, are almost certainly
heightened in the intimate context of marriage.  As is the case with com-
mercial partners, a spouse’s economic standing and more general power
and influence within the association can be unpredictably affected by the
addition of subsequent spouses.  Rights to inheritance, employment and
government benefits such as health care and social security, and market
earnings all will be subject to more claims as the plural marital association
grows in size.  And, unlike commercial associations, in which reduction in
percentage draw and influence is balanced in theory by new members’
additional earnings and market contributions, this is a radically less clear
proposition in intimate associations.  Subsequent spouses may add to
household income, or they may not, particularly if the cultural norm in
some polygamous communities is that women do only minimal paid work
outside of the household.  (Note, this is not a universal norm; in other
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polygamous societies the opposite is true.165)  Instead, additional wives
can create more claims on a husband’s earnings, pension, and other ben-
efits (a point that also will be addressed more fully below), not to men-
tion generate more children as dependents.166  In addition, the eco-
nomic stakes are arguably heightened, i.e., they include not only arms-
length profits and earnings but also partnering over the most basic ele-
ments of people’s lives:  food, shelter, utilities, etc., that is, the things that
comprise a household.167  Finally, intimate associations generate distinct,
noneconomic vulnerabilities, most notably, the sexual and emotional
ones elaborated in Part II.
2. Unanimity Norms. — To ameliorate these vulnerabilities, plural
marital associations can adapt the unanimity defaults from commercial
partnerships for adding new partners or expelling existing ones.  To pro-
tect existing partners, RUPA rejects both unilateral and majority action in
favor of more difficult and costly unanimity rules.  In practice, this means
that if a marriage is established as a plural one, any subsequent spouses
must be approved by all existing members of the marital association.  Ex-
pulsions of a single spouse from the association similarly would require
unanimity.  Thus, spouses in plural marital associations can neither uni-
laterally bring others into the marriage nor unilaterally expel anyone.  Of
course, unanimity norms generate their own problems, most notably of
holdouts who gain bargaining power by being the last to give consent.
Such a rule also arguably enhances spouses’ ability to be emotionally pu-
nitive or abusive.  But, as with commercial associations, the costs of de-
faulting to unanimity must be balanced against ameliorating vulnerability
and exploitation.168  Daniel Kleinberger refers to this as the “pick your
partner” principle of partnership law.169
There remains the difficulty of discerning consent and the fear of
duress or other more subtle forms of coercion.  Unanimity requirements
165. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 30, at 939 (modelling African agricultural R
economies in which the opposite is true—women do agricultural work).  But see Douglas
R. White & Michael L. Burton, Causes of Polygyny:  Ecology, Economy, Kinship and
Warfare, 90 Am. Anthropologist 871, 872–73 (1988) (describing economic explanations
for polygyny that emphasize family labor rather than wage labor and casting doubt on
whether any economic explanation can adequately explain phenomenon).
166. See infra notes 229–252 and accompanying text (discussing polygamy’s effects R
on children raised in these households and communities).
167. See, e.g., Lundberg & Pollak, American Family, supra note 47, at 10 (“Individuals R
make resource-sharing commitments—often implicitly rather than explicitly—in their
roles as sexual, romantic, and domestic partners . . . .”).
168. In refuting the majoritarian rule predicted by Dagan and Heller for governing
liberal commons, Robert Ellickson contends a milder form of unanimity, consensus, is
optimal:  “Governance by consensus thus promises to result in both superior decisions
(because intensities of preference are better taken into account) and higher levels of
satisfaction with the decision-making process itself.”  Ellickson, Norms of the Household,
supra note 115, at 87. R
169. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 583, 597, 660 (2004).
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are relatively meaningless if wives are coerced into consenting.  In his
brief for polygamy, Richard Posner concedes:
In principle, polygamy with the consent of all of the husband’s
wives would be the unambiguously best regime for women be-
cause it would expand their choice set.  But a premodern legal
system might be incapable of determining whether consent had
been freely given, which may explain . . . why divorce on
grounds was preceded by a stage of no divorce.  In these circum-
stances, the second best choice from the woman’s perspective
might be no polygamy.170
Hopefully, in a “modern” legal system such as ours, we have refined
principles of discerning consent and duress.171  To the extent that these
are complicated in intimate relationships, it is difficult to contend that
plural intimacy is meaningfully different from dyadic.172
In addition, fiduciary obligations would allow judges to scrutinize co-
ercion in plural marital associations.  As in partnership law, plural
spouses would be in fiduciary relationships, which are governed by robust
legal doctrines of loyalty, care, and good faith.173  Spouses are, of course,
free to veto adding more intimates.  However, administrative gatekeepers
for plural unions might choose to make additional inquiries into whether
consent was freely given, should the circumstances warrant it.  Particu-
larly relevant is the norm that the fiduciary duty remains intact despite
strained relations between the partners.174  (Although some may con-
sider this an overly pragmatic expectation of intimates, in the 1970s, com-
munity property doctrine shifted to incorporate this norm.)  In sum, fidu-
170. Posner, supra note 10, at 257 (footnote omitted). R
171. This may require that families present themselves to the licensing authority.  In
contracts, Judge Posner himself has urged abandoning such doctrines as the preexisting
duty rule because of doctrines that now allow judges to police duress directly.  See Lake
River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding damage
formulation was improper penalty and not acceptable liquidation of damages).  Similarly,
in trusts and estates, some scholars have urged abolishing or reducing some of the wills
formalities because their historic purpose is now served by robust duress and capacity
doctrines.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of
Wills:  A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
1–2, 52 (1987) (discussing success of probate reform eliminating traditional formalities
and rules of strict compliance in Australia).
172. The significant litigation over liability of wives who sign joint tax returns under
duress is one example.  See, e.g., Melvyn B. Frumkes, Duress Diverts Dual Tax Liability for
Joint Returns, 19 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial L. 1, 5–11 (2004) (outlining cases in which
courts did or did not find duress).
173. “Not unlike spouses, partners have ‘the right to know what is going on in the
partnership, the right to be involved in conducting the business, the right to commit the
partnership to third parties, the right to participate in decision making, and the right to
veto certain decisions.’”  Starnes, Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, supra note 14, R
at 1536 (quoting Daniel S. Kleinberger, Agency, Partnerships, and LLC’s § 9.1 (2d ed.
2002)).
174. See Bainbridge, supra note 153, at 135 (“[P]artners frequently must subordinate R
their personal economic interests to those of the firm and their fellow partners.”).
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ciary obligations supplement other legal norms in policing duress and
coercion.175
3. Dissolution Norms. — Arguably trickier than formation is “exit,” or
divorce, and its effects on dissolution of plural marital associations.  In
the United States, many view intimate connections as deeply definitive of
who they are, more so than employment or other market relations.176
Hence, the inability to convince one’s co-spouses to formalize relations
with a new, desperately sought love, or to expel an immiserating one,
could make remaining in the association untenable.  Others may merely
become disenamored with the bargaining and drama of plural marital
life, or, as frequently is the case in dyadic marriage, simply want a change.
If entrance and expulsion require unanimous agreement, what of the
ability to exit plural marital associations, to walk away?  For some who
currently practice faith-based polygamy, their religion sanctions only ex-
panding the marriage by incorporating new spouses.177  Like strict
Catholicism and other orthodox religions, their faith does not permit di-
vorce.  However, no-fault divorce has been a core part of family law in
almost every state for close to half a century.178  When religious intimates
175. There is a robust debate on the scope of fiduciary obligations.  Compare Daniel
S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”:  From Tax Rationalization Through
Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 445, 469–71 (2009)
(“[C]ontractual good faith is less powerful than fiduciary duty.”); Ethan J. Leib, Contracts
and Friendships, 59 Emory L.J. 649, 673–80, 694–97 (2010) (“As friendships get closer to
marriages in intimacy and interdependence, they get closer to fiduciary
relationships . . . .”); Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 665, 700–07
(2009) (examining courts’ treatment of friends as fiduciaries); and Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2418–30 (1995) (discussing
“family law regime premised on a fiduciary framework”), with Ribstein, Partners, supra
note 152, at 232–37 (“The strong medicine of fiduciary duties is, however, appropriate only R
for a narrow class of cases.”), and Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited
Partnership Agreements, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 927, 930 (2004) (arguing “waiver of
fiduciary duties should be broadly permitted in limited partnerships”).  See also J. Dennis
Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA:  An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Spring 1995, at 29, 43–46 (outlining arguments in favor of mandatory
fiduciary duties for business partners).
176. See, e.g., Robert O. Blood, Jr., Love Match and Arranged Marriage:  A Tokyo-
Detroit Comparison 3–34 (1967) (comparing and contrasting individuals’ ideas of love
and marriage in different societies, including those holding love marriages, individualism,
and egalitarianism at premium).
177. For instance, fundamentalist Mormon sects require three wives in order to
achieve what they call celestial or eternal marriage, also known as the New and Everlasting
Covenant.  See, e.g., Scott, Celebrating, supra note 37, at 109.
178. The role of fault in ending marriage is actually fairly complex.  In some states, as
a practical matter, fault continues to be taken into account in divorce proceedings; in
others it is relevant only in making property or alimony determinations.  See, e.g., Linda D.
Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law:  Looking at
Interjurisdictional Recognition, 43 Family L.Q. 923, 972 chart 1 (2010) (classifying U.S.
jurisdictions on grounds for divorce, consideration of fault for alimony, and spousal
support).  In New York, one of the last holdouts, the Governor signed legislation that
shifted the state toward more of a conventional no-fault jurisdiction in August 2010.  See,
e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault:  Why Divorce Reform Has
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seek state licensing, they are free to avail themselves of state dissolution
rules, or not.  There is no compelling reason to treat plural marriage dif-
ferently, thereby giving religious norms more deference than dyadic mar-
riage in this regard.  Hence plural marriage would incorporate the same
gender neutral no-fault rules allowing unilateral exit that govern the dy-
adic form.  Bob Ellickson denominates this strong principle of unilateral
exit as a “liberal household,” meaning “each of its members . . . individu-
ally have the power to exit from the arrangement and collectively have
the power to control the entry of new occupants and owners.”179  Some
polygamous families live as a single household; others do not.  But given
the contemplated legal structure of the plural marital association, the
principle underlying voluntary, unilateral exit holds.
Some states, such as Louisiana, recently added a more restrictive
form of marriage, covenant marriage, which is more akin to the old fault-
based system.180  It may be the case that more states adopt the covenant
form, also making it available to plural intimates.  But, following the
norms currently in place, a spouse in a plural marriage would be permit-
ted to exit, i.e., divorce, for the same set of reasons as in no-fault dyadic
marriage.  Moreover, given the other constraints plural marital associa-
tions will impose on their members, following Levmore’s love-it-or-leave-it
principle—where the remedy is to leave—marital partners can always exit
the association.181
Barring constraints on divorce may be relatively straightforward, as
the voluntary exit norm is so thoroughly entrenched in both commercial
partnership and dyadic marriage.  However, plural marital unions share
another feature with commercial associations that dyadic marriages do
not—members may exit, but others may remain who desire to maintain
Lagged in New York, 27 Pace L. Rev. 559, 599–603 (2007); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 79, 79–80 (noting since 1985, all
states except for one adopted some form of no-fault divorce); see also Nicholas Confessore,
No-Fault Divorce Finally in Sight for New York, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2010, at A1
(explaining that last remaining jurisdiction without some type of no-fault divorce rule, New
York, has passed legislation, pending Governor’s approval, to incorporate such rules into
law).
179. Ellickson, Norms of the Household, supra note 115, at 62.  He elaborates:  “To R
enable the self-determination of existing household members, a liberal society must
empower a household to reject an unwanted person who seeks to be taken in as either an
occupant or owner.”  Id.
180. Three states currently recognize covenant marriage, and almost twenty others
have contemplated or are contemplating it.  See infra note 188. R
181. See Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 463 (2009)
(“Once lawmakers enacted no-fault divorce laws, some individuals attempted without
success to resist civil divorce actions on religious grounds, arguing that entry of a no-fault
divorce decree would violate their rights under the First Amendment.” (footnote
omitted)).  Partnership rules allow wrongful termination suits when a partner’s dissolution
prevents a remaining partner from recouping an expected investment.  This may be a
point where family law principles of voluntary exit, etc., trump commercial partnership
norms.
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the association.  In other words, does one member’s voluntary exit or
unanimous expulsion mandate dissolution of the association?
In dyadic marriage, when one spouse leaves, the union is definition-
ally and unilaterally dissolved.  This is not necessarily the case in plural
marriage.  In fact, it is at least as likely that the remaining spouses will
want the marital association to continue.  Partnership law again is instruc-
tive.  As noted, after much debate, the 1997 RUPA clarified that one part-
ner may exit, or be expelled, without dissolving the partnership.182  As
long as at least two parties committed to the form remain, the association
can continue.  Following these norms, one spouse could leave a plural
marriage, voluntarily or not, but the union would remain intact.  In other
words, no single spouse could unilaterally dissolve a plural marital associ-
ation, which, in addition to the economic commitments that characterize
commercial partnerships, also entails significant emotional and child-
rearing attachments.  Of course, if dissatisfied with the resulting associa-
tion, a spouse could follow an exiting spouse at her or his election.  But
the crucial feature of this default is that the desire by one spouse for a
divorce need not dissolve the union of all of the other remaining spouses
who desire to remain in the marriage.183
The ability to maintain the association leads to another logical ques-
tion:  What would this partnership model mean if the husband is the one
to exit?  Perhaps counterintuitively, but again, following the commercial
partnership model, the remaining wives should have the option to dis-
solve the family unit or to maintain it intact.  For both proponents of
polygamy and its opponents, who also oppose gay marriage, the specter
of all-women households may be the biggest challenge of legalizing plural
marriage.  Yet, this Article does not propose this as a “backdoor” to same-
sex marriages, group or dyadic, but, as conceptually following commer-
cial partnerships, and also taking to its logical conclusion how many
polygamists themselves describe plural marriage—as a union among
them all.184
182. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act states:
Under RUPA, unlike the UPA, the dissociation of a partner does not necessarily
cause a dissolution and winding up of the business of the partnership.  Section
801 identifies the situations in which the dissociation of a partner causes a
winding up of the business.  Section 701 provides that in all other situations there
is a buyout of the partner’s interest in the partnership, rather than a windup of
the partnership business.  In those other situations, the partnership entity
continues, unaffected by the partner’s dissociation.
RUPA § 603 (1997).  These “other situations” include expulsion.  See §§ 601(4)–(5)
(describing circumstances and effects of expulsion).
183. Hence, in a plural marital association, “divorce” would take on more subtle
nuances and legal meanings.  “Divorce” would mean voluntarily exiting the association,
although without the typical dissolution that results in dyadic marriages if more than two
spouses remained.  Expulsion would entail “voting” a spouse out, while others remain in
the association.
184. Compare Campbell, Bountiful Voices, supra note 22, at 198–99 (describing two R
co-wives who legally married each other and “the couple’s interview suggested a genuine
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Departures, whether exit or expulsion, will force a property division,
the marital analogy to a buyout.  This raises the question, then, of how to
define and distribute property in plural marital associations.  An analog
exists in community property states, which, as noted, already incorporate
aspects of commercial partnership law.  Earnings during the marriage,
and fruits of those earnings, are defined as marital property, with each
spouse owning a proportionate share.185  In addition, spouses can desig-
nate assets as marital or separate property through prenuptial or post-
nuptial agreements.  At dissolution, divorce or death, assets are titled pro-
portionately in the name of each spouse.  (As in commercial partnership,
unanimity would be required to amend agreements, or to negotiate
around defaults, once the association is formed.)  In polygamous unions,
marital property would mean the entire intimate partnership, not merely
each husband/wife dyad.  Any spouse seeking exit would take his or her
proportionate share of those assets designated as marital.  Again, defaults
would be crucial, and the extant community property rules can provide a
starting point for definitions.
Although partnership law defaults to equal distributions among part-
ners, states could consider implementing a more refined regime, perhaps
calibrating property rights to contribution based on length of time in the
marital association.186  Clear property division rules are crucial to ease
exit and avoid spouses being held hostage in plural marital associations
because of unpredictable property rights, or, as is the current case for all
but “first” wives, that is legal wives, no economic rights if they leave.187
4. Defaulting to Dyadic. — Finally, licensing an additional marital
form raises the crucial question of how intimates will choose among mari-
tal options and how plural marriage will interact with existing dyadic mar-
riage.  Marital “choice” regimes have already been introduced in some
states.  For instance, the proposed structure might not look substantially
different from Louisiana’s marital regime, which offers prospective
spouses a choice between conventional and “covenant” marriage.188  Sim-
shared domestic existence that bore the conventional elements of marriage”), with
Bennion, supra note 54, at 72, 74 n.40 (describing how some co-wives develop romantic or R
sexual bonds).  This joins the fascinating debate over what we mean by sexual orientation,
that is, whether it is sexual or affective, or both.
185. D. Kelly Weisberg & Susan Frelich Appleton, Modern Family Law 664 (1998)
(“Community property principles, explicitly recognizing marriage as a partnership, give
each spouse an undivided one-half interest in property acquired by spousal labor during
the marriage.  Although most community property states apply a rule or presumption of
equal division at dissolution.”); see also Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 307 (1974)
(recommending “just division” of community property assets).
186. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-202 (2006) (adopting sliding scale accrual method
for the elective share).
187. See also Ellickson, Norms of the Household, supra note 115, at 62 (“An owner R
can unilaterally withdraw his capital over the objection of others by invoking his legal
power to partition jointly owned property.”).
188. In 1997, Louisiana adopted the first statute permitting covenant marriage.  La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272–276, 9:307–309 (2008).  Covenant marriages limit the grounds
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ilarly, there are proposals to allow prospective spouses to elect whether to
hold marital property as community or separate property, an option re-
cently adopted in Alaska.189
The default becomes crucial in such choice regimes.  This is a point
at which plural marital associations might diverge from partnership de-
faults.  Unlike commercial partnerships, plural marital associations would
not be the default form; instead, there would be a strong default to dy-
adic marriage, with the aforementioned possible hurdles to electing plu-
ral marriage.190  (Nor would the old common law marital form apply,
although equitable remedies might, as described below.)
In addition, because plural marriage can differ so fundamentally
from its dyadic counterpart, marriages should be designated as dyadic or
plural ex ante.  To clarify, dyadic marriages could not be converted into
polygamous ones simply by marrying other spouses.  Rather, the marital
multiplicity determination is one that must be made up front and, as will
be described below, by all the parties involved.  This prohibition on mari-
tal conversion is crucial in order to secure the stability of the current
marital regime.  It is not the position of this Article that most people are
upon which a divorce will be granted, operating in effect as “super marriages.”  The
Louisiana statute mandates that unless there is adultery, abuse, abandonment, or
commission of certain criminal acts, the couple must be separated for at least a year before
they can divorce.  In addition, the couple must seek marital counseling.  Arizona adopted a
similar measure in 1998, although the Arizona statute allows for divorce subject to mutual
consent.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-901 to -906 (2007).  The most recent state to pass a
covenant marriage statute was Arkansas in 2001.  Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-801 to -811
(2009).  See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, What Does Covenant Marriage
Mean for Relationships?, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 137, 172–88 (2004)
(considering some early empirical evidence on covenant marriages in Louisiana);
Chauncey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage:  Who Holds the Keys to
Wedlock?, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 261, 274–88 (2003) (summarizing three covenant
marriage state statutes); Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10
Mich. J. Gender & L. 169, 177–80 (2003) (exploring demographics of couples choosing
covenant marriage).
There is one important difference however.  Because divorces are governed by the
rules of the domicile, a marriage designated as covenant would in fact be governed by rules
of no-fault divorce if the spouses have moved to a jurisdiction not recognizing covenant
marriage.  Plural marital associations, then, would have to rely on comity rules, as do same-
sex marriages, but without the additional hurdles imposed by the Defense of Marriage Act.
Another analog is to the quasi-community property rules followed in some community
property states that give limited community property status to marriages dissolving in their
jurisdiction that were formed in non-community property states.
189. Alaska Community Property Act, Alaska Stat. § 34.77.030(a) (2008) (“[P]roperty
of spouses is community property under this chapter only to the extent provided in a
community property agreement or a community property trust.”).  Currently each state
designates its marital property regime as community property or separate property, with
some comity concessions.
190. “If the parties fail to more formally define and establish their firm, their
relationship defaults to partnership status.”  Bainbridge, supra note 153, at 101.  Of course, R
there could be real debate about the number and nature of hurdles required.  But some
degree of paternalism could be justified here because of the state investment in
ameliorating exploitation and opportunism in the relationships it sanctions.
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open to, or even indifferent to, plural marriage.  Rather, the underlying
premise of the Article is that dyadic and plural marriages require distinct
default rules, and that converting dyadic to plural partnership midstream
might generate precisely the costs, bargaining disparities, and opportu-
nism that I am trying to ameliorate.191  People should not end up in plu-
ral marriage at the whim of a box they have checked:
The “threat of polygamy”, the possibility that their present or
future husband might take another wife, is influencing women’s
perception and management of relationships, marriage and
family life.  In a polygamous society, it may on some level be
wrong to call any marriage monogamous because all marriages
are potentially polygamous, and both men and women organize
their relationships on this assumption.192
Nor are prenuptial “monogamy contracts” sufficient to guard against
the polygamy threat.  As Miche`le Alexandre has pointed out, in polyga-
mist societies, without an anti-conversion rule, “a monogamist contract is
never guaranteed.”193  Women who obtain promises of monogamy ex
ante still report that the threat of polygamy polices their behavior.  But
polygamy blackmail is less effective in an anti-conversion regime.  In sum,
anti-conversion rules mean that plural marriage would not be defined by
the number of spouses, but by the mutual election of the parties ex ante.
Readers familiar with default rules will recognize the set I am posit-
ing as an opt-in regime.  With a strong default to conventional dyadic
marriage, people must express a strong and informed preference for plu-
ral marriage.  By the same token, people have to seek licensing:  Plural
marital associations would not be “imposed” on all practicing
polygamists.  As several commentators have noted, the decision to struc-
ture default rules as opt-in or opt-out is a significant one.194  We need
though, a more robust literature on opt-in/opt-out as structures for inti-
191. Of course, this is only a problem for “first wives,” many of whom report shock,
confusion, and anxiety when learning that their husband plans to marry a subsequent wife.
However, having already started a family, and the economic partnership, it is far more
difficult to negotiate or exit.  In theory, any “subsequent” wife understands she is entering
a plural marriage, unless she is deceived, a documented problem in polygamous cultures.
This suggests an interesting opportunity for empirical and anthropological studies of
whether there are definable differences between first and subsequent wives.
192. Zeitzen, supra note 26, at 8; see also id. at 170 (“The knowledge that polygamy is R
possible and permissible can be a destabilizing factor in marriages, a phenomenon well
documented in polygynous societies.” (citation omitted)); supra notes 58–59 and R
accompanying text (arguing polygamy harms society by negatively affecting individual well-
being).
193. Alexandre, Big Love, supra note 23, at 16; see also Posner, supra note 10, at 253 R
(“In most polygamous cultures a woman cannot make an enforceable contract to be a
man’s only wife, and this limitation on freedom of contract reduces the advantages of
polygamy for women.  The option of polygamy is given them, but the option of monogamy
is withdrawn.”).  One deficit of private law ordering is that it leaves it to wives to complain,
versus the state asserting independent interest.
194. A recent Comment clarified the three “routes” to voluntarily including or
excluding a specific term in a marriage:
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mate relationships.  For instance, doctrines ranging from old common
law marriage to the new ALI proposal for domestic partnership can be
viewed as strong opt-out regimes, i.e., they make it difficult to avoid the
imposition of legal duties and obligations on intimate relationships.195
On the other hand, some scholars have made a strong case for structur-
ing intimate partnerships as what we would recognize as opt-in, sug-
gesting that the state should not impose legal obligations on its citizens
because of their sexual or reproductive conduct.196  Instead, these schol-
ars argue that parties should voluntarily seek licensing or other explicit
contractual status.  This debate is helpful in the plural marriage context.
Some might be surprised, given the vulnerabilities and risks described in
Section II, that I am styling this as an opt-in regime rather than one that
would be imposed on plural intimates.  Yet, recall that the goal of this
Article is to have plural marriage adhere to conventional dyadic norms,
with all their flaws, not to transform marriage—a project I am also sympa-
thetic to by the way.  Currently, intimates who do not license their rela-
tionships have only limited rights, typically from contract, or perhaps in
equity.197  But I reject an involuntary regime, at least as long as dyadic
marriage is not similarly subject to it.198
(1) Opt-In.  The state allows marrying couples to opt-into contractual terms,
including a term by checking a box on the marriage license application; (2)
Default with Opt-Out.  The state makes a term the default, and it is included
unless the couple opts-out by checking a box on the marriage license application;
(3) Affirmative Choice.  The state puts both an opt-in and an opt-out checkboxes
on the marriage license application and does not issue the marriage license
unless the couple selected one.
Andrew Blair-Stanek, supra note 144, at 44. R
195. See, e.g., Erin Cleary, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the Aftermath of
Lewis v. Harris:  Should New Jersey Expand the Act to Include All Unmarried Cohabitants?,
60 Rutgers L. Rev. 519, 526–27 (2008) (explaining how scope of ALI proposal goes beyond
family dissolution to reshape paradigm of domestic partnerships); Marsha Garrison, Is
Consent Necessary?  An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 815, 834–36 (2005) (identifying justifications for imposition of marital
duties on intimates); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less:  The ALI Domestic
Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 353, 368–72
[hereinafter Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less] (arguing some commentators find
imposition of legal and financial obligations paternalistic).
196. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 195, at 854–64 (rejecting “conscriptive” models
that impose obligations on intimates); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9, 88 (1990) [hereinafter Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking] (suggesting that otherwise state is being paternalistic).
197. Miche`le Alexandre proposes a similar equitable remedy for plural unions to
avoid unfairness.  Alexandre, Lessons, supra note 10, at 1474–78 (arguing common law R
marriage doctrine should be used to rectify inequities of de facto polygamy).
198. Readers might question whether the opt-in aspect is illusory.  Can’t a spouse in a
dyadic marriage who wants to take a second wife merely threaten her with divorce if she
won’t agree to restructure the marriage as plural?  Of course.  But this sheds light on a
crucial point:  How is this threat any different from dissolution threats in the current
dyadic regime?  Spouses in conventional marriage routinely use divorce, and its
accompanying child custody threats, to gain bargaining power, inducing the other spouse
to abide by their wishes.  Plural intimacy, otherwise known as cheating, infidelity, and
\\server05\productn\C\COL\110-8\COL801.txt unknown Seq: 63 15-NOV-10 9:07
2010] REGULATING POLYGAMY 2017
5. Penalty Defaults. — The primary goal of these proposed rules is to
show that commercial partnership defaults provide guidelines and norms
for regulating polygamous unions, consistent with contemporary norms
of fairness and egalitarianism in family law.  These defaults do implement
some key changes from the way polygamy is currently practiced in many
communities, and also from the ideals its adherents might desire.
First, consistent with the understanding of plural marriage as a part-
nership, not a series of dyads, no one person—including the husband—
would have sole discretion to marry; instead all spouses would need to
give their consent.  No one could unilaterally enter into a series of dyadic
marriages contemporaneously, thereby transforming and diminishing
other spouses’ rights, without their knowledge or consent.199  (As with
regular dyadic marriage, nothing prevents infidelity, or the accumulation
of multiple families, but the key is the state would not license them.  In
short, “bigamy” would remain a crime.)  This is a radically different pro-
position from the way many polygamists currently practice plural mar-
riage in the United States, conceiving it in effect as a series of legal dyads,
each of which runs through the husband, like spokes around the hub of a
wheel.200  Instead, I propose that plural marriage be conceived as an asso-
ciation, with legal rights and obligations among all parties.  As noted re-
peatedly above, this is necessary to ameliorate the basic vulnerabilities
and opportunities for exploitation that polygyny often entails.201  In
short, plural marriage would not be institutionalized bigamy.202
affairs, is not an uncommon desire.  The key distinction between the polyamory threat in
plural marriage versus dyadic is that what is sought is a second spouse, versus a mistress.  In
fact, one could make an argument that, in a regime that permitted plural marriage, a
dyadic wife would have a choice she does not currently have:  divorce or “convert.”
199. After some ambiguity, the 1997 RUPA clarified that the partnership is a legal
entity on its own terms, not merely a composite of its members.  Unlike partnerships,
marital associations would not be a separate legal entity, but rather an aggregation of the
individuals.  Hence liability rules are not applicable.
200. See, e.g., Bennion, supra note 54, at 55, 81–82, 135 (describing hub and spoke R
model in fundamentalist Mormon communities).
201. For instance, in today’s age of sexual hygiene and risk, it is reasonable that
people be able to agree to be faithful to the others in their sexual “pool,” particularly in a
marital context in which “monogamy” reasonably substitutes for “safety.”  See Rachel C.
Loftspring, Comment, Inheritance Rights in Uganda:  How Equal Inheritance Rights
Would Reduce Poverty and Decrease the Spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l
L. 243, 258–60 (2007) (discussing polygamy, property rights, and AIDS in Africa).
202. One website of Christian polygamists describes the difference as follows:
“Dishonest Bigamists” are “accused of bigamy for turning secret affairs into secret
‘secondary’ would-be ‘legally recognized’ marriages . . . and being dishonest, as their other
mates do not know of each other.”  In contrast, “Honest Polygamists” are “accused of
bigamy for obtaining any ‘secondary’ would-be ‘legally recognized’ marriages . . . yet being
honest, with all the family knowing of each other.”  Bigamy, Christian Polygamy INFO, at
http://www.christianpolygamy.info/bigamy (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Aug. 26, 2010).  The term “polyfidelity,” captures this attitude.  See supra note 24 R
(defining polyfidelity).
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In addition, some practicing polygamists might reject the egalitarian
spirit behind these proposed defaults.  The unanimity and equality de-
faults from the partnership model formally reject the various status hier-
archies, both of husbands over wives and among co-wives, that character-
ize many polygynous households and cultures.  This is most obviously the
case when a husband claims sole or primary authority over all of his wives.
In addition, though, “first” or prior wives may claim rights and status over
subsequent ones.  Or, co-wives may compete with each other for their
husband’s favor, which can translate into authority.  This is intensely ex-
acerbated when plural families find themselves in regimes that recognize
only one “legal” wife, thereby leaving co-wives to compete for that status,
which may bring significant immigration and other material benefits.203
Unanimity rules and formalized equal voting refuse to give force to these
rankings, formal or informal.  Of course, as is currently the case in dyadic
unions, individual households can work out governance norms as they
wish.  But the crucial intervention is that law will not enforce such ar-
rangements, or even agreements, any more than it would in dyadic pre-
nuptial agreements.  This reiterates the midgame norms of dyadic mar-
riage.  “In the United States, courts will generally enforce prenuptial
agreements regarding the distribution of assets in the event of divorce.
They will not, however, enforce agreements regarding the distributions of
benefits and burdens in ongoing marriages.”204  Hence, much as a pre-
nuptial agreement or informal ex post agreement giving a husband
power over his wife, or a religious norm in which wives “submit” to their
husbands, would have expressive value only and would not be enforcea-
ble in court, so too would rankings or other status hierarchies between
husbands and wives or between co-wives be unenforceable.
Finally, practicing polygamists might reject the requirement to desig-
nate marriages as plural ex ante, the accompanying anti-conversion rule,
and the imposition of formal fiduciary duties.  Some might find such
norms inconsonant with intimate relationships.  Others might oppose
them as unnecessary government interference.205
Hence, at least some of the proposed defaults should be understood
as penalty rules rather than majoritarian ones.  This might surprise some.
If this Article advocates legalizing polygamy, why not suggest a system that
would defer to the preferences of its current practitioners?  Following
203. See, e.g., Carolyn Sargent & Dennis Cordell, Polygamy, Disrupted Reproduction,
and the State:  Malian Migrants in Paris, France, 56 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1961, 1962, 1967–68
(2003) (explaining restrictions on polygamy in France cause Malian migrant women to
strategically approach marital disputes); Carolyn Sargent, Professor, Wash. Univ., Address
at the Global and Transnational Feminism Lecture Series, Sex in the City:  How Polygamy
Shapes the Lives of West African Women in Paris 1 (Dec. 3, 2008) (“[West African migrant
wives in polygamous marriages] demonstrate considerable ingenuity and assertiveness in
pursuing their own objectives and strategies.”).
204. Lundberg & Pollak, American Family, supra note 47, at 13–15. R
205. See supra note 65 (discussing fundamentalist polygamist communities’ distrust R
of government).
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Ayres and Gertner’s formulation, this would reduce the costs of forming
polygamous relationships and expedite their arrangement.  Yet, I con-
ceive of some of these rules as so-called penalty defaults because the goal
is not to reflect what the “average polygamist” might seek, but rather to
reduce the strategic and opportunistic behavior described in Part II.B.  As
classically conceived, penalty defaults either increase the costs of an ar-
rangement or force disclosure of information.  Parties must incur the
costs of negotiating and drafting around penalty defaults, thereby in-
creasing the costs of entering their preferred arrangement.  In addition,
some of these antimajoritarian defaults also will be information-forcing,
in that both personal preferences against fairness and egalitarianism and,
if current prenuptial agreement norms are followed, any financial infor-
mation affecting property rights will need to be disclosed.206
It is not clear that the unanimity requirement actually functions as a
penalty default, however.  While we might assume that many practicing
polygamists give the husband authority to add additional wives, the bar-
gaining dynamics between him and potential wives might go in the other
direction.  Given women’s fear of the “polygamy threat” described in Part
II, men might promise potential wives control over the selection of subse-
quent wives as an incentive for marriage.207  Women presumably would
want such a promise.  Hence, when we focus on the bargaining process
ex ante, unanimity may well be functioning as a majoritarian rather than
a penalty default.  On the other hand, it is certainly information-forcing,
to the extent that it forces men (and women) who prefer unilateral
power to disclose this preference up front.
Similarly, anti-conversion rules are classic penalties in that they force
intimates who prefer plural arrangements to disclose this valuable infor-
mation up front.  Nothing will prevent a spouse from subsequently insist-
ing on pluralism, but they would need then to dyadically divorce and
remarry under the plural marital association form—a costly endeavor
and, crucially, one that will give the noncompliant spouse the opportu-
nity to distribute his or her property and renegotiate under the plural
form.  Knowing that a potential spouse has a predilection for plural inti-
macy is valuable information to have ex ante.
Is styling some of these defaults as penalties paternalistic?  Probably.
However, family law norms generally are not as majoritarian as those in
other fields.  As already discussed, in the last few decades family law has
206. See Emens, supra note 24, at 371 (explaining that converting some mandatory R
prohibitions on adultery to default rules will force parties to disclose information about
intimate preferences for monogamy and nonmonogamy); Stake, Mandatory Planning,
supra note 14, at 417–18 (arguing mandatory premarital agreements can “reveal[ ], and R
thus secur[e], the common needs and hopes of the couple” and “may help some couples
to avoid uphappy marriages by exposing their incompatibilities”); Blair-Stanek, supra note
144, at 34–35 (stating that incorporating more defaults in marital family law can enhance R
autonomy, reveal information, and circumvent constitutional restrictions).
207. I’d like to thank Scott Baker for bringing this point to my attention.
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taken a relatively hard stand against opportunism and in favor of formal
fairness and egalitarianism as governing principles.208  Perhaps people
should be free to structure their intimate lives as they see fit, including in
inegalitarian, strategic, or opportunistic ways, but, as discussed, the state
is invested in promoting fairness and antiexploitation norms in all rela-
tionships that it licenses, including intimate ones.  Antimajoritarian pen-
alty defaults raise the costs of opting out of arrangements the state
presumes to be fair.  Practitioners of both dyadic and plural marriage
may favor power disparities based on gender and other factors, but there
is nothing intrinsic to polygamy that warrants more deference to these
wishes than in conventional marriage.
Furthermore, these proposed rules depart from commercial partner-
ship norms in some crucial ways.  Commercial partnership rules are truly
defaults and notoriously slippery, that is, easy and inexpensive to bargain
around.  In contrast, some of these proposed rules will almost certainly be
construed as stickier.  (States contemplating plural marital associations
might not even style all these rules as defaults, instead making at least
some of them immutable.)  For instance, the ex ante designation, anti-
conversion rules, and imposing additional hurdles to plural marriage
would make dyadic marriage the strong and sticky default.  States might
want to make unanimity rules particularly sticky, imposing real scrutiny
before permitting parties to waive their approval rights.  In this sense,
again, plural marital associations might follow family law norms, in which
rules are notably sticky.209  Hence, my proposed rules follow commercial
partnership law in form, but not in flexibility.  As with commercial part-
nerships, or any commercial association, regulation can only do so much
to alleviate vulnerability and opportunism.  Following the analogy to its
logical conclusion, the goal here is simply amelioration, not elimination,
of these costs.
As with all sticky defaults, the consequence is reduced autonomy.
Yet, as in all such determinations, encroachments on individual auton-
omy are balanced against enhancing intimacy liberty overall by making
plural marital associations available as a marital option.
6. Other Private Law Models. — As noted in the Introduction, other
legal scholars have conceived of marriage as a partnership, embracing
principles of dissolution, buyout, and fiduciary obligation, among others.
The RUPA prompted Cynthia Starnes to urge that divorce be reformed in
208. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing emergence of fairness R
and equality norms in family law).
209. Andrew Blair-Stanek encourages states to craft a more robust set of marital
default rules, finding that “[s]tates have used their powers to set default terms of the
marriage contract in only a very limited way . . . typically dealing solely with disposition of
assets upon divorce.”  Blair-Stanek, supra note 144, at 34 (footnote omitted); see also R
Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law:  The Case of Child Custody, 33 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 779, 795–804 (2006) (considering child custody rules through penalty default
lens).
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accord with partnership principles.210  Jennifer Drobac and Antony Page
took the argument an additional step, contending that conventional mar-
riage is not only unfair but obsolete.211  They propose that civil marriage
be replaced with domestic partnerships modeled on commercial partner-
ship norms.212  Like Drobac and Page, partnership scholar Larry Ribstein
urges developing standard forms that would reflect the heterogeneity of
intimate associations, much as business law has generated different forms
for various commercial entities.213  Martha Ertman proffers a typology of
business associations and intimate associations that could serve as a map
for the variety of intimate arrangements.214  At the same time, she con-
tends that seeing the similarities between business and intimate relation-
ships could denaturalize the hierarchies fostered by conventional family
norms.
These private law approaches differ, of course.  Starnes remains com-
mitted to marriage, but turns to partnership norms to justify reforming
marital dissolution policy.215  Ribstein rejects the direct analogy between
210. Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 14, at 119–29 (using R
commercial partnership law as conceptual basis for postdivorce maintenance); see also
Starnes, Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, supra note 14, at 1534–35 (arguing R
partnership model normalizes wives’ economic claims and avoids “mothers as suckers”
rhetoric).  Starnes describes RUPA’s principles in detail to combat simplistic applications
of imagined partnership norms as a “clean break.”  Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker, supra note 14, at 120–24.  “Adherence to this clean-break principle of R
partnership law, however, without regard to related partnership principles essential to its
fair application, made divorce a financial disaster for homemakers.”  Id. at 108.
211. Drobac & Page, supra note 14, at 356–79 (stating “marriage fails many families”). R
212. They envision that marriage would continue within religious or cultural
communities, but without legal significance.  Their proposed Uniform Domestic
Partnership Act proffers four forms:  enduring, provisional, filial, and caregiving domestic
partnerships.  Id. at 402–21.
213. Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach, supra note 16, at 316–21; cf. Ribstein, R
Limited Liability Unlimited, supra note 16, at 409–10 (proposing contractual entities to R
“free idiosyncratic contracts from the limitations of existing standard forms”).  Ribstein
also encourages a choice-of-law approach to resolving the same-sex marriage debate that
would privilege contractual elements of intimate relationships.  See F.H. Buckley & Larry
E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 561, 563
(encouraging states to enforce contractual elements of other states’ marriage laws); Erin
O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1151, 1165 (2000) (proposing choice of law regime as compromise).
214. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15; see also Ertman, Commercializing R
Marriage, supra note 18, at 20, 38–63 (proposing model in which homemakers have an R
Article 9 type security interest in wage-earning spouse’s postdivorce income).
215. Starnes explains:
Even as language can convey a dispiriting message of incapacity and pity about
mothers, it can also convey an affirmative message of empowerment and dignity.
A partnership model of marriage conveys the latter message, offering a
vocabulary and concept that cast mothers as full stakeholders in marriage, equal
in status to fathers, regardless of who brings home the bigger paycheck.
Partnership provides an alternative reform discourse, free from the stubborn
remnants of old ideologies that sabotage reform efforts long after they are spoken
in polite society.
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marriage and commercial partnerships.  For him, the analogy lies in the
generation of standard forms that commercial law has become expert in.
Unlike Starnes, Drobac and Page, and especially Ertman, Ribstein dis-
putes that partnership’s profit-seeking goals share much in common with
families.216  On the other hand, these proposals share some crucial com-
mon features.  Drobac and Page’s Uniform Domestic Partnership Act,
Ribstein’s Domestic Entities, and Ertman’s typology all embrace business
law’s flexibility, which takes account of the heterogeneity of modern inti-
macy.  As Ertman puts it, this flexibility “is compatible both with the vari-
ous ways that people order their intimate lives and the range of legal and
institutional responses to those arrangements.”217  They also note that
uniform laws and other private law strategies can better achieve certainty
for intimates in a mobile society.218
On the other hand, even as they seek to meet the needs of increas-
ingly diverse intimate relationships, the proposals all remain firmly
locked in a dyadic model.  Drobac and Page’s imaginative case studies of
different intimate arrangements are all dyadic, and their proposed
Uniform Domestic Partnership Act explicitly defines a domestic partner-
ship as dyadic.219  Ribstein’s proposals were motivated by the needs of
same-sex intimates, and he gives only passing attention to other sexual
minorities such as polygamists.220  Unlike Drobac and Page and Ribstein,
Ertman does not propose explicit forms.  But she is the only one of this
cohort to take explicit account of intimacy multiplicity, suggesting that
Starnes, Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, supra note 14, at 1534. R
216. See Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach, supra note 16, at 319 (crucial feature R
is whether they are profit-seeking entities).  Others join Ribstein in vigorously opposing the
analogy between commercial and intimate associations.  See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman,
Illusion of Equality:  The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 174 (1991) [hereinafter
Fineman, Illusion of Equality] (“Through the application of a business, contractual,
partnership model, dependency and need are obscured.”); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory
of Alimony, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 33–40 (1989) (discussing failure of partnership analogy);
Scott, Rational Decisionmaking, supra note 196, at 52 (“[S]imilarities between marriage R
and commercial contractual relationships should not be exaggerated.”).
217. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 82. R
218. Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach, supra note 16, at 316–21; see also R
Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 464–65 (relying not on business analogy but on R
private ordering through contract); Stake, Mandatory Planning, supra note 14, at 425–29 R
(proposing state mandate for premarital contracts).
219. “[A]n association of two (2) adult persons . . . form[s] a single economically and
emotionally supportive family.”  Drobac & Page, supra note 14, at 427. R
220. Ribstein views the turn to private ordering as a “compromise” in the same-sex
marriage debates.  See Ribstein, A Standard Form Approach, supra note 16, at 313 (noting R
“contractual choice of law analogy provides a promising way to compromise seemingly
polar positions on same-sex marriage”); Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, supra note
16, at 449 (noting “many of the same impediments to recognizing new relationships that R
apply to business relationships also apply to domestic relationships,” and suggesting “[a]n
open-ended domestic relationship . . . would provide a mechanism for enforcing such
contracts that would fill the gaps in the marriage standard form”).
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“the highly contractual nature of an LLC could address the wide variety
of conditions present in polyamorous arrangements.”221
My point is not merely that these private law proposals fail to account
for polygamy.  In other words, this is not a classic “me too” argument.
Rather, my point is that, for all of the analogies they draw between inti-
mate and business associations, this cohort of perceptive scholars still
misses the crucial implications of analogizing polygamy and partnership.
For instance, Martha Ertman derives her intriguing typology based on the
role of the state in formation and dissolution.  She argues that partner-
ship involves the state only at dissolution, akin to cohabiting couples,
whereas, like corporations, marriages involve the state at both formation
and dissolution.  In contrast, this Article has emphasized not the chronol-
ogy of state involvement, but rather how different associational forms
generate distinct bargaining dynamics.  Hence, for my purposes, the rele-
vant feature of both commercial partnership and plural marriage is their
shared open-ended multiplicity and the distinct dynamics it generates.
Nor is corporate law, with its rules governing majority and minority share-
holders, an appropriate analog.  While it might be tempting to conclude
that in plural marriages husbands are always the ones with power, akin to
a majority shareholder, as described above, co-wives too jockey for power
and resources.222
Put slightly differently, to the extent that at least some of the con-
cerns we fairly have about polygamy stem from its opportunism and ex-
ploitation, I suggest these are not endemic to polygamy, but rather are
expedited by its structure.  The open-ended multiplicity of partnerships,
too, can engender vulnerabilities, but legal norms ameliorate those.
While patriarchy certainly characterizes a substantial portion of polyga-
mous relationships, I would contend a very similar deployment of
gendered power was at work in heterodyadic marriage for most of its his-
tory.  Male supremacy’s grip on dyadic marriage did not lead to its aboli-
tion, though, as some radical women’s groups urged in the nineteenth
century.  Instead, a series of legal reforms were put in place that, in tan-
dem with shifts in cultural and religious norms, transformed the institu-
tion.  Similarly, legal reform might very likely ameliorate conditions
within polygamous marriages.  Partnership is helpful then as a model to
better perceive and deexceptionalize plural marriage and to consider
how we might reform plural intimacy.
221. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 101.  Laura Rosenbury makes this R
point outside the sexual context in her article on friendship.  Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, supra note 109, at 229–33, 240–41 (stating conferral of status on friends will also R
promote nonexclusivity and fluidity as norms among intimates).  Others who embrace
private law ordering of intimate associations take a more contractual approach.  See supra
notes 14, 16, and accompanying text (discussing scholars viewing marriage and intimate R
relationships through contractual lens).
222. See supra notes 120–122 and accompanying text (describing competition among R
co-wives).
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Ertman’s characterization of state involvement—at dissolution for
cohabitants, and at formation and dissolution for corporations—in some
ways also privileges the existing love-it-or-leave-it dynamics in which the
state does not intervene “midgame.”223  There is an intriguing possibility
though.  Saul Levmore notes that the norm of exclusivity of remedies,
that “withdrawal from a partnership must precede or accompany legal
actions against one’s partners,” is in transition in commercial law.224
RUPA tries to “bury” the love-it-or-leave-it regime “by allowing almost any
cause of action by a partner against the partnership or against other part-
ners without a final accounting or dissolution.”225  Plural marital associa-
tions might veer from traditional family law and instead adopt this
“evolved norm,” thereby deprivileging the strong dichotomy between
midgame and endgame in intimate, as well as commercial interactions.
As Levmore notes, “under the traditional partnership rule, the very point
of bringing a claim for one’s ‘property right’ of final accounting and dis-
solution may be to get a hearing on a liability matter that the com-
plaining party would in fact have preferred to bring without severing the
relationship.”226  Given our professed commitment to families, such an
evolved norm might very well make sense.227
Some might continue to resist the analogy.  Of course, partnership
rules are designed for particular kinds of relationships between profit-
seeking entities.  Still, as Cynthia Starnes observes:  “It would be foolish,
of course, to insist that partnership perfectly describes marriage.  The
question, however, is not whether anyone would mistake a business part-
nership for a marriage, but rather whether any gain can flow from an
analogy to partnership.”228
223. Ertman’s typology “focuses on two important points of state intervention in the
relationship—formation and dissolution.”  She concedes that “[m]arkedly absent from this
discussion are the myriad ways in which state nonintervention in business and family life
determines the course of events during the relationship.”  Yet she concludes, “[t]he law is
most involved in a business or intimate affiliation at entry and exit, however, and these
moments determine which law governs.  Accordingly, it makes sense to focus on parallels
in formation and dissolution.”  Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 100. R
224. Levmore, Love It or Leave It, supra note 125, at 221. R
225. Id. at 223 (footnote omitted).  Levmore notes:
The Official Comment to the new (model) statute notes that the abolition of the
exclusivity rule “reflects a new policy choice that partners should have access to
the courts during the term of the partnership to resolve claims against the
partnership and other partners, leaving broad judicial discretion to fashion
appropriate remedies.”
Id. at 223 n.10 (quoting RUPA § 405(b) cmt. 2 (1997)).
226. Id. at 242.
227. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 481–89 (contemplating prenuptial R
agreements that would be enforceable during marriage).
228. Starnes, Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, supra note 14, at 1537.
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D. Children and Other “Externalities,” or, “Polygamy on the Installment Plan”
Much noted are polygamy’s effects on third parties, that is, those
who did not choose to enter the plural marriage.  These might be
thought of as polygamy’s “spill-over effects,” or its externalities.  One
charge against polygamy in the United States is that it entails social costs
in terms of corruption and fraud.229  An even greater and more common
concern, however, is polygamy’s effects on the children raised in these
households and communities.  People point to child brides and “lost
boys” as emblematic of the abuses polygamy perpetuates against chil-
dren.230  Part of me wants to radically resist the notion that intimacy can-
not be theorized without attention to children.  The assumption of wo-
men as mothers falls prey both to repro-normativity and to
heteronormativity.231  Yet, the strong reality is that a paper on bargaining
dilemmas and vulnerabilities in plural families must address the role of
children, child custody determinations, and what Martha Fineman calls
the dependency critique, to assert that it is taking vulnerability seriously
and as a central concern of family law.
In fact, children raise two distinct questions for polygamy.  The first
is that polygamy is intrinsically “bad” for children.  In a sense, this allega-
tion is not materially different from accusations about gays and lesbians
229. In the United States, polygamy has served as a cover for social corruption, most
notably, welfare and tax fraud.  Under our current dyadic marital regime only one woman
can be legally recognized as a man’s spouse.  This means that all subsequent “wives” have
the technical legal status of single heads of (often quite large) households, and, as such,
are entitled to federal and state benefits.  Investigations have shown that these monies are
often claimed by husbands or sect leaders, comprising a substantial source of institutional
wealth and funding.  At the same time these communities report high levels of child
poverty and neglect.  Similarly, some polygamist communities have politicized not filing
tax returns.  Sect leaders call this fraud against the government “bleeding the beast.”  See
Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 405–12 (describing fundamentalist
community’s illegal evasion of civic and family obligations).  Yet legalizing plural marriage
will diminish the opportunity for both welfare fraud and tax abuse and also shine some
much-needed sunlight on polygamous communities, allowing them to live their lives
openly and hopefully reducing the sway of underground sects and cult leaders.  See
Sigman, supra note 7, at 184–85 (“[T]he historical criminalization of polygamy has created R
barriers to legal enforcement of other criminal provisions concerning abuse, sexual
assault, and neglect within some polygamous communities.”); see also Bennion, supra note
54, at 120 n.57 (“According to the Utah Department of Workforce Services, in 2002, 66% R
of Hildale FLDS residents received federal assistance and according to the Arizona
Department of Economic Security, 78% of Colorado City residents received food
stamps.”); Duncan, supra note 10, at 329–31 (describing various forms of entitlement and R
tax fraud).
230. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing how some polygamous R
communities coerce girls into early marriages and expel boys, leaving them on their own
with no resources or family; in this sense, girls are forced into new families and boys are
deprived of theirs).
231. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes:  An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 197 (2001) (contending feminism has launched rigorous critique
of women’s socialization into being heteronormative, but not of women’s socialization as
mothers).
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as parents.  For both, the claim is that the nature of the adult intimacy
disadvantages, or in the stronger form, injures, children in some mean-
ingful way.232  Charges of child abuse and neglect are what prompted
Texas officials to raid the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints and seize hundreds of children from its members.233  Con-
cerns over child welfare also sparked other large-scale polygamy prosecu-
tions in the twentieth century.  However, as Martin Guggenheim, a
scholar of children’s welfare, contends, the state should not be permitted
to use child abuse prosecutions to “[r]egulat[e] the behavior of adults
who are not directly harming their children.”234  In addition, the abuse
concern may well confuse polygamy as a form of intimate association with
the unregulated communities and “compound effect” that Strassberg and
Sigman attribute to fundamentalist polygamous communities in the
United States.235  If this is the case, then Sigman is almost certainly cor-
rect that decriminalization, or the additional step of recognition and reg-
ulation called for by this Article, is the key to assimilating these families
and bringing them within our moral scrutiny.236  Finally, some worry that
232. Abuse concerns include child brides, incest, lost boys, violence, and the difficulty
of even proving paternity given the lack of record keeping in some underground
polygamous communities.  Shayna Sigman elaborates why people may fear abuse from
polygamy:
Reasons that polygamy might be more likely to be abusive or neglectful than
other relationships are that:  (1) polygamy invites secrecy, undermining women’s
ability to get help if needed; (2) the structure of polygamy suggests that the
husband will not have sufficient time to devote to each wife or their children; (3)
the treatment by other wives may be abusive; and (4) the types of people who
voluntarily choose polygamy may be attracted to the uneven power dynamic.
Sigman, supra note 7, at 172–73.  Janet Bennion’s empathetic interviews of fundamentalist R
Mormon women led her to identify the following as risk factors for abuse within families:
physical and social isolation/circumscription; father absence; lack of female network;
overcrowding; economic deprivation; and male supremacy/patriarchy.  Bennion, supra
note 54, at 10.  But see Guggenheim, supra note 100, at 776 (agreeing state uses child R
welfare as excuse to intervene in nontraditional families but suggesting families headed by
same-sex couples may receive more deference from state than polygamous families).
233. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 100, at 800 (detailing charges of abuse and R
neglect); Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Texas Mis-Step:  Why the Largest Child Removal in
Modern U.S. History Failed, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 449, 458–81 (2010)
(describing allegations that precipitated raid and subsequent legal proceedings).
234. Guggenheim, supra note 100, at 814.  Guggenheim, however, ends up endorsing R
criminal prosecutions of polygamists because criminal law better protects civil liberties.  Id.
235. Sigman, supra note 7, at 169–74 (discussing potential for abuse or neglect in R
polygamous relationships); Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 357 R
(contending “modern Mormon fundamentalist polygyny is . . . instrumental in the
development of small theocratically governed communities that largely evade both
regulation by the secular government and economic contribution to that government”).
236. While child abuse has certainly figured in several of the highly publicized
polygamy prosecutions, we may conflate correlation with causation.  All of these acts are
already criminalized.  However, they are difficult to prosecute in underground polygamous
communities.  Shayna Sigman observes “[c]hildren and women in polygynous families may
be at greater risk to suffer abuse precisely because of the premium placed on silence and
privacy.  These are the greatest weapons an abuser has.”  Sigman, supra note 7, at 181; see R
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growing up in polygamous families will reinforce conventional gender
roles in children, inhibiting their development in a liberal society nomi-
nally committed to gender equality.237  For instance, the report from the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services concluded the fol-
lowing after the FLDS raid:  “DFPS also presented evidence that . . . the
community functioned as a single household with a pervasive belief sys-
tem that groomed girls to become future victims of sexual abuse and boys
to become future sexual abuse perpetrators.”238  Social reproduction and
the socialization of children into gender roles is something that concerns
me greatly.  And yet, I suspect there are deeper threats to gender sociali-
zation than plural marriage:  television; the Internet; video games; mov-
ies; advertising; toys (from Barbie to Bratz); and even the organization of
sports and Scouting.  Nor is illiberal socialization limited to polygamists.
Orthodox religions, traditionalist families, conservative states, and some
ethnic enclaves oppose liberalism in various ways.  Yet, there are long-
standing constitutional norms protecting parents’ rights to raise their
children as they see fit, short of abuse or neglect.  We should be attentive
to how children learn to gender identify, but it is unclear that plural mar-
riage threatens social reproduction more than a variety of other social
things, which are tolerated and even subsidized.239
The second concern is more directly related to the topic of this
Article—whether polygamous families can be effectively regulated consis-
tent with extant norms in family law.  Apart from concerns about abuse or
illiberal socialization, critics of polygamy contend that it generates other
harms for children in our society, which is nominally organized around a
nuclear family model.  Some contend that polygamy is bad for children
also Duncan, supra note 10, at 316 (contending decriminalization will help to ameliorate R
abuse).
237. Importantly, here is where the gay analogy might actually be helpful.  Similar
allegations about childrearing and gender roles are made as a primary reason to deny
same-sex marriage.  Moreover, we may again conflate fundamentalist underground
polygamy with other forms of polygamy, including those who practice its crisis, charitable,
or immigration iterations.
238. Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., Eldorado Investigation 7 (Dec. 22,
2008), available at http://texasflds.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/eldorado-investigation-
report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Amanda Townsend & Agnes
Pawlowski, Girl, 14, Fled Abuse, “Mind Control” of Polygamy, CNN (Sept. 14, 2007), at
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/11/fleeing.polygamy.hammon/index.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Probably the worst part of the whole theology . . .
is the treatment of women and teaching women that they are not equal to men.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
239. Maxine Eichner and Linda McClain have both made strong cases for the role of
an active state in supporting liberal ideals within families.  See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The
Supportive State:  Families, Government, and America’s Political Ideals 5 (2010) (“Because
of . . . the critical role that sound families play in . . . a flourishing society, the family-state
relationship must occupy a central position in liberal democratic theory.”); McClain, The
Place of Families, supra note 46, at 4 (stating “government has an important responsibility” R
to carry out “the task of producing persons capable of responsible personal and
democratic self-government”).
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because multiple families with a single father will necessarily decrease the
emotional and financial support he gives to any child.  This is one of the
major criticisms of polygamy as practiced currently in some underground
communities and has been alleged in some high-profile prosecutions.240
In addition, some question whether child custody disputes would be un-
workable with polygamy’s multiplicity.  Let me take these in turn.
With regard to how marital multiplicity affects economic and emo-
tional child support, it is unclear that polygamy generates more costs for
children than the standard alternatives.  In 2006, the Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention reported that 38.5% of children were born to un-
married women.241  While some of these mothers will subsequently
marry, others, particularly poor women, will not.  Instead, the fathers of
their children will subsequently father children with other women, lead-
ing to multiple nonmarital families, or de facto polygamy.242  In addition,
a substantial percentage of married couples divorce and remarry, starting
new families.243  These successive divorces and remarriages have led to
what some have called serial polygamy, or what nineteenth-century activ-
ists derided as “polygamy on the installment plan.”244  This cultural dy-
namic leaves children from prior families economically and emotionally
disadvantaged in favor of subsequent ones, and, because men tend to
procreate with each new marriage more so than women, serial polygamy
has generated dynamics not unlike those feared from its contemporane-
ous variation.  In fact, the child welfare arguments currently made against
240. See, e.g., Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra note 24, at 408 (“Of more
legitimate state concern than simply the population effects of polygyny relative to
monogamy is the much smaller ratio of adults to children present in polygyny for support
purposes.”); Jason D. Berkowitz, Comment, Beneath the Veil of Mormonism:  Uncovering
the Truth About Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev.
615, 639 (2007) (stating children “are deprived of monetary support because the fathers
are unable to provide for all their children”); see also Guggenheim, supra note 100, at R
791–94 (discussing more generally purported state interests in protecting children from
living in polygamous households); Weaver, supra note 233, at 486 (describing this concern R
at work in FLDS raid).
241. Joyce A. Martin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Births:  Final Data
for 2006, 57 Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep. 2 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_07.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
242. In the African context, anthropologist Zeitzen notes that some men have
replaced multiple wives with girlfriends.  In these contexts, the “move away from polygyny
is more an economic adaptation to urban conditions than a normative commitment to
monogamy as such, a process seen in all of urban Africa.”  Zeitzen, supra note 26, at R
163–64.
243. In addition, forty percent of children born into two-parent households
experience a parental breakup by age fifteen.  Pat Wingert, Americans Marry Too Much,
Newsweek, Aug. 15, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/14/americans-
marry-too-much.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Hendrik Hartog,
Man and Wife in America:  A History 286 (2000) (“[T]he men and women who lived
behind the developing law of divorce . . . made it . . . serve their limited and concrete goals:
to live as husband and wife, to be married.”).
244. Gordon, Mormon Question, supra note 6, at 173. R
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polygamy were also made against no-fault divorce half a century ago.245
In other words, competition among families for emotional and economic
resources is not unique to what we might think of as contemporaneous
polygamy, but has long been found in both the de facto and serial ver-
sions as well.246
In fact, despite their emotional and economic costs to children, de
facto and serial polygamy both enjoy strong legal protection.  Individuals
have a constitutional right to divorce and remarry as many times as they
desire, regardless of whether they are supporting prior families.247  Nor
can the state limit men’s right to reproduce outside of marriage, based
on burdens to the welfare system.248  Hence, apart from the fact that the
question of “affordability” has already been declared constitutionally ir-
relevant, practically speaking, both serial polygamy and de facto polyg-
amy have already undermined it.  In this sense, the question of child sup-
port is a bit of a red herring.  This is not to say that these dynamics are
245. Nancy Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S., Sexual Relations, and
Community, in Sex, Preference, and Family:  Essays on Law and Nature 63, 78 (David M.
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
246. In her comparative survey, Miche`le Alexandre finds:
Vulnerable individuals often enter into these de facto unions with little
bargaining power and find themselves without any recourse when the de facto
polygamous union terminates either by the death of a de facto spouse or by the
unilateral termination by one of the parties.  De facto spouses with the greatest
bargaining power are able to enter into as many of these de facto unions as they
want without shouldering any of the statutory marital responsibilities imposed by
their particular jurisdiction on de jure spouses.
Alexandre, Lessons, supra note 10, at 1476–77.  While this focuses on particular R
postdivorce dynamics, even when mutually sought or initiated by the wife, one can find
such dynamics in intact dyadic marriages as well.  While intact, dyadic marriages do not
share the particular heightened opportunities.  And yet, economists of the household have
identified how, under the no-fault regimes that now dominate Western family law, the
divorce threat is prevalent.  See, e.g., Lundberg & Pollak, Efficiency, supra note 112, at 164 R
(“[T]he equilibrium allocation typically depends upon the spouses’ alternatives outside
marriage (e.g., ‘the divorce threat’) . . . .”).  Of course, things used to be much worse in
dyadic marriage.
247. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 375, 375–77 (1978) (holding
unconstitutional statute forbidding individuals with child custody obligations from
marrying without court approval), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(finding constitutional right to procreate), with State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Wis.
2001) (holding where father is not supporting existing children, state may bar him from
having more children as condition of his probation).  Kenneth Karst’s classic article, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 667 (1980), found there is a
constitutional right to remarry implied in Zablocki.  Similarly, children may have
expectations of being only children, but the law doesn’t protect these either.  See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support Obligations?, in Fathers
Under Fire:  The Revolution in Child Support Enforcement 302, 313–18 (Irwin Garfinkel
et al. eds., 1998) (examining conflicting intuitions on support priorities for successive
families).
248. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375–77 (holding unconstitutional a statute restricting
marriage for people with children likely to become public charges).
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not worth taking into account, only that polygamy is not necessarily dis-
tinct in this regard.
Another related concern about children is how custody would be de-
termined upon divorce.  As difficult as custody disputes are, how can the
law possibly manage multiple adults seeking custody?  But in fact, family
law is already grappling with parental multiplicity.  Dyadic parenthood,
along with what Katherine Baker has called “bionormativity,” is splinter-
ing along several axes.249  First, no-fault divorce and changing cultural
norms have combined to drastically increase the number of remarriages
and hence blended families.  The following is a common scenario:  A dy-
adic couple may have a child and then divorce.  The custodial parent may
then remarry, and the child may form strong ties to the new stepparent.
A third marriage and second stepparent may even follow.  Hence, in se-
rial polygamy, several adults may “parent” a child who does not share a
biological relationship, any of whom may seek custody or visitation rights
at dissolution.  A second fact pattern stems from the rise in assisted repro-
duction among both gay and heterosexual couples.  Contributors of ge-
netic material, i.e., sperm and egg donors, are seeking parental rights, as
are surrogate mothers.  Such claims have been an issue for heterosexual
consumers of “reprotech” resources for some time, and gay couples in-
creasingly are confronting them, i.e., lesbian couples and sperm donors;
gay men and surrogates or egg donors.  Grandparents and other ex-
tended family members have also made claims for visitation, if not out-
right parenthood.  Finally, adoption too has generated parental complex-
ity, particularly in states that have implemented open adoption.250  Thus,
a variety of contemporary scenarios have introduced the question of pa-
rental multiplicity into the law.  Child custody and welfare issues upon
dissolution of plural marital associations are not meaningfully different
from ones that arise in de facto polygamy or the variety of scenarios that
249. “There is much talk about how the diminished importance of marriage harms
children by destabilizing homes and breeding competing loyalties, but the diminished
importance of marriage affects children in a more fundamental way.  Without the law of
marriage, we do not know who parents are.”  Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 649, 651 (2008) [hereinafter Baker,
Bionormativity] (footnote omitted); cf. Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin:  Ghosts in
the Postmodern Family, 25 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 73, 78 (2010) (discussing persistence
of biological connections in adoptive, reprotech, and stepfamilies and suggesting law take
lessons from contact norms utilized in adoption law).
250. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60, 67 (2000) (denying grandparents’
petition for visitation); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114, 131 (1989) (rejecting
sole or dual paternity claim by biological father not married to child’s mother); Carter v.
Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 853–56 (Alaska 1983) (construing statute broadly to enable
stepparent visitation rights); Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985)
(using equitable estoppel to enforce state claim for child support against transgender
partner of child’s mother, where child was product of artificial insemination with third
party); Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:  Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 997, 1012 n.77 (1995) (citing
cases in which courts gave visitation rights to birth parents after adoption).
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generate “third party” parental claims—serial polygamy, the increasing
number and variety of reprotech families, grandparents, and adoption.
Family law itself is in transition, and courts are already developing norms
to allocate parental rights among multiple claimants.251
In sum, family law already has disaggregated marriage from parent-
ing.  We have a separate law of parenthood, and it is generating norms to
grapple with parental multiplicity.  As the existing law shows, permitting
polygamy is a conceptually distinct question from permitting multiple
parenthood.  To the extent that children of polygamy are raised in house-
holds with more than one parental figure, this does not mean that they
are being raised in a household with multiple parents.252
Concerns about children and child welfare should be taken seri-
ously, and one might be inclined to conclude that polygamy’s critics are
correct:  It should be a banned form of intimate association.  And yet,
open-ended intimate multiplicity already exists.  We might fairly be con-
cerned about its harms, costs, and regulatory challenges, but plural mar-
riage is not a necessary condition for these concerns.  Formal, contempo-
raneous polygamy, serial polygamy, and de facto polygamy all share some
of the vulnerabilities and uncertainties with regard to struggles for finan-
cial, and particularly emotional, resources among families.  Despite ongo-
ing controversy, we don’t ban de facto polygamy.  And, with the advent of
no-fault divorce, serial polygamy is the norm.  Family law has developed
robust norms to grapple with the implications and effects of “serial”
open-ended multiplicity with regard to children.  The next step, which
this section has addressed, would be to contemplate how to best address
legal questions of multiple adults as contemporaneous intimates.
E. Summary
This set of proposed default rules is both tentative and incomplete.
Marital law comprises volumes in state codes, and this Article could not
possibly address, or even anticipate, all of the issues that a regime permit-
ting plural marriage would confront.  Yet, this is a first step, an effort to
251. Family law has yet to generate universal norms to address parental multiplicity.
Determinations of “third party” legal parenthood, custody, and visitation rights vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as does much of family law.  See generally Susan Frelich
Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 11 (2008) (distinguishing biological,
functional, and estoppel approaches to parental multiplicity); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah
Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:  Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological
Lesbian Coparents, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 341 (2002) (describing courts’ use of equitable
doctrines to determine legal relationship of lesbian coparents and children); Melanie B.
Jacobs, Why Just Two?  Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to
Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 309, 310 (2007) (“[D]octrines such as
intentional and functional parenthood have been applied by courts to legalize the co-
parentage of a child by a nonbiological gay or lesbian partner . . . .”).
252. See, e.g., Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 249, at 655–56 (noting differing R
degrees of parenthood may be “inevitable by-product of a system that rejects
bionormativity”).
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consider whether the challenges polygamy poses for legal regulation
could be met, and how they should be met.
Taken together, an opt-in regime with a strong anti-conversion prin-
ciple, combined with unanimity rules barring unilateral actions, voluntary
exit, i.e., divorce, and buyout norms should alleviate some of the worst
harms we might fear from plural marriage.  Of course, there are some
real and meaningful distinctions between regulating the bargaining con-
cerns in polygamy’s intimate sphere versus partnership’s commercial one.
In particular, some of the rules I posit might be styled explicitly as more
expensive or information-forcing penalty defaults rather than
majoritarian ones, and some of the rules will be “stickier” than commer-
cial partnership’s notoriously slippery ones.
In the end, the claim here is not that these defaults will eliminate
vulnerability or exploitation, but rather, that they will ameliorate them.
People might still fear that these rules, particularly unanimity, will not be
sufficient, however sticky, because of coercion or deceptive behavior.  In
addition, the fact that it is a voluntary opt-in regime will leave many plural
households unregulated and its members without protection.  Finally,
some will complain I have fallen into an autonomy paradox, that inti-
mates gain substantial rights, but concede significant liberties.  All of
these concerns are true of course.  But none of them are meaningfully
different from the current dyadic regime.
IV. INTIMACY EXCEPTIONALISM
Only an ostrich could fail to have noticed that the institution of
marriage as we know it, i.e., heterosexual and dyadic, has been subjected
to increasing scrutiny by policymakers, scholars, and layfolk alike.
Conservatives, liberals, feminists, economists, and multitudes of others of
all political and methodological stripes have debated the effects of our
marital regime on the men and women who participate in it and on the
same-sex couples and other sexual minorities it excludes.  Resolutions
have been in short supply; proclamations and diagnoses, though, prolifer-
ate.  We have thoroughly theorized and debated the heterosexual aspects
of contemporary marriage.  Now, perhaps, it is time to theorize and de-
bate the dyadic part.
This Article has focused on plural marriage through a regulatory
lens.  It has contemplated polygamy as a bargaining paradox, a poten-
tially fruitful analog to commercial partnerships, and possibly a new mari-
tal form.  The primary goal thus far has been to shed some much-needed
light on polygamy itself.  However, theorizing marital multiplicity has
broader implications for the intimacy debates.  As this Part will show,
moving beyond marital dyadicism to contemplate multiplicity suggests
three things for conversations about recognition and regulation of inti-
macy.  First, it explains why this Article encourages marital licensing and
state-supplied defaults, or, in other words, why the purely private order-
ing urged by many for same-sex couples is not sufficient for committed
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intimates, regardless of the number.  Second, it plunges headfirst into the
recognition debates, using polygamy to show how they frequently fall
prey to what we might think of as intimacy exceptionalism and intimacy
essentialism.  Finally, it returns to the bargaining focus of the last two
Parts, using a materialist and consequentialist approach to offer some fi-
nal thoughts about intimate associations.
A. The Limits of Private Ordering
Several arguments can be made against recognizing polygamy.  In
addition to specific objections to the practice rehearsed in Part I.B, there
is the more general argument that state recognition is unnecessary be-
cause committed intimates can achieve the same status-outcomes through
private ordering.  Both those seeking the continued exclusion of sexual
minorities from heterodyadic marriage and “abolitionists” who urge the
state to get out of the intimacy recognition business altogether embrace
this view:
[T]he deregulation of marriage will stimulate the democratiza-
tion of the antenuptial agreement.  Besides the standard form
agreements promulgated by religious and secular institutions
sponsoring marriage, standard form antenuptial contracts will
be developed and promoted by bar associations, legal publish-
ers, independent websites—anyone with an ideological or eco-
nomic interest in servicing the deregulated marriage market.253
Yet a brief look at inheritance rules and norms suggests the limits, and
insufficiency, of private ordering for intimate associations.
Private ordering would suggest that intimates name each other as
beneficiaries in their wills.  Indeed, a veritable cottage industry of estate
planning for same-sex couples has sprung up in the last several years.254
Yet such crude optimism ignores the stickiness of default rules in the in-
heritance context.  Most people in the United States die intestate, that is,
without a will.255  In the absence of wills, state statutes direct distribution
of the estate to a designated set of family relations, preferred in varying
orders.  Currently, in every state, spouses inherit, either to the exclusion
of blood relations or in tandem with them.256  If there is no spouse, then
253. Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage:  The Pro-Marriage Case for
Deregulating Marriage, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161, 1183 (2006).  For others who urge
abolition, see infra notes 277–284 and accompanying text. R
254. See generally Patricia A. Cain, A Review Essay:  Tax and Financial Planning for
Same-Sex Couples:  Recommended Reading, 8 Law & Sexuality 613 (1998) (reviewing
numerous treaties and books pertaining to estate planning for same-sex couples); Jennifer
Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in the
Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 Seattle U. L. Rev. 75 (2003) (focusing on
estate planning for nontraditional couples, including same-sex ones).
255. See Joel C. Dobris et al., Estates and Trusts 62 (2d ed. 2003) (“Most Americans
die without wills.”).
256. In states that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, the surviving spouse
inherits the entire estate in many contexts.  Unif. Probate Code § 2-102.  Non-UPC states
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blood relatives inherit in order of proximity to the decedent.  Without
state recognition of intimate relations, intestacy would become the exclu-
sive province of blood relatives.  The only way for nonmarital intimates to
inherit would be if the decedent managed to avoid intestacy.  Destabi-
lized estate plans fly in the face of longstanding American cultural norms
and expectations, increasing the costs and uncertainty of post-mortem
wealth transfers.
In addition, wills have their own well-documented perils.257  Inheri-
tance case law is filled with challenges by third parties to privately or-
dered distributions between intimates.  Particularly at risk are estate plans
that do not conform to social intimacy norms, including, of course, ones
drafted by sexual minorities.  Most recently is the 2009 case of an elderly
gay couple of twenty years, Clay Greene and Harold Scull, who had exe-
cuted reciprocal wills and power of attorney documents.  After Scull fell
and injured himself, officials in Sonoma County, California ignored the
medical and other decisionmaking provisions in the power of attorney,
separated the couple, terminated their lease, auctioned their possessions,
forced Greene into a nursing home, and refused to allow Greene to make
medical decisions for Scull or even see him.258  This is only the most re-
cent in a long list of examples of how poorly non-recognized intimates
fare in the probate system.259  Spouses do not always fare well in probate
divide a decedent’s assets between the surviving spouse and other family members of the
decedent.  See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits
of Non-Marital Exclusion, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 1063, 1064–66 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko,
Expressive Function] (recounting UPC’s innovations regarding surviving spouses and
exclusionary effects on gays and lesbians).
257. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the
Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1116–17 (1984) (describing pitfalls of probate
process); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
489, 489, 498–501 (1975) (contending excessive formalism in probate process undermines
testamentary intent); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 Ariz. L.
Rev. 235, 236–38, 243–58 (1996) (describing how undue influence and incapacity doctrine
undermines security of wills); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform
Probate Code, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033, 1036 (1994) (arguing “[t]he problem lies . . . with
judicial insistence on literal compliance” with formalities); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue
Influence and the Law of Wills:  A Comparative Analysis, 19 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 41
(2008) (providing historical and comparative survey of how undue influence doctrine
affects will-making).
258. Complaint at 8–20, Greene v. Cnty. of Sonoma, No. SPR-81815 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 22, 2010).  The court granted only part of the County’s requests for control of Scull’s
affairs, permitting access to a bank account.  After Greene sued, the County settled,
agreeing to pay $600,000 in damages to Scull’s estate.  Case Docket:  Greene v. County of
Sonoma et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=issue_caseDocket_Greene_v_County_of_Sonoma_et_al (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
259. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance:  An
Empirical Study, 16 Law & Ineq. 1, 15–17 (1998) (discussing how gay and lesbian partners
are disadvantaged with respect to inheritance); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for
Domestic Partners, 79 Tulsa L. Rev. 55, 60 (2004) (describing how current American
inheritance law provides little protection for surviving domestic partners); E. Gary Spitko,
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challenges, but they certainly do better than most non-recognized inti-
mates.260  “Spouse,” or some statutorily recognized affiliation, is an im-
portant legal designation, necessary to overcome the stickiness of rules
favoring other legally defined “heirs.”  Against the very sticky backdrop of
intestacy, the only way to compete is to become part of the state-
recognized scheme of greedy heirs.  That is, intimates compete with the
decedent’s other family members for recognition and rights to post-
mortem wealth.261  Nor do non-recognized intimates enjoy rights such as
the elective share or community property, both devices designed to pro-
tect surviving spouses from disinheritance.262  Ironically, while the turn to
“private ordering” might suggest the relevance and application of part-
nership principles, the lack of marital recognition and status bars non-
married intimates from accessing the actual partnership principles now
embedded in much of family and inheritance law.263
Finally, as long as polygamy remains criminalized, wills risk exposing
the entire family to state interference.  Wills are public documents and as
such provide a public record of how a decedent’s estate is distributed.
Wills leaving money to multiple spouses will inevitably raise questions as
to whether the decedent practiced polygamy, providing evidence to pros-
ecutors and immigration officials alike.  Private ordering alone is not suf-
ficient.  As the inheritance context demonstrates, privately ordered inti-
mate relationships would require an entirely different set of intestacy
categories, as well as substantial changes to both probate statutes and also
current probate norms involving judges and juries.  Inheritance then pro-
vides one example of the fragility and instability of purely private order-
ing among intimates.
An Accrual/Multifactor Approach to Intestate Succession for Unmarried Committed
Partners, 81 Or. L. Rev. 255, 255–58 (2002) [hereinafter Spitko, Accrual] (describing why
domestic partners do not usually inherit); Spitko, Expressive Function, supra note 256, at R
1064–66 (noting existing inheritance law disadvantages same-sex couples); see also
Leeford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift:  Competing Default Rule Theories
Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 273, 276, 315–16, 328–29 (2010)
(stating 2008 UPC amendments on parent-child inheritance only nominally help
nontraditional families).
260. See supra note 259 (describing role of marriage in determining post-mortem R
distribution of wealth).
261. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 257, at 243–58 (describing how courts use undue R
influence doctrine to grant inheritances to blood relations over domestic partners); Spitko,
Expressive Function, supra note 256, at 1075 (describing intestacy law as favoring blood R
relations over domestic partners).
262. See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 259, at 60 (stating benefits do not typically extend R
to non-spouses); Spitko, Accrual, supra note 259, at 293 (arguing committed partners R
should partake in “elective share”).
263. See Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker, supra note 14, at 108–24 R
(noting people wrongly conceive partnership law as entailing a “clean break”).
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B. Intimacy Exceptionalism
In addition to the private ordering alternative, arguments in favor of
recognizing polygamy confront two additional obstacles:  intimacy essen-
tialism and intimacy exceptionalism.  Some people, including those who
support intimacy autonomy and heterogeneity in principle, balk at polyg-
amy.  They conclude that polygamy’s injuries—characterized variously as
patriarchy, barbarism, despotism, or more generally, just plain old devi-
ance—warrant and justify its exclusion from recognition as a legitimate
intimate relationship.  Polygamy as practiced in its dominant historic and
contemporary forms might fairly give policy makers pause.  As Part II sug-
gested, it is often associated with inequality, exploitation, and dissatisfac-
tion.  Yet, this Article has taken a first step toward suggesting that this is a
result not of polygamy per se—that is, of an essential defect with this
form of intimacy—but of regulatory failure.  There is no good reason why
we could not recognize and regulate polygamy to ameliorate many of its
illiberal aspects.  Many assume the intrinsic harms of polygamy—while at
the same time assuming the intrinsic goods of dyadic marriage.  Heter-
odyadic marriage becomes the standard-bearer, the unspoken intimacy
norm, according to which all other intimacy forms are measured and
evaluated.264
Yet, opportunism and injury are present and operationalized in dy-
adic relationships as well.  In fact, the patriarchal nature of marriage was
a large part of nineteenth-century calls to abolish the institution.265
Wives suffered from domestic violence, marital rape, and civil subordina-
tion of their property rights and contract capabilities.266  Yet, despite calls
264. See generally Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking:  Feminism, Nature, and
Difference 1–2 (1989) (contending “essentialism is essential to social constructionism, a
point that powerfully throws into question the stability and impermeability of the
essentialist/constructionist binarism”); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman:
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, at ix (1988) (discussing how “notion of a
generic ‘woman’ functions in feminist thought much the way the notion of generic ‘man’
has functioned in Western philosophy:  it obscures the heterogeneity of women and cuts
off examination of the significance of such heterogeneity for feminist theory and political
activity”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 581, 585 (1990) (stating feminist theory at times relies on “notion that a unitary,
‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class,
sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”).
265. See, e.g., Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows:  A History of Marriage and the Nation
63–72 (2000) (discussing abolitionist and early women’s rights, and analogizing marriage’s
gender order to slavery’s racial order to indict marriage’s subordinating effects on
women).
266. Id. at 11–12 (describing how feme covert principle legally subordinated wives to
husbands, diminishing women as citizens); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work:  The First
Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 Yale L.J.
1073, 1082 (1994) (“The common law charged a husband with responsibility to represent
and support his wife, giving him in return the use of her real property and absolute rights
in her personalty and ‘services’—all products of her labor.”); see also Richard H. Chused,
Married Women’s Property Law:  1800–1850, 71 Geo. L.J. 1359 (1983) (tracing evolution
of women’s property rights in first half of nineteenth century).
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to do so, we neither abolished nor criminalized dyadic marriage.  Instead,
proto-feminists and their allies undertook a vast reform project, still in
progress, which has now been joined by large numbers of those commit-
ted to gender equality as a core principle of liberalism and democracy.267
Regulation was the solution, not abolition.  And while feminist scholars
continue to criticize marriage’s gender inequities, no one denies that for-
mal equality has changed women’s lives.268  Indeed, legal reform of mar-
riage is arguably one of the central forces that has revolutionized gender
roles today.  Essentialist claims that dyadicism is “good” and polyfidelity is
“bad” naturalizes dyadic marriage as a static institution with an intrinsic
set of “idealized” traits, obscuring it as a product of political and legal
struggle and reform.
Of course, many will dismiss this as ancient history, contending that
current heterodyadic marriage bears no relationship to modern-day po-
lygamy.  However, this willfully ignores the fact that many contemporary
marriages steadfastly continue to adhere to patriarchal principles.269
Sometimes these are imposed and sometimes they are embraced.  Yet,
few contend the state cannot or should not recognize all heterodyadic
marriages between consenting adults.270  Instead, most believe the solu-
tion to the injuries of intimacy lies in encouraging women to perceive
them as such, i.e., as injuries, and to then avail themselves of their formal
rights, not prohibiting women from entering these relationships, let
alone criminalizing them.271  If the state is willing to recognize the vast
267. See generally Eichner, supra note 239 (exploring state involvement in marriage); R
McClain, The Place of Families, supra note 46 (discussing state involvement in enforcing R
liberal ideals within families).
268. See, e.g., Fineman, Illusion of Equality, supra note 216, at 1–17 (stating marriage R
continues to be an inequitable institution); Williams, supra note 18, at 1–141 (describing R
how legal norms of marital property interact with cultural and workplace norms to
structurally disadvantage women); Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-
Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1199, 1227–33 (2010) (contending straight
women have stake in same-sex marriage debate and whether it is framed as matter of sex
equality); Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 79–85 (urging turn to private law R
norms to govern intimacy to jettison some of marriage’s historical gendered baggage).
Case and Fineman now do support abolishing contemporary marriage.
269. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between
Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 Utah L. Rev. 381, 396–401
(describing cases involving explicitly patriarchal norms in contemporary marriages).
270. But see supra notes 265–266 and accompanying text (urging abolition of R
marriage because of its intrinsic association with institutionalized gender subordination).
271. This is certainly a major point of contention in the literature on domestic
violence.  Compare Cheryl Hanna, No Right To Choose:  Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1857 (1996) (concluding
“prosecutors can no longer avoid mandated participation if they are serious about
improving the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence”), and Emily J. Sack,
Battered Women and the State:  The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy,
2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1657, 1677–78 (defending mandatory arrest rules in domestic violence
cases), with Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer?  Do We Know That for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 St. Louis U. Pub.
L. Rev. 7, 37–38 (2004) (“While implementing mandatory arrest policies seemed to benefit
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number of patriarchal dyadic marriages, then it seems odd not to recog-
nize polygamous ones that share the same characteristics.  This, again,
suggests the solution is to be found in regulatory amelioration, changing
the structure of marriages, whether dyadic or plural, to create a baseline
of formal equality.  Contra essentialist claims about the inherent good or
evil of intimate relations based on a numbers game, this Article has em-
braced a consequentialist analysis focusing on effects and whether they
can be ameliorated.
Intimacy essentialism is at work in a second way as well.  Opposition
to polygamy as intrinsically bad for women exposes a feminist longing for
a universal, idealized feminist gender subject.272  This imagined subject
would welcome, participate in, and even embrace mutual, reciprocal so-
cial and political relations with men.273  Yet polygamy is one of several
disputed sets of relations that complicates the quest for an idealized gen-
der equality.  Penny Andrews’s work shows that, in countries such as
South Africa, debates over polygamy often occur in the context of “sev-
eral decades of global human rights debates centering on a woman’s
right to equality, on the one hand, and the respect for cultural values and
traditions on the other.”274  Andrews points out that South Africa’s
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, which brought plural marriages
within the jurisdiction of the formal courts, carefully negotiated new and
“competing” constitutional imperatives of gender equality and cultural
autonomy.275  An international lens exposes the ways that polygamy is
part of the pantheon of feminist conflicts over women as volitional sub-
white women . . . that deterrence came at a high cost for African-American women . . . .”),
and G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 237, 243 (2005)
(“[D]ecision to sacrifice autonomy was based on flawed conceptions of will and resistance,
as well as faulty ideas concerning the curative power of state intervention.”).
272. See Spelman, supra note 264, at 2 (“[M]uch of Western feminist theory has been R
written . . . as if not just the manyness of women but also all the differences among us are
disturbing, threatening to the sweet intelligibility of the tidy and irrefutable fact that all
women are women.”).
273. On the “sex/violence” axis of feminist legal theory, see, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis &
Joan C. Williams, Foreword to Symposium:  Gender, Work & Family Project Inaugural
Feminist Legal Theory Lecture, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1, 2–3 (2000) (“For the
past two decades . . . feminist jurisprudence has conducted a rigorous and sustained
inquiry into how rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, and pornography
subordinate women.”).
274. Penelope E. Andrews, “Big Love”?  The Recognition of Customary Marriages in
South Africa, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1483, 1485 (2007).
275. Andrews observes:
[T]he “Africanization” of the new constitutional state was a precondition for
democracy, and a clear signal that South Africa would shed its colonial and
apartheid past.  But such derogation from the country’s ignominious past
generated a challenge with respect to the embedding of equality as the signature
constitutional principle.  Simply put, how was the Constitution to balance, on the
one hand, the constitutional commitment to equality, while on the other finally
providing formal recognition to indigenous laws and institutions?
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jects.  Postcolonial and other feminists have called for more complex ac-
counts of women’s subjectivity, as beings who make “choices” under cul-
tural, economic, and other constraints.276  An ongoing question for
feminism is whether it leaves room for women who are committed to re-
ligious faith, cultural autonomy, antiracism, class solidarity, etc.
A second hurdle for polygamy to overcome is the increasing schol-
arly resistance to state recognition of intimacy in any form.  Legal aca-
demic debates over intimacy recognition are robust and complex.  Some
urge that the state’s recognition of intimates should be limited to conven-
tional marriage.277  Others favor keeping marriage, but contend it should
not be privileged over other status-based regimes.278  At the other end of
the spectrum, scholars urge the state to get out of the marriage business
and argue that state-sponsored marriage should be abolished.279  Within
Andrews, Who’s Afraid of Polygamy?, supra note 96, at 356 (footnote omitted); see also R
Bunting, supra note 162 (complicating contention that early marriage is always human R
rights violation).
276. See generally Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety:  The Islamic Revival and the
Feminist Subject (2005) (analyzing constraints on Egyptian women involved in urban
women’s mosque movement in Cairo from 1995–1997 and impact movement had on
Egyptian society); Uma Narayan, “Westernization,” Respect for Cultures, and Third-World
Feminists, in Dislocating Cultures:  Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism 1,
1–13 (1997) (“Those in Third-World contexts who dismiss the politics of feminists in their
midst as symptoms of ‘Westernization’ . . . fail to consider how these feminists’ experiences
within their Third-World contexts have shaped and informed politics . . . .”).
The National Geographic story on an FLDS community noted, “[t]oday FLDS women
in the Hildale-Colorado City area have ample opportunity to ‘escape’—they have cell
phones, they drive cars, there are no armed guards keeping them in—yet they don’t.”
Anderson, supra note 37, at 57.  Critics, however, note that, being completely isolated and R
without skills, the women have nowhere to go and no means of supporting themselves.  Id.
277. Within this group some would limit marriage to heterodyadic intimates.  See,
e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. Rev. 1, 26–94 (arguing there is no constitutional right to same-sex marriage).
Others, though, would maintain the elevated and privileged status of marriage but open it
to sexual minorities.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate:  A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGeorge
L. Rev. 641, 647–59 (2000) (“The path [to legal recognition of same-sex marriage] is step-
by-step and incremental, inevitable in some jurisdictions, impossible elsewhere in the short
term, and sedimentary in the sense that new institutions are being piled on top of old
ones.”).  Collectively, this camp opposes creating an inferior regime of other state-
recognition proposals, such as the proposed American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution, as well as the domestic partnership and civil union statutes and
ordinances that have been enacted in many jurisdictions.
278. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Queer/Religious Friendship in the Obama Era, 33
Wash U. J.L. & Pol’y 211 (forthcoming 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (urging gay community to embrace liberatory potential of parallel
recognition regimes).  Although Nancy Polikoff is one of the most adamant abolitionists,
in commenting on the American Law Institute Principles for Dissolution she expressed
openness to a dual regime.  See Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less, supra note 195, at R
366–68 (“I am also willing to acknowledge that legal recognition of nonmarital
relationships expresses acceptance of such relationships, and that this is a good thing.”).
279. This group ranges from agnosticism about marriage to active opposition, often
based on feminist first principles.  See, e.g., Fineman, Masking Dependency, supra note 20, R
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this camp, some encourage private ordering—that intimates should ne-
gotiate their own intimacy arrangements—against a backdrop of supplied
defaults.280  Others, though, believe that subsidizing the increased priva-
tization of marriage is the wrong move.  Instead, the state should direct
its energies towards subsidizing economic vulnerability.281  Finally, some
who endorse status-based regimes fervently believe that recognition must
rest on voluntary consent and oppose the state imposing recognition on
intimates.282  Others embrace this intimate “ascription,” believing that in
order to protect vulnerable intimates the state should impose the obliga-
tions based on status or behavior.283
Of course, some scholars have urged that polygamy should be recog-
nized, typically based on principles of political or constitutional liber-
alism or concern for the vulnerable populations that practice plural mar-
at 2214–15 (“It is essential for feminists to point out consistently that without substantial
rethinking of the concepts underlying patriarchy—such as that of the private-natural
family—the condition of women is unlikely to improve significantly.”); Nancy Polikoff,
Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y &
L. 167, 176 (2000) (“Supporters of legalizing same-sex marriage are . . . wrong when they
see equal access to marriage as the only way out of this inequality.  Abolish marriage as a
legal category for everyone.”); Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less, supra note 195, at R
354 (calling idea of treating separating domestic partners like divorcing spouses “an
important step in the right direction of making marriage matter less”); Zelinsky, supra
note 253, at 1163 (“The law should not define, regulate, or recognize marriage.”); see also R
Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note 15, at 80 (outlining typology of intimate and R
commercial associations in some large part to combat “the naturalized model of family
[that] contributes to inequalities both within relationships and among various types of
relationships” (footnote omitted)).
280. Several endorse a standard form approach.  See, e.g., Drobac & Page, supra note
14, at 401–20 (proposing “Uniform Domestic Partnership Act” to treat all partnerships the R
same); Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, supra note 16, at 449 (proposing “Domestic R
Entity” as mechanism to fill gaps in marriage standard form); Ribstein, A Standard Form
Approach, supra note 16, at 310 (highlighting “potential of allowing couples to select not R
only from among the standard forms in a particular state, but also from the menus of
standard forms offered by various states”).  Others emphasize personalization.  See, e.g.,
Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 14, at 464–65 (“Within limits, couples should be authorized R
to legally define their own marriages.”); Stake, Mandatory Planning, supra note 14, at 399 R
(“Allowing people to write their own enforceable marriage terms . . . is an essential and
important step in the right direction.”); see also Ertman, Marriage as a Trade, supra note
15, at 82 (“[B]usiness models offer a repertoire of tools to address both extant and future R
problems in private relationships.”).
281. This argument is made in its strongest form by influential feminist theorist
Martha Fineman.  Fineman makes a persuasive argument that state support for families
should be designed to support relations of dependency, not to subsidize horizontal,
conjugal relations.  In Fineman’s vision, the state plays a robust role in subsidizing families,
but through supporting dependency, not conjugality.  Fineman, Inevitability of
Dependency, supra note 20, at 96; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?,  9 R
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 239, 271 (2001) (“It is [the caretaker and dependent] relationship
that should be subsidized and protected.”).
282. See supra note 196 (citing references).
283. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 216, at 55–56 (arguing “[t]he theory developed R
here . . . focus[es] . . . on the parties’ situation when the marriage ends” in order “to avoid
an unequal distribution of the dissolution’s financial burdens”).
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riage.  Others, though, urge the solution to polygamy is to be found in
the state withdrawing altogether from the business of recognizing inti-
mate relationships.  Polygamists, then, would have no more, or less,
standing before the state than any other intimates.  For these abolition-
ists, the long-term economic relationships and vulnerabilities that can
emerge in intimate relationships are substantively different from those
that emerge in arms-length ones.  Law continues to erect ever more re-
fined and innovative frameworks for commercial associates that allows
them to determine the optimal form to serve their interests.  In addition
to the variety of associational forms, licensing structures, and state-sup-
plied defaults, commercial associates are also protected by implied part-
nership rules, consumer regulation, and some parts of contract law.  At
the same time, some of intimacy’s best advocates are exceptionalizing it
as monolithic, inhabited by intimates who connect sexually but not eco-
nomically, and, ideally, beyond regulation.  They urge horizontal inti-
macy is irrelevant to the state’s task of managing and supporting families,
or, alternatively, optimized when left to its own devices.284  Underlying all
of these visions is a liberal account of intimacy as populated by autono-
mous individuals who do not become interdependent.
Marriage is not only a licensing but also a distributive justice scheme.
As currently structured, it discriminates between intimates, channeling
resources, preferences, and subsidies to those it recognizes and not
others.  Importantly, marriage also allocates resources between intimates.
During marriage and after, at death or divorce, rules establish baseline
entitlements, determining rights and duties, many of them economic.  It
is important to note that getting rid of marriage will eliminate disparities
in subsidies and resources between different kinds of intimates, but will
not eliminate the distributive justice concerns between intimates
themselves.285
We are still in search of a framework to theorize polygamy in the
United States.  This Article has rejected the now popular gay analogy as
inapt, that is undescriptive and unhelpful.  In addition, it is skeptical of
both essentialist and exceptionalist rejections of polygamy.  The former
assumes the inherent harms of polygamy (while also assuming the inher-
ent good of dyadic marriage), condemning it out of hand.  It also traf-
ficks in monolithic visions of all women as idealized feminist subjects.
The latter rolls polygamy into its broader conclusion that, unlike other
economic relationships, the state has no business recognizing intimate
ones.
284. See supra note 279 (exemplifying calls for state noninterference); see also Halley R
et al., supra note 97, at 420–21 (urging feminist regulations of sexuality have created costs R
and harms).
285. See Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:  A Revision, 102 Mich. L. Rev.
129, 142 (2003) (reviewing costs of marriage to state, individuals, and women as a group,
but concluding “as an institution that imposes social control, marriage, though flawed and
unjust, is better than its competitors”:  the state and the market).
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In focusing on polygamy through a bargaining and regulatory lens,
this Article embraces what we might think of as a consequentialist ap-
proach, one that focuses on functions and effects.  Consequentialism
poses two questions.  First, it focuses on how different intimacy forms gen-
erate distinct effects and dynamics.  Second, it questions whether any
negative effects can be ameliorated through appropriate regulation.  In
proposing a regulatory model for contemplating polygamy, this Article
also embraces a different framework for the intimacy recognition debates
more broadly.  For instance, a consequentialist approach to licensing dif-
ferent intimacy forms not only normalizes intimate associations, but also
normalizes a baseline of equality within them, which abolition does not.
A consequentialist approach also suggests why plural marriage might
be attractive to some intimates.  Arguments for gay marriage often rest on
sexual orientation—that object desire is innate.  The argument concludes
that people should not be excluded from marriage because of their ori-
entation.  In contrast, few claim that polygamy rests on an analogous sex-
ual orientation.286  Of course, for some their religious faith or cultural
norms dictate, or at least sanction, polygamy.  But beyond religious and
cultural mores, why might moving beyond intimate dyadicism be attrac-
tive to intimates?  Parts II and III of this Article focused on the disadvan-
tages polygamy engenders and how regulation might rectify them.  How-
ever, marital multiplicity could generate positives as well.
As noted earlier, some commentators have questioned the viability of
plural marriage from an efficiency perspective.  Mary Anne Case charac-
terizes this as a “collective action problem” that complicates dyadicism’s
model of easy and efficient reciprocity.287  Yet, we can also imagine that
spouses might find these heightened collective action costs to be vastly
outweighed by the benefits of a “portfolio of spouses,” not unlike the de-
cision to expand a partnership.288  There is a vast literature on specializa-
tion within the household and how it breaks down along gender lines.  A
portfolio of spouses might enable an even more efficient specialization
while also diffusing conventional gender dynamics associating men with
paid work outside the household and women with unpaid care work
286. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 24, at 350 (noting those who treat “polyamory as if it R
is hardwired” stand “[i]n contrast to the universalizing quality of mainstream discourse”);
see also Ruth Colker, Hybrid:  Bisexuals, Multiracials, and Other Misfits Under American
Law 1–8 (1996) (discussing hybrid identities); Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer,
Transitional Discrimination, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 651, 653–54, 664 (2009)
(criticizing anti-discrimination law for failing to capture how transitional identities can
remain inchoate).
287. Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note 18, at 1783–84 (identifying efficiency as R
“perhaps the best justification both for the state’s continuing involvement in licensing
marriage and the state’s ability, if it wishes, to stop at two in setting the number of partners
for a marriage”).
288. In fact, there are some fascinating potential analogs.  See, e.g., Zeitzen, supra
note 26, at 44 (discussing how in Inuit polygyny when first wife is barren or only has female R
children, she encourages polygamy); Jacoby, supra note 30, at 965 (“[W]ives are attracted R
to husbands on whose farms their labor is more productive.”).
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within it.289  Poly wives could negotiate among each other to accommo-
date a variety of interests arguably much more easily than mono wives can
negotiate with individual husbands.  Hence, plural marriage might allow
a family to better maximize their social insurance, defined narrowly as
benefits, earnings, and entitlements, and more broadly as the variety of
intimate care and support one could find in an extended family.
Polygamy’s numbers game can alter the dynamics within marriage in
another way as well.  In addition to allowing spouses to develop “spheres
of influence” or expertise, polygamy alters bargaining dynamics.  Much
noted are the effects of heterodyadic marriage and child-rearing on wo-
men—husbands do less and wives do more household labor, which en-
genders the much studied and documented “leisure gap.”  Polygamy al-
lows some women to evade these dynamics.  More bodies means the
ability to negotiate collectively for fair divisions of labor and responsibili-
ties.  Of course, anthropologists also have documented competition
among wives, as described in Part II.  Still, “cooperation” is the corollary
to “competition.”  In short, polygamy provides more bodies, both to sup-
port the household and to police shirking within it.
Finally, some wives in polygamous unions report the development of
genuine friendships.  Our culture embraces a dyadic model of romantic
intimacy.  Polygamy offers a different model of companionate marriage,
one in which spousal bonds do not necessarily rest on sexual attraction.
Fundamentalist Mormons might not be the only ones who disdain classic
companionate marriage with its (some might say disastrous) emphasis on
eternal, heterodyadic soulmates.  As noted in Part II, many radical femi-
nists envision communities and households of women.  This is not to say
that feminists with this political view would embrace polygamy.  It is to say
that there are alternative visions of intimacy, affection, and family, inten-
tional or incidental, that marital multiplicity might facilitate.  They need
not be normative to be real.  Hence polygamy provides a different vision
of the companionate model of marriage—a more expansive one that
does not limit itself to sexual intimacy with a single individual of the op-
posite sex.  In this sense, polygamy may indeed be a species of
polyamory.290
In sum, marital multiplicity could provide women with a variety of
benefits including friendship, a chance to develop their own capabilities,
and increased bargaining power to insist upon, among other things, a fair
division of labor.
289. A National Geographic profile of an FLDS community found that wives
“tend[ed] to carve out spheres of influence according to preference or aptitude.  Although
each has primary responsibility for her own children, one wife might manage the kitchen,
a second act as schoolteacher . . . and a third see to the sewing.”  Anderson, supra note 37, R
at 50.
290. See Emens, supra note 24, at 282 (“[W]hen Americans hear the term R
‘polygamy’ . . . they typically think of traditional polygyny . . . . But there is another
model—called ‘polyamory’ by its increasingly vocal practitioners.”).
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Put differently, while on its face polygamy might seem to perpetuate
what Gayle Rubin called the “traffic in women,” in fact, plural marital
associations with the legal norms described in Section III might offer wo-
men the opportunity to convert their status from that as “exchanged” to
“exchangers” in intimate marketplaces.291  Plural marital associations
might very well offer women the ability to fulfill their intimate desires,
which are undoubtedly more complex than the current dyadic regime
can possibly capture or accommodate.
CONCLUSION:  HOW BIG IS OUR LOVE?
Is it better to channel legal energy into continuing to root out, re-
press, and punish polygamy, or into admitting polygamy into the mar-
riage pantheon?  This Article concludes that the answer may hinge on
whether polygamy could be effectively regulated.  It has confronted po-
lygamy not as an abstract question of religious or intimacy liberty, but
rather as a set of actual relationships that, if licensed as a state-recognized
regime, would require regulation.  In considering what such a regulatory
scheme might look like, this Article has rejected the analogy between gay
and plural marriage as a red herring, a distraction from the fact that what
is truly distinctive (in the sense of being legally, as opposed to morally or
religiously distinctive) about polygamy is its multiplicity and its implica-
tions for how power is bargained for and distributed in marriage.  In con-
trast, same-sex marriage adheres to the two-person marital model (or at
least the vast majority of gay marriage advocates limit their support to
dyadic marriage).  Hence, this Article has hopefully put some brakes on
the slippery slope invocation and also contended that, if polygamy is le-
galized, it will warrant a distinct regulatory structure.
However, the Article also suggests that we could readily and easily
adapt norms from commercial partnership law to conceive of polygamy as
plural marital associations, ameliorating some of the costs and dilemmas
that open-ended multiplicity can generate while enabling its potential up-
sides.  Of course, a real and functioning marital regime would require far
more detail than an Article such as this one could possibly either antici-
pate or propose.  Still, merely grappling with how these proposed defaults
would alter plural marriage as currently practiced, and possibly affect dy-
adic marriage as well, is hopefully a worthy thought experiment.  Antici-
pating concerns, the Article contends that at least some of the harms and
costs of polygamy, particularly its effects on children, are not limited to
formal plural marriages, but rather are seen in what the Article has called
291. Rubin notes, “[i]f it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who
give and take them who are linked, the woman being a conduit of a relationship rather
than a partner to it.”  She continues, this “exchange of women” implies “a distinction
between gift and giver.  If women are the gifts, then it is men who are the exchange
partners.”  Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women:  Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex,
in Toward an Anthropology of Women 157, 174 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975) (footnote
omitted).
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serial and de facto polygamy as well.  These other forms of open-ended
intimate multiplicity are not only tolerated but legally protected, which
should raise some real questions for those who oppose legalizing
polygamy.
Moreover, these proposed defaults may very well resolve what the
Article described as the polygamy paradox.  At bottom, one of the biggest
concerns about polygamy is its effects on women’s well-being.  Economics
and bargaining scholars such as Becker and Posner have endorsed polyg-
amy as “good for women,” while many whose first principles are sex
equality remain skeptical.  Indeed, when viewed ex ante, from a “court-
ship” perspective, women may well be advantaged as a group as men com-
pete for multiple wives.  On the other hand, the bargaining dynamics ex
post, during the long life of the marriage itself, may very well disadvan-
tage plural spouses, particularly wives.  Neither those who advocate nor
those who oppose polygamy on gender grounds have grappled with how
regulatory norms might shape bargaining power in marital multiplicity.
If we vest plural intimates with rights, it then will be a (very tough) open
question as to whether they will exercise them in favor of their own self-
interest, or, rather, whether cultural and social norms will prevail.  If the
latter, is plural intimacy markedly different from dyadic?
Undoubtedly, some readers will remain skeptical that partnership
principles, designed to govern arms-length commercial formations, can
have anything meaningful to say about the bargaining uncertainties and
vulnerabilities generated in plural marriage.  Or that commercial norms
more generally are relevant to how we think about intimacy.  Others may
adhere to a prior reticence that the state should not license intimacy at
all.  I have real empathy with both of these concerns.  After all, the goals
of commercial partnerships, profit-making, and marriage, nurturing com-
panionship and building a family, are different.  In addition, as Martha
Fineman and others have pointed out, family law may best achieve its
goals by supporting vertical relations of dependency, not intervening in
the lives of consensual “horizontal” intimates.292  What all of these posi-
tions share is an underlying skepticism about what we might think of as
the economics of intimacy.  Although the literature on household bar-
gaining is robust, many legal scholars still resist the notion that private
law could have much to say about distributive justice within the house-
hold.  Perhaps unthinkingly, many legal scholars continue to embrace
the public/private distinction, concluding that law should not view inti-
mate relations as economic ones.  This Article has challenged this segre-
gation of market and intimate norms, suggesting that the bargaining dy-
namics and justice concerns are similar.
U.S. legal feminism is coming late to debates about polygamy.  The
current president of South Africa, a polygamist, urges it as a weapon in
292. See supra notes 20, 108, and 279 (describing Fineman’s theory of inevitable R
dependency and how to best support it).
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the country’s battle against AIDS, and the First Lady of France, Carla
Bruni-Sarkozy, has declared it preferable to monogamy.293  South Africa’s
recent recognition of customary marriages included polygamy.  The
Canadian government has commissioned studies on whether it should be
legalized.  Even in places as unexpected as rural Russia, people have also
begun to lobby for recognition of the practice.294  My intention here is
not to advocate for polygamy, but to show it as a serious topic of legal and
policy debates, not just fun television.  As one practitioner of plural mar-
riage stressed to me, polygamy is not for everyone, and probably not for
most.  But then, marriage is not for some at all.  The question is not
whether any of us would enter plural marriage, but whether we should
prohibit others from doing so.295  And, I argue, this boils down to a ques-
tion of whether we can effectively regulate it consistent with social goals
of egalitarianism and fairness in intimate relationships.  Can we even con-
sider it?  The answers lie in our response to the question, how big is our
love?
293. Ms. Bruni “has said that ‘love lasts a long time, but burning desire, two or three
weeks.’  She is monogamous from time to time, as she remarked to the magazine Le Figaro
Madame.  ‘But I prefer polygamy and polyandry,’ she said.”  Guy Trebay, The French
President’s Lover, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2008, at ST1.  The new president of South Africa,
Jacob Zuma, is a polygamist, with three wives and a fiance´e at the time of his election.  In a
recent interview, endorsing his new and aggressive campaign against AIDS, President
Zuma made the controversial point that “a polygamous marriage in which H.I.V. is openly
discussed is safer than a monogamous union in which a man has hidden mistresses.”  Celia
W. Dugger, In South Africa, an Unlikely Leader on AIDS, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2010, at A1;
see also Michael Allen, Altared State:  Who’s the First Lady When the President’s a
Polygamist?, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 2009, at A1.  As the Wall Street Journal said, “It’s ‘Big Love,’
South African style.”  The Journal quoted Zuma as saying “There are plenty of politicians
who have mistresses and children that they hide so as to pretend that they’re
monogamous. . . . I prefer to be open.  I love my wives and I’m proud of my children.”  Id.
294. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.).  See generally
Gumede v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2009 (3) BCLR 243 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding
customary marriages entered into prior to Customary Marriages Act are still subject to
equal division of assets); BHE v. Magistrate 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 593 (S. Afr.)
(declaring unconstitutional provisions of Black Administration Act that did not recognize
inheritance rights of widows in customary marriages and extra-marital children).  In
Russia, where there is “ ‘[a]n insufficiency of men, educated women who want to realise
themselves, rural women who want to protect themselves, all these things are going to give
rise to arrangements like polygyny, whether it’s called that or not.’”  Mira Katbamna, Half
a Good Man Is Better Than None at All, The Guardian, Oct. 27, 2009, at 13 (quoting
Caroline Humphrey, Professor of Anthropology at Cambridge University).
295. Columnist John Tierney said of Big Love’s depiction of polygamy, “It looks more
like what it really is:  an arrangement that can make sense for some people in some
circumstances.”  Tierney, supra note 63. R
